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Foreword
With a population of more than 250 million people and a notable strategic
position between the North and South, the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) constitutes a distinct region of the developing world. Its future
development is a matter of crucial importance to the world and to Canada.
As an organization that funds research for development and helps the
countries of the South to strengthen their research capacity, IDRC needs to
listen as much and as often as possible to researchers, development workers
and policymakers.
We need to understand the context for decision-making in developing
countries. This includes the research environment — by which we mean the
institutional, human, and financial resources involved in research, their
linkages to other parts of society, and to those doing related research in other
countries and regions. Also included is how developing countries see the
priorities for the research agenda. From our point of view, this interaction
should ensure that the strategy we pursue is attuned to the realities of the
countries and institutions we work with, and that the research we support
addresses at least some key issues.
We have a number of ways in which we carry out this consultative
interaction. We are fortunate that, at the level of the governance of IDRC, we
have a Board of Governors with members from all regions of the world who
set IDRC policy and strategy, and who have a broad overview of their region.
We have seven regional offices in major regions of the world. In part, they
remind us of the realities and priorities of the countries with which they
work. Our program staff, based in regional offices or Ottawa spend a lot of
time "on the road", meeting with their peers in the South on particular
projects, as well as on broader issues of development and research.
We do, however, very much need and benefit from more formal
occasions to consult with development actors, researchers and policymakers
in the South. This enables us to hear their perspectives on development
experience and problems, and to understand how they perceive that research
makes a difference, and to gain insight into the areas they think provides
particular promise.
This meeting provided us with just such an opportunity, and I am very
grateful to all who have accepted the invitation to participate and to share
their ideas and experience with us. Since we at IDRC were in the process of
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reviewing our strategic and program framework for the next three-to-five
years, the timing of this particular consultation was excellent, and the papers
and discussion certainly provided valuable ideas and insights.
There are several aspects of the Arab region that we need to consider
in channeling our consultations:
The vast majority of the population in the region suffers from acute
development problems.
The region continues to entertain a poor competitive position in the
global economy. Income from rents and consumer-oriented industries still
predominates over income from productive enterprises. The context of
market globalization and the gradual withdrawal of the state from the
social and economic sectors encourages an environment of weak national
planning and inefficient management of national budgets.
GDP growth and integration in the world economy have not
been paralleled by social and human development. An estimated 100
million people live in poverty, without sufficient income to obtain a
nutritionally adequate diet. Rising unemployment, growing social
inequalities, and serious quantitative and qualitative retreats in the
delivery of social services in education, health, and housing are
creating social and political tensions.
Environmental degradation and accrued depletion of water and
arable land are working against economic growth, food and water
security, and qualitative human and social development.
The weakness of representative, accountable, and democratic
governments in addition to bureaucratic bottlenecks threaten already
bleak development prospects. Indeed, the Algerian experience carries
dangers of regional and international spillovers.
There are numerous potentials for sustained economic growth, social
development, environmental protection, and democratic governance.
Arab countries have now begun to implement economic reforms
to stimulate private investment, spur economic growth, support the
transition to a market economy and improve living standards. There
are efforts to redefine national strategies, and to engage in administra-
tive reforms to induce the intervention of a variety of actors in the
development process and to combat poverty.
Public agendas are now emerging — and gaining momentum —
on the need to balance economic growth and environmental protection,
and for the effective and rational mobilization of existing natural
resources.
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Arab countries are also undergoing a political transition through
the mainstreaming of elections, policy dialogues and other moves
towards the liberalization of politics. More active civil societies are
encouraged, and human rights issues are reaching public visibility.
Due to its strategic position, the region has important and long-
standing trade ties with the rest of the world. It is in a privileged
position to act as a social, political, and cultural bridge between the
North and South.
Regional integration and linkages are of great importance.
Despite obvious differences within and between countries, the
region is cemented by a number of common characteristics related to
its distinctive climate, ecology, history, language and culture, which
permeate its social fabric, development aspirations, and quest for a
meaningful future.
Developmental solutions (always linked to social, cultural, and
historical factors) must take into account this regional distinctiveness
and cohesiveness. The potential of the region and opportunities for
development interventions can be enormously strengthened through
concerted, cooperative, regional efforts. For example, globalization has
forced Arab countries to negotiate their worldwide economic
integration on an individual basis, weakening both their collective and
individual potential. Limited regional economic trade connectivity and
cooperation is blocking complementarities in the resource base and
potential economies of sale, and is deterring both foreign investment
and successful local enterprise.
Integration is of crucial importance in the field of
communication and information technology (ICT). Despite advances in
the availability of hardware and accessories, and despite a gradual
easing of tariff barriers and taxation policies, the lack of a systematic
dissemination strategy in Arabic prohibits effective and cumulative
regional activities and knowledge. This makes it difficult for the region
to keep up with the rest of the world in the ICT field, to connect to
international development debates, and to provide an enriching
contribution to international development forums.
Integration plays a role in environment and society-building.
Environmental problems are becoming increasingly connected at a
regional level, thereby compelling common solutions and strategies.
Social problems and issues of democratic governance can be more
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effectively addressed through exchange and dialogue. Successful
models of these types of communication and dialogue exist but are not
easily accessible.
Many of the salient features of the research environment in the Arab
world are shared in other regions: the lack of institutionalized or well-
defined public, national and regional research strategies; problems
associated with the dispersion of research; inadequate national funding;
weak research management; weak scientific and research capacity; and
restrictions in terms of independent inquiry, and data access and
collection.
There are research gaps in several development fields that need
immediate intervention. These include the new role of the state in a
context of privatization and liberalization; avenues of employment and
poverty alleviation; improving the quality of education and health
provision; industrial development; information and communication
technologies; the management of natural resources in the areas of
sustainable and biotechnological agricultural production; water use and
waste management; successful models of democratic governance.
These are the most important fields in which to begin work.
There is a growing need to rethink research within coherent
national and regional strategies, and within adapted conceptual
frameworks. Research results need to be published, disseminated and
circulated so that researchers and research institutions can exchange
ideas and build on cumulative knowledge, and adjust to needs and to
well-thought-out development priorities. Several experiences of
cooperation in the region pave the way for such linkages.
IDRC has developed a niche in research fields which can
contribute to the R&D needs of the region. Current research exists on
such topics as the development of micro, small, and medium-sized
enterprises (MSMEs), the future of welfare, the mechanisms
addressing social justice, the empowering processes of social
participation, the sustainable management of natural resources,
technology transfer, democratic governance, as well as on policy
formulation and reforms. These research endeavors have been
supported by IDRC to diverse institutions of the regions.
IDRC has also linked its support to research with a capacity-
building, dissemination- and policy-reform component. IDRC
continues to play a role in initiating, promoting, and strengthening
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research linkages and innovative partnerships within the region, as well
as between the region and international bodies.
This meeting represents one such effort.
• Last, but not least, is the question of genuine peace in the region,
which remains plagued by a turbulent modern history, protracted
conflicts and political instability. This particularly relates to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which not only impedes development
avenues in Palestine, but, to varying degrees, in the whole region. A
mutually satisfactory resolution could lead to a very different climate
for sustainable development, economic growth, and political stability.
IDRC's involvement in peace-building in the region has taken
diverse channels.
With the launching of the peace process, IDRC undertook to
provide an Expert and Advisory Service to the Canadian government's
input in the multilateral track of the peace process concerning refugees,
the environment, water, and regional economic development.
The refugee issue needs a strong and systematic base of research
and policy strategies to empower stakeholders to undertake action once
the final-status talks move into full operation. IDRC is giving specific
attention to this question, due in part to Canada's role in the Refugee
Working Group in the multilateral negotiations.
Furthermore, IDRC is supporting research and analysis on issues
of particular relevance to achieving peace. Examples include
cooperation projects between Palestinians and Israelis on natural
resource management and on pressing environmental problems.
Because of the Palestinian development context, IDRC is now
formulating a strategy to ensure more concerted and consolidated
program-delivery in Palestine, directed toward the questions of state-
building, democratic governance, and peace.
This meeting provided us with a great opportunity to consult each
other so as to address the challenges before us.
Maureen O'Neil
President
International Development Research Centre
Ottawa, Canada
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Opening Address
Mme President, distinguished presenters, researchers, chers amis et
collègues:
It is indeed my welcome duty and pleasure today to open this
important meeting on development and research trends in the Middle East
and North Africa. Let me start by wishing you a very warm welcome and by
thanking the IDRC for asking me to take part in this occasion.
J'aimerais profiter de 1'occasion pour dire quelques mots au sujet du
Centre de Recherches Pour le Developpement International, IDRC comme
on le connaît. Done parler en temps d'une institution canadienne, J'aimerais
aussi commenter en plus sur 1'importance des travaux que vous entrepreniez
ces deux jours ici au Caire.
I stress IDRC as a Canadian institution in spite of its international
pedigree — not just because I happen to be the Canadian Ambassador — but
because IDRC has at least two particularly Canadian characteristics. One is
internationalism, the other is modesty. Though Canadian-funded, its
internationalism is ensured not only in its mandate, but also in its direction
through an international board. As a middle-power sharing the North
American Continent with the now-remaining world superpower, we
recognize that an international outlook and presence is critical for Canada.
IDRC is a manifestation of that outlook; one in which I take particular pride.
However, this is not to say that IDRC's role is to promote Canadian
government policy; quite the opposite. With its international board, it is
independent of the Government of Canada and guards that independence
jealously. I have to say, however, that its very creation, independence,
purpose and style — particularly its democratic and open approach — reflect
the values of the people of Canada. In that sense, IDRC is a very Canadian
institution.
It is also very Canadian with regard to one of its other characteristics:
its modesty. By international standards, Canadians have a tendency not to
make a great public fuss about their achievements. And IDRC is no
exception. IDRC is very active in sharing its findings within the
development-research community. But how many of the general public,
government officials, the media in the Middle East or elsewhere appreciate
the tremendous contributions IDRC has made to development research in the
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several key areas you will be discussing in the next two days? From
macroeconomics, communications, environment to MSMEs, to governments
and democratization, IDRC has shared information generously with all.
En tous les cas, je profite de cette occasion et de la presence de
Maureen O'Neil pour remercier IDRC de tout ce qu'ils ont fait et de les
encourager a ne pas continuer a être si typiquement modeste a la Canadienne
car ils ont beaucoup de quoi être fiers.
These are all obviously intrinsically important matters in their own
right. However, as it has been mentioned in some of the papers I have
reviewed, in this region there seems to be a particular problem with
delinkage between research and policy settings. And in some cases, there
remains a certain difficulty in access to information that makes the
researcher's role doubly challenging. In that sense, in spite of the hard work
of many researchers (including many of you here today), this region has not
yet benefited fully from the fruits of development research. Certainly not to
the degree that it could, nor to the degree that other regions have achieved.
There is a popular image, in the West at least, of the researcher or scholar
being housed in an ivory tower, devoiced from reality, pursuing archaic
subjects for their own sake. This is certainly not the case here, because your
subject matter is literally of life and death importance to your communities.
The problem seems to be how to take your findings and ensure that they are
considered while making policies and implementing programs.
Perhaps part of the answer lies in reaching out, to work more closely
with other elements of society: with government officials, the media, NGOs,
communities, schools, and professional groups. I think by being as open as
possible ourselves, by disseminating findings widely through the media and
other mechanisms, by encouraging public debate, and by building networks
and teaming up with practitioners and policymakers, perhaps we can
encourage others to do likewise. That is the challenge I leave with you, who
know your country well.
For ourselves within the Embassy here in Cairo, through the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA), we are trying in our modest
Canadian way to address this issue by seeking ways to link our development
activities in Egypt more closely with the research knowledge of IDRC. For
the moment, we are concentrating on two areas of mutual interest: MSME
development, and water resources. We believe that IDRC and the extensive
network of national, regional, and international research to whom they are
linked have a great deal to teach us in such areas as policy for MSME
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development and water resource utilization. Perhaps we, through CIDA, can
help build bridges between researchers, policymakers, and practitioners in
these areas.
In any event, the subjects you are covering in this meeting are both
very interesting and very important. I will only ask, as you discuss the
development in research environment and trends in the Middle East and
North Africa, that you consider also how this environment and these trends
can be built upon or modified to ensure that the good work you are doing will
have a real and positive impact on the people of the region, especially those
that are mostly disadvantaged.
Je ne pourrai pas être avec vous pendant ces deux jours mais on me
promet que je vais lire les papiers et que j'aurai les informations sur les
rèsultats de vos discussions. En attendant, je vous donne tous mes souhaits
pour une reunion très stimulante et très productive.
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introduction
Eglal Racked and Dina Craissati
In a recent article by Mohamed El-Sayed Said, Deputy Director of the
Egyptian Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, on the state of
research and development (R&D) in Egypt, the disparity between the size
and quality of the scientific community on one hand and its productivity on
the other is deplored (El-Sayed Said 1999). Despite Egypt's impressive
numbers of highly qualified academics and researchers in the theoretical and
applied sciences (125 000 to 150 000), and despite a massive body of
scientific and technological research centres, performance indicators in R&D
are at best rudimentary. Research has been characterized by negligence and
anachronism for more than three decades. It lacks clear and viable visions
and strategies, creativity, efficient management, and faces enormous
financial difficulties. The challenge is identified in the formulation of a
courageous policy and the institution of innovative reforms entailing
academic autonomy and ingenuity, high standards of research and
management, an effective agenda linked to development demands and needs
as well as to university curricula. Foremost, what is needed is the
optimization of governmental constructive intentions, and commitments to
reviving R&D in Egypt.
Such an analysis does not pertain only to Egypt; indeed it represents
the impetus for this book (and the workshop it is based on) to reappraise the
state of R&D, and to a lesser degree that of science and technology (S&T), in
the Arab region. It also explores the challenges ahead in this period of
intense social, economic, political, and environmental and technological
mutations. In January 1999, Canada's International Development Research
Centre (IDRC), through its Middle East and North Africa Regional Office
(MERO), initiated and organized a workshop on the "Challenges and
Opportunities of Research for Development in the Arab region", in which it
invited partners and experts to examine and exchange ideas and information
associated with the issue. Aside from the urgent need to reassess R&D in the
Arab world, the workshop also came at a moment in which IDRC is defining
its future strategic directions and programming for the years 2000 and
beyond, and whereby the Centre seeks the active involvement and input of its
partners. This consultation has been precious. It has highlighted major
1
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research problems and identified development disparities in the Arab world.
But most important, it has underscored the immense potential of the region
and constructive ways whereby IDRC can contribute to an R&D program
which is designed to cope with contemporary risks.
R&D and S&T in MEN A
In line with the flourishing of civil society institutions in the 1990s, the Arab
world has witnessed a proliferation of research and academic institutions, as
well as NGOs performing research, particularly in Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine,
Tunisia and Morocco. Four thousand academic departments in the region at
university and college levels perform research: about half in the natural
sciences, and half in the humanities and social sciences (Qasem 1998). In a
parallel way, the number of university graduates in the Arab world doubled
between 1985 and 1995 (Sid-Ahmed 1999a). Furthermore, Arab
governments are showing good faith in making genuine efforts to place R&D
and science and technology (S&T) high on their agenda. Recently— and
symbolically at the threshold of the new millennium — the world turned its
eyes towards Egypt's technological talent and performance when the
Egyptian scientist Ahmad Zuwail was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry
for his new laser technique discovery.
Although these evolutions demonstrate a valuable stock, the progress
of R&D and S&T in the region lies at a very critical and fragile juncture.
Many of the salient features and problems of the research environment in the
Arab world are common to those of other developing regions. However,
some scholars point out that the Arab region is flagging farthest behind. Four
major problems pertaining to producing, accessing, and using knowledge in
the region can be identified: the lack of research visions and strategies; weak
research performance and management; financial instabilities; and the
absence of an autonomous and liberal research environment.
In the Arab world, S&T in general, and R&D in particular, are not
institutionalized. Nor are they part of well-defined, coherent public/national
and regional research strategies or pertinent conceptual frameworks. Ongoing
research lacks a solid infrastructure of basic science on which to draw. It is
scattered, plagued by redundancy, duplication, and absence of serious and
effective coordination. It is often neither published or disseminated, nor
circulated within a process where researchers and research institutions can
exchange, dialogue, build on cumulative knowledge, or adjust to changing
development requirements and priorities. In addition, the type of recent
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research conducted in the region has been a direct response to donor initiatives,
and ad hoc commissioned and packaged contracts — which emphasize applied
and short term outputs. Consequently, research has been adjusting to
unsynchronized needs and demands. Finally, there is no recognition that the
revitalizing of research requires the rethinking of educational approaches and
of cultural frames of reference (Sid-Ahmed 1999a).
Research in the Arab world also suffers from serious pitfalls in
qualitative performance, particularly in the development of conceptual
orientations and paradigms, in multi- and inter-disciplinary approaches, in
the methodology and production of statistical surveys, and in
computerization. The link between research and practices of economic,
scientific, and social development is very weak and action-oriented research
not well articulated. The inability of undertaking productive teamwork to
achieve the needed synergies in research has been identified as a major
handicap in producing qualitative outputs (Sid-Ahmed 1999a). Research
management has been also influenced by decades of experiences with
crippling bureaucracies that have hindered creativity and enterprise. Finally,
despite the development of online research resources, electronic information
networks, and local Internet providers in the region, the weakness of Arab
countries in ICT stands out.
In 1995, the Arab states spent 0.2% of their gross national expenditures on
R&D (in contrast to the average 3% spent by all states in the world). The
increasing numbers of university graduates are not matched by budgetary
allocations to higher education and it is onerous to speak about return on
investment in academic research (Sid-Ahmed 1999a). In addition, liberalization
and privatization politics have created problems of sustained national and
international funding. Public research institutions and institutions of higher
education are becoming seriously under-funded and impoverished. Although the
role of the private sector in knowledge production is increasing, it is not
achieving its full potential and not coordinating with national institutions.
With rare exceptions, the conduct of research in the Arab world is
restricted in terms of independent inquiry, data access and collection,
exchange and dissemination. The situation of research is rudimentary when
the production of knowledge touches on politically sensitive issues. In such
cases, the publication of official data is censored and access to media is
effectively prohibited. Specifically in this regard, critical social science is
very difficult to undertake. Consequently the connection of research to
advocacy and to informing and influencing government policies is very weak
and lobby channels are not effective.
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MENA's critical development crises
Such a state of research is all the more alarming in view of its incompatibility
with the requirements of the rapid changes, high risks, and difficult
challenges brought about by globalizing trends and scientific/technological
innovations in diverse fields of development. Like the other developing
regions of the world, the Arab region suffers from acute development
problems which have not been fully assessed, and which require systematic
appreciation and study.
Over the past decades, the region has been undergoing a hasty transition
from centrally planned economies to structural adjustment policies. These
include the liberalization of markets, privatization of state industries, cut-backs
on state welfare, and decentralization. The gradual withdrawal of the state from
the social and economic sectors has not been accompanied by the necessary
bureaucratic and administrative reforms. Instead it permits weak national
planning and inefficient management of national budgets. Moreover, the
withdrawal has not been matched by an effective mobilization of existing
resources (particularly the private sector). Although GDP growth is sustained,
it has not been balanced by social and human development. In this book, Nader
Fergany underlines the gravity of poverty: according to 1997 UNDP estimates,
90 to 100 million Arabs (out of a total Arab population of about 250 million)
live in poverty and do not possess sufficient income to obtain a nutritionally
adequate diet, nor essential non-food requirements. As well, Max Rodenbeck
elaborates on social and political tensions emerging due to rising
unemployment, growing social inequalities, new forms of exclusion and
income concentration. The high degree of social stress is aggravated by serious
qualitative retreats in the delivery of social services in education, health, and
housing. He observes that women and youth are particularly hit.
Despite sustained indicators of — and systematic improvements in —
economic growth, the region continues to entertain a poor competitive
position in the global economy. Income from rents and consumer-oriented
industries still predominates over productive enterprise. Regional and
national economic trade connectivity and cooperation is limited, blocking
economies of scale and regional economic integration, while deterring both
foreign investment and successful local enterprises. This is particularly a
point of concern with regard to Israel's economic vantage in the region and
the resulting tensions that hinder collaboration.
In addition, the Arab region faces enormous difficulties in keeping up
with the swift advancements in ICT. As indicated in Sherif Reda Hashem's
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paper, during the last two decades, several national and international
initiatives were implemented in the MENA region to support the spread of
ICTs. There are advancements in terms of availability of hardware and
accessories, and there is a gradual easing of tariff barriers and taxation
policies. However, for a wide range of political, regulatory, financial,
technical, social and cultural reasons, the trend is slow and the region
continues to lie far behind in terms of access, connectivity and usage.
National information systems remain inadequate and comprehensive national
archives and databases are non-existent. Access and usage are limited to
major cities and institutions, and to the elite; this is contributing to increasing
the gap between rich and poor, and to constraining development efforts.
Finally, there is a poor appreciation of the development potential of ICTs —
hence no related national and regional policies exist.
Correspondingly, the weakness of representative, accountable, and
democratic governments pose bleak threats to development. Despite the
mainstreaming of elections and other moves towards the liberalization of
politics, these progressed too quickly within a top-down approach. They
were not able to consolidate into genuine democratic experiences, nor
develop a democratic political culture. In addition, bureaucratic bottlenecks,
patronage networks, and serious violations of human rights continue to be
reported. Using the Moroccan case in this book as an example, Mohamed
Tozy sheds interesting light upon the limits and democratic potential of the
recent governmental alternation.
The absence of clear mechanisms for the transfer of power increase the
risks of instability in this region, which is already loaded with several areas
of political conflict. The Arab-Israeli case, which is at a critical juncture and
unlikely to result in a just settlement, raises important questions about the
prospects for peace and about its repercussions on sustainable economic and
technological development— not to mention on disputes over natural
resources, especially water.
Indeed, economic liberalism needs not only to be balanced by social and
economic justice; environmental protection must now be added to the equation
of sustainable development.1 As underlined in the section on natural resource
management, MENA's water security represents a critical issue: renewable fresh
1 Pierre-Marc Johnson and Andre Beaulieu, "The Road to a Better World", The Globe
and Mail (30 December, 1999) argue, like many others, that the failure of the WTO to agree
on the agenda of a new trade liberalization round in Seattle is rooted in its neglect of
addressing social and environmental issues.
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water will barely cover basic human needs in the future. It is expected that within
one lifetime (1960 to 2025) per capita renewable supplies will have fallen from
3 430 to 667 cubic meters. Furthermore, water quality is deteriorating due to a
combination of low river levels, inadequate treatment, agricultural runoffs, and
uncontrolled effluent from industries. The aridity of several areas is compounded
by a continuing depletion and degradation of land resources, leading to large and
growing food deficits. Together with other aspects of environmental degradation
(specifically, industrial and air pollution), these problems are working against
economic growth, and human and social development. There is a dire and
pressing requirement to invest seriously in capital, but even more in developing
effective and forceful strategies of integrated rural development, and
environment and natural resources management.
MENA's solid potentials
In her keynote address during the workshop, Heba Handoussa flags the
argument (though not in the same sequence): "The MENA region is at once
ahead and behind the development challenge." The region holds solid
opportunities for development interventions. It is rich in key natural
resources (oil and minerals). Its notable strategic geographic position is a
privilege, for MENA engages in important trade with the rest of the world
and acts as a social, political, and cultural bridge between North and South.
In addition, as Handoussa mentions, the declining rates in population growth
are opening doors to effective implementations of socioeconomic reforms.
The potential of the region lies beyond national endeavors. Nader
Fergany insists that the region's output can be enormously strengthened
through concerted cooperative regional efforts. Regional economic trade
connectivity and cooperation can realize complementarities in the resource
base and even achieve economies of sale; it can encourage both foreign
investment and successful local enterprise, and can strengthen the national as
well as regional base in negotiating worldwide economic integration. In the
field of ICTs, capitalization on common language can facilitate effective and
cumulative knowledge-dissemination. And regional cooperation can
unequivocally benefit the environment because the regional connection of
environmental problems compels common solutions and strategies.
In addition, there is a notable evolution in the thinking of all
development actors on the need to revise their development visions and
interventions. Arab countries have now begun to redefine national strategies
and to engage in economic reforms that stimulate private investment and spur
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economic growth, but which also combat poverty and improve living
standards. More active civil societies are encouraged, while human rights and
democratic issues are capturing public interest. Public agendas are now
emerging and gaining momentum on the need to balance economic growth
and environmental protection, and for the effective and rational mobilization
of existing natural resources.
As noted by Mohamed Sid-Ahmed in the Al-Ahram Weekly, the last
Nobel Prize for Chemistry in the preceding millennium was awarded to an
Egyptian who achieved a scientific breakthrough in a "foreign" environment
(Zuwail's work on lasers was undertaken at the California Institute of
Technology), (Sid-Ahmed 1999b). In his paper included in this book, Sid-
Ahmed makes a remark which lies at the base of the challenges discussed
during the conference: It is high time to embark on the needed shakeup to
ensure that outstanding contributions to science in this new millennium are
realized in an "Egyptian" context.
A modest contribution
The collection of articles and interventions in this book represents a modest
effort to think the needed shakeup in the R&D field, and the ways whereby
research in and for MENA can effectively contribute to sustainable
development. In line with the IDRC tradition of engaging in dialogue with its
partners around emerging development trends and priorities, the book is also
intended to serve as a tool for IDRC programming and intervention in the
Arab region and as a resource base on development, research, and policy
issues. Furthermore, it is part of IDRC efforts at disseminating precious
research and expert outputs related to R&D. And last but not least, it
represents an important IDRC endeavor of initiating, promoting and
strengthening research linkages and innovative partnerships within the
region, as well as between the region and international bodies.
Five documents have been commissioned as a preparation for the
workshop and represent the book's main contributions. The first three — by
Max Rodenbeck, Nader Fergany and Saad Eddin Ibrahim — give a detailed
portrait of the development and research environment in the Arab region.
The two other documents by Karima Korayem and by Driss Khrouz (in
collaboration with AH Hajji and Mohamed Boussetta) take the consultation
on the research environment at the level of case studies on Egypt and
Morocco. The five documents constitute Part I of this book together with a
sharp keynote address on the topic by Heba Handoussa.
On the other hand, Part n discusses the R&D environment in the Arab
world via three specific issues: socioeconomic development (with the specific
entry points on the politics of MSMEs and on issues of governance related to
the recent democratic transition in Morocco); approaches to environment and
natural resources management; and the integration of the Arab region in global
knowledge networks. Five resource persons were commissioned to make
interventions in the different fields (Galal Amin, Tamer El-Meehy, Mohamed
Tozy, Mohamed Kassas and Sherif Reda Hashem). These have been edited and
are followed by brief interventions by IDRC officers who reviewed some
current IDRC-MENA activities in these sectors.
At the end of Part I, as well as at the end of each of the three sections of
Part n, we have tried to review the discussion points of particular relevance.
Part El, the conclusion, focuses on highlighting points representing major
concerns and recommendations for IDRC (and others) in order for work to
continue in the region.
We would like to thank all those who have participated in the content
of this work (whether through articles or through their contribution in the
discussions). If a dedication is to be made, then it goes to those whose
relentless engagement to genuine development in the region represents a
precious potential. A list of the workshop participants is provided at the end
of the book. Our gratitude also goes to the IDRC MERO staff who gave
invaluable organizational and administrative support.
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The new millennium is less than a year away. It marks a time for introspection,
projection, and reappraisal of achievements and mistakes. A time to reflect on
what we, as social scientists, have contributed to development — and where
we have failed in our mission.
Donors have evolved in their thinking: large foundations, multilateral
and regional development institutions as well as donor governments are
increasingly aware of the complexity of the process of development. They
are equally cognizant of the need to support integrated programs that cover
social services and infrastructure, community development and participation,
as well as decentralization and governance. For example, the pioneering
work of United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has helped to focus
interest on the various social, economic, and political elements that mitigate
against progress on the human development front. It has also developed
competition and dialogue among public bodies, and local grass roots leaders.
New terms are continuously being introduced into our vocabulary by
development practitioners: empowerment, partnership, and inclusion. Each
point to the emerging consensus on the importance of engaging the ultimate
beneficiaries of development programs in the design and implementation
stages of programs.
Think-tanks and research institutions are also revising their agendas.
One can discern an increasing awareness among social scientists from any
one discipline regarding the urgent need to borrow the approach and tools of
other disciplines, to consult the broader literature on the many facets and
dimensions of development, to pursue research programs that are closer to
the practical concerns of policymakers, and to provide concrete and holistic
solutions to the complex problems of development. Research results over the
past decade are key to our understanding of the intimate relationship between
the many variables that concern the development challenge, from
globalization and its technological ramifications, poverty and its
socioeconomic determinants, to sustainable growth and protection of the
environment. It is cross-disciplinary research that emphasizes such issues as
the importance of women's human capital endowment in determining a
household's education outcome, the role of institutions in determining the
competitiveness of industries and nations, and the impact of the process of
knowledge acquisition on the pace with which agents and countries are
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catching up. But much more is needed from social scientists if they are to
have a significant weight in influencing the decision-making process so as to
ensure that practical research results and policy options translate to
comprehensive reform on the national agendas of our countries.
Where does this region stand on the development front? What are its
prospects?
The MENA region is at once ahead and behind the development
challenge. Ahead in the sense that on average, governments of the region are
relatively well endowed in access to resources because petroleum and
mineral wealth earn above-average revenues. Such money can potentially be
allocated to priority areas: this is one positive potential. Another is that a
major demographic transition has commenced, providing another potential
gift, a "once-in-a-nation's-lifetime" opportunity to capitalize on the decline
in fertility and population growth.
On the other hand, MENA lags far behind other developing regions.
On the technological front; educational access, education and training
quality, the productivity of workers, and the efficiency of enterprises —
again on the performance of MENA in restructuring its economies to meet
with the quickly-changing trends in the international economy. MENA has
done very poorly in preparing itself for the many threats and opportunities of
globalization.
The challenge of globalization is fourfold. First of all, competition has
moved from exclusive leadership in product invention and innovation, to
competition for process-technology. This includes organization, management,
production systems, inventory control, and marketing. Secondly, dynamic
industries are no longer dominated by natural resources — petroleum, metals,
minerals— and key-growth sectors (apart from services) are manufacturing
industries based on electronics, new materials, biotechnology and chemicals.
Thirdly, the revolution in information and communications still unfolds at an
amazing pace, and its implications are reduced costs of transactions, coupled
with the ease with which trade, finance, and production decisions can be taken.
Finally, international trade has been growing at a much faster pace than world
output, fueled by the demolition of trade barriers and the operation of trans-
national corporations (TNCs) and their global networks. In turn, the growth in
trade has become the primary engine of GDP growth for those emerging
economies that are catching up and whose incomes are converging with those
of the advanced nations. Foreign direct investment (FDI) growth has outpaced
that of world trade, while global capital flows to developing countries have
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dramatically declined. Thus, FDI has become a major vehicle for accessing
capital, technology and export markets.
As a result of globalization the role of the state is changing. It is
shifting from producer and planner to facilitator and arbitrator. The "model"
state is no longer dominating the market. Instead, it pursues an explicit or
implicit industrial policy, targeting sectors with dynamic advantage and
promoting clustering of enterprises into formal production networks. It is
reforming its administrative and legislative structure, while promoting the
reduction of transactions cost so that private agents can expand their
operations. It is revising its social contract and encouraging the process of
democratization. The "model" state is also retrenching from those activities
that can better be performed by the private sector. But, at the same time, it is
redeploying its resources in favor of social spending for the poor. Only few
MENA countries are seeing serious work on all fronts, but such work will
truly transform the state into the model that is needed for the next
millennium.
Poverty remains at the heart of the development challenge. Economic
growth and technological progress are proceeding at varying if slow paces in
most of our MENA countries, and yet we can observe that the poverty gap is
growing both in relative and absolute terms. Economic reform and structural
adjustment programs have been accompanied by major reductions in public
investment and social spending in those areas that touch the poor most
directly, including significant cutbacks in food and energy subsidies, and in
the development of infrastructure in poor regions. The departure of a strong
and dominant public sector has meant fewer jobs for the educated middle and
lower classes, and inferior work conditions in the informal sector.
Meanwhile, higher unemployment due to structural adjustment is
accompanied by a decline in the living standards of a sizeable proportion of
households. Such a decline directly affects the extended family system.
The poor have relatively larger household sizes and experience higher
unemployment rates, especially for women. In fact, studies for Egypt and
other MENA countries show that women tend to be the first victims of
economic reform, not only in terms of losing jobs but also in being pulled out
of the education system. It has been shown that women suffer from a
chronically low participation rate in the MENA labor forces, and that
households headed by women are much more highly represented among the
poor in urban and rural regions. The severity of the problem of poverty
cannot be overstated. Those who suffer are not only those in our present, but
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also in our future generations. What is at stake is the social cohesion of the
nations in the region; their breakdown seriously threatens stability and invites
both extremist and fundamentalist expansion.
Unfortunately, social scientists have so far excelled at characterizing
the many facets of poverty but have failed to converge in providing a
comprehensive policy agenda to resolve the problem at its roots. More of this
typical and narrowly focused type of research will only confirm the
inextricable links between the characteristics of the poor with reference to
their consumption, savings, and reproductive behavior on one hand, and their
access to education, health and employment opportunities on the other.
What is sorely needed is quality, micro-level research into the behavior
of the poor, and into the mechanisms that can work to deliver social services
and technical extension so as to maximize on the response of households and
micro-enterprises in accessing such facilities. For instance, why is it that poor
households resist sending their female children to school? What are the
factors that limit poor women's participation in wage employment in the
traditional small-enterprise sector? Which elements of micro-finance
programs can help relieve the constraints on access for the majority of micro-
firms? Improved data collection is also necessary if the progress in human
development and poverty alleviation is to be measured and policymakers
held accountable for results.
The parallels between household decisions and company decisions are of
enormous importance, and the various social-science disciplines have much to
learn in exchanging their thoughts and sharing their concepts and approaches.
What we must understand and appreciate is that all of the social disciplines
matter. The fact that the poor tend to have larger families is a conscious
decision that can only be influenced by changing a broader set of conditions
that the poor face. The fact that they will not send their girls to school or access
health facilities cannot be answered by decrees from officials or by media
persuasion. Similarly, the fact that micro-enterprises tend to have below-
average productivity, provide poor working conditions, and avoid tax and
social security payments is primarily a function of entrepreneurial behavior in
the face of limited access to markets, to credit and to technologically superior
work methods. In both the households and the micro firm examples, simply
accessing social service facilities, infrastructure, and extension service centers
cannot ensure an effective response — unless these programs are adapted to
the specific needs and attributes of the socioeconomic context. And, unless
they address all of the complex factors that impact on behavior.
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A second and equally important area of analysis is how to reform and
upgrade the existing systems of education, training, health, social security,
and other areas that relate to social infrastructure and safety nets. The entire
region suffers from technically obsolete and poorly balanced systems that
favor the advantaged and neglect the primary services that meet the needs of
the poor. The problem of upgrading quality while raising the equity of our
social services deserves considerable attention from both specialists and
generalists. It also brings to focus the underlying budget constraints at both
central and local government levels. The bottom line to a fair and effective
system for the provision of public goods lies in the ability to appraise
priorities, to catch up in the introduction of state-of-the-art pedagogical and
health systems, and to calculate the opportunity costs of any one reform
program against those of alternative programs that may be less capital- or
technology-intensive, and yet more inclusive of the poor.
While focusing on access to and quality of social services and social
infrastructure, researchers must not lose sight of the broader picture whereby
the provision of public goods and income distribution are but two of the
several claims on the state's budget. What prevents key ministers taking
action, even when such action is plainly in the "overall interest of society"?
Why do policymakers ignore the glaring inequities, inconsistencies, and
waste in distributing budgets across functional lines and within them? Why is
it so difficult to reorient resources from open-ended to targeted programs,
from administrative costs to actual delivery expenditure, from formal to
informal agents, from rich to poor?
The answer simply lies in the absence of sufficient pressure for change,
in the lack of transparency in budget procedures and accountability for
performance, and in the fact that those who stand to gain are the silent
majority and the poor. Most MENA countries are still in transition and the
autocratic state is only slowly starting to devolve its dominant hold on power,
resources and decision-making. This brings in the entire realm of institutional
economics, governance, budget procedures and public administration: all
must receive the attention of researchers.
How does one meet with the development challenge in MENA? Four
sets of actions on the part of social scientists apply.
1. The need for social scientists to work together. The development process
is multi-dimensional. Economics is but one of the key ingredients to
estimating the costs and benefits of development programs, to the
evaluation of policy options, to summarizing the overall coherence of
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development plans and budgets over the medium- to long-term horizon.
Issues of governance bring in political, judicial, and legislative
dimensions to understanding institutional bottlenecks and proposing
reforms. Anthropology, demography, and sociology are essential to the
understanding of the characteristics of poverty and estimating the
response of various segments of population to policy initiatives. Urban
planners, education specialists, environment and engineering specialists
must also contribute their technical expertise on the how to raise the
quality of life. In short, all work within a broader and consistent agenda
that pulls a closely knit and converging platform of action together and
that meets with the multifaceted challenge of development is urgently
required.
2. The need to paraphrase the results of solid research into practical policy
making implications. Publication, dissemination and networking means
giving voice to those interest groups that are scarcely heard in the policy-
making arena. Social scientists must, therefore, work with NGOs to
identify leadership in quality and effectiveness. NGOs are the only
channel available that allow the poor to participate in civil society. The
NGOs are slowly organizing themselves so as to speak with one voice,
have a well-defined constituency, and a clearly articulated agenda.
NGOs must then seek to have these agendas adopted by the intellectual
community, members of parliament, and the media. If development is to
be human-centered and respond to the needs of the most vulnerable and
disadvantaged in society — women, children, the rural and urban poor,
and the informal sector — all members of civil society must lend support
to prioritization in favour of their access to and quality of social services
and social infrastructure. Moreover, the issue of equitable and effective
governance must also be addressed by NGOs, particularly since the poor
are the most likely to be excluded from the institutions of the state.
3. The need for NGOs to organize and better articulate their action plan
for development. For NGOs to play their development role to the full,
they must be able to influence policy through successful interventions
and a voice that carries weight, credibility and practicality.
Unfortunately, there is only a small number of NGOs that can
implement innovative and successful programs, or achieve significant
scale in their programming, along with a capacity to reach the poor at
the local level. However, there is a relatively new set of actors —
development intermediaries — who can adopt many legal forms, and
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who can act as a bridge between large governmental and donor
programs and local communities. Some are involved at the national
and at the grassroots level, others in capacity-building and networking
with NGOs. These are the agents of change who will — if suitably
promoted by donors and the intelligentsia— bring about effective
communications with policymakers.
4. The need for regional development intermediaries to act on behalf of
regional social scientists and organize a channel of communication for
networking among themselves, and with development agencies and
key policymakers in the region. The purpose should also be to create a
self-sustaining and growing core of well-informed policymakers who
are regularly acquainted with the work on hand. Their sources of
information comes from their network via regular meetings, a quality
newsletter that disseminates ideas, research results, and practical
experiences. The newsletter uses non-technical language, as do policy
briefs on specific issues.
Intermediaries would be responsible for synthesizing the results
of work completed by MENA social scientists. On their behalf, they
would integrate related research from regional and international
organizations as well as outline progress in the implementation of any
NGO action plans. Such intermediaries would also develop a set of
indicators related to real budget expenditure on each social service on a
per capita basis, across MENA countries. This would enhance the
sense of competition among policymakers across and within countries
of the MENA region. Indicators would also include regional and
international best practices to serve as benchmarks, and would promote
an understanding of successful reform experiences in such systems as
education, literacy programs, child care, health care, social security,
micro-finance, and extension services.
Heba Handoussa
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Chapter 1.
An Emerging Agenda for Development
in the Middle East and North Africa
Max Rodenbeck
Introduction: Scope and methodology
This paper aims to identify the key issues and debates facing development
efforts in the Middle East and North Africa, with a focus on areas where gaps
in research-based knowledge represent the most serious constraints.
It is divided into two sections. In the first, a broad overview of the
regional context is given, suggesting current and future challenges and
opportunities for development.
The second section is divided into six sub-headings exploring specific
topics:
1. Water, land and environment;
2. Social issues: poverty, unemployment, and small- and micro-enterprises;
3. Production and sharing of knowledge;
4. Macroeconomic issues;
5. Governance; and
6. The special case of Palestine.
Within each of these subheadings, a "development problematic" is first
outlined, followed by an analysis of major specific research issues which are
currently being debated.
This work is based on extensive background research, followed up by
dozens of interviews with academics, independent researchers, government
officials, development experts and representatives of NGOs in Egypt, the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jordan, Morocco, and Lebanon during the
summer and fall of 1998.
Section 1: The Middle East and North Africa in the global context
Being in the middle
MENA holds a strategic position at the interface between Europe, Asia and
Africa. It is a vital conduit for world trade, particularly between East and West.
It also forms a physical barrier between the wealthy North and the poor South.
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MENA is extremely rich in some key natural resources, notably oil, but suffers
dangerous scarcities in water and arable land. The region has had a turbulent
modern history, and continues to endure protracted conflicts and political
instability. This has given rise to social currents— such as Islamic
fundamentalism — that feel alienated from and are often hostile to the current
international order. These interlinked factors all serve to make MENA's future
development a matter of crucial importance to the rest of the world.
By most development indicators, MENA falls very much where
geography suggests that it should: in the center. The region's median GNP
per capita in 1996 was just over $2 000, placing it slightly above the world
average (World Bank 1998). Similarly, life expectancy, at 63 years, falls just
below the world average (UNDP 1997).2
By some standards, MENA outperforms other developing regions. Its
transport and communications infrastructure is generally good. With few
exceptions, its central governments are strong. It has important and long-
standing trade ties with the rest of the world, particularly Europe and the
Mediterranean region. Notably, MENA's exports of oil constitute half of
world trade in this essential commodity, while its oil reserves account for two
thirds of the world total.
These positive factors suggest that MENA should be poised to follow
the example of other countries at a similar level of development, and make
the leap into a cycle of sustained economic growth and improving living
standards. However, MENA's economic and political development has
lagged far behind its potential.
Falling behind
Despite pockets of wealth — notably in Israel and the Persian Gulf States —
MENA falls short of average developing country standards. UNDP assesses
the percentage of MENA's people who live below an income poverty line of
$1 a day at a modest 4%, compared to 32% for developing countries as a
whole. However, on a scale measuring human poverty (taking into account
such factors as education, personal security, and longevity), some 34% of
MENA's people are considered poor. This is only slightly better than India,
which has only a quarter of the income per person (UNDP 1997).
2 The figure is for Arab states alone. But since they cover 90% of the MENA
population, and since there are discrepancies between different agencies' definition of this
region, the terms MENA, Arab, or Middle East are used interchangeably in this paper.
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Furthermore, real per capita GNP actually fell by 25% between 1980
and 1996, making MENA the worst-performing region of the world apart
from sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1998). Although much of this decline
was due to falling oil prices, it was greatly assisted by the strikingly high
population growth rates MENA has generated in the past three decades. In
turn, this demographic pressure has created a complex matrix of problems.
Overburdened education systems have achieved a universally low standard in
improving literacy — particularly female literacy. Because of large numbers
of children and a relatively small proportion of working women, dependency
ratios in Arab countries are the highest of any region: 30% of the population
work to support the rest, compared to a global average of 48%. MENA's
unemployment rates — at an average of 15% — are double those of any
other region (ERF 1998).
Surging populations have also placed tremendous stress on often
meager natural resources. Across the region, fresh water resources per capita
have fallen by half in the past 30 years. Pressure to grow more food has led
to very poor land-use patterns. Even so, MENA is more dependent on food
imports than any other region. Urbanization has been rapid and haphazard,
creating serious problems of sanitation and solid waste.
intractable conflicts
There are other reasons for the region's underperformance. During the past
three decades only one MENA country — Tunisia — has experienced neither
war with a neighboring state, nor sustained internal unrest, nor a serious and
unresolved border dispute. Not only have all 21 others experienced violence,
but in many cases, their years of conflict have still not achieved a firm
"closure" of root problems. The Western Sahara problem, for instance, has
festered since 1975. Sudan has endured civil war for over 30 of its 42 years
of independence. Even today, many Lebanese believe their 1975-1989 civil
war is not concluded, but rather has gone into remission.
The Israeli-Palestinian struggle is the most obvious regional example
of such an intractable conflict. It is also the most poisonous in its far-
reaching effects. Even during "cold" phases, such as in the recent period
since the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords, the tensions generated by the
conflict directly affect citizens of Israel, Palestine and four surrounding
countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria) — including 2 million
Palestinian refugees whose plight is increasingly ignored by the international
community. Many more Middle Easterners are touched indirectly by way of
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lost development potential. Not only have scarce resources been
systematically diverted to defense for half a century. The unsettled conflict
has seriously dampened foreign investment. In the calm period from 1992-
96, for instance, foreign direct investment in the MENA region as a
proportion of GDP ran at only 1/3 the level of developing countries as a
whole (ERF 1998). A major reason for the shortfall is jitteriness about
regional stability.
In addition, the people of the region have also paid a heavy toll in more
direct ways. In Lebanon, Algeria, Iraq and Palestine, entire generations are
scarred by both the physical and psychic trauma of war. The 20 million
people of Iraq have been reduced to a hand-to-mouth existence since the Gulf
War. This country's enormous development potential has been wrecked for
decades to come. When Iraq returns to the community of nations, it will be in
need of massive assistance at every level.
Largely because of the experience or threat of turmoil, most MENA
states support forms of government that reflect demands of mobilization and
war preparation. This has had negative consequences for advancing ideals of
representative, accountable government. Indeed, a salient feature of the
MENA region today, given the democratic transition that has gripped much
of the world in the past decade, is the nearly total absence of meaningful
democracy. Not surprisingly, the region is currently one of the darkest zones
of the world in terms of human rights and freedom of expression.
Another effect of security-obsessed states has been to keep private
investment below world norms, since investors tend to be as wary of
governments that exert pervasive controls as they are of potential unrest. In
most MENA countries, state control has extended to major sources of rental
income, such as oil, or Suez Canal revenues in the case of Egypt, or
phosphate mines in Jordan and Morocco. This has encouraged the
maintenance of policies (such as monopolies, or discrimination in favor of
state-owned enterprises) that weigh against the kind of private sector, export-
led growth which has been the engine for advancement in more liberal
economies. Access to rents has made governments complacent about the
need for reforms, which meant that in many cases MENA countries entered
into periods of debt crisis before being persuaded into structural adjustment
programs. This has weakened their ability to negotiate favorable terms of
trade and multilateral aid, and has required a diversion of resources that
punishes the neediest segments of society. Heavy indebtedness still plagues
Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, and Sudan.
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Transition ahead
It is not difficult to construct a rather negative catalogue of problems for
MENA. Yet the region has great potential. Moreover, there are many signs
that it is on the verge of a very important transition — politically,
economically, and socially. The coming decade is likely to prove a crucial
period in determining the region's long-term future. This presents both
increasing challenges and opportunities for development interventions.
Without exception, MENA countries have now begun to implement
economic reforms to stimulate private investment. The measures adopted so
far include privatization, the passage of business-friendly commercial
legislation, and the offering of incentives to foreign investors. These moves
have already brought results in the form of increased growth rates,
particularly in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. However, MENA's
unrepresentative governments have tended to pander to wealthy industrialists
and foreign investors rather than to try and encourage the small-scale
enterprises that actually employ most people. Liberalization moves have
often appeared hesitant and grudging. In a world where it is easy for
transnational corporations to be based in any country for their operations,
MENA's delay in introducing economic liberalization may have long-term
consequences in lost competitiveness.
With population growth rates at last falling significantly in most
countries, MENA is on the verge of a demographic transition with far-
reaching consequences. In the biggest-population countries (Egypt, Algeria,
Morocco, Iran), fewer children are being born now than five years ago. This
means that a bulge is beginning to work its way through their population
pyramid. Renewed pressure will be put on schooling and employment over
the next 15 years. Thereafter, dependency ratios will fall as the proportion of
workers to dependents rises. Indeed, by 2030 the working-age population of
Arab countries will nearly triple in size, from 138 million at present to 332
million (ERF 1998). The active labor force will grow even faster, since
female participation is growing from a very low base.
The increase in national productivity entailed by demographic
transition proved to be a key determinant in the success of East Asian
economies (Williamson and Yousef 1998). But in the context of MENA's
already high jobless rates and overburdened education systems, turning
demographic transition to advantage will require immense effort. There is a
danger that instead of raising productivity, the bulge in 20 to 40 year-olds
will dangerously intensify competition for jobs, housing, and resources.
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Ominously, several of the region's countries have not yet begun to tackle the
population question. Some, such as Israel and the Arab Gulf states, are
actually pursuing pro-natalist policies.
The region is also on the verge of an important political transition. As
noted above, MENA has so far bucked the global trend towards
democratization. This is likely to change somewhat, not only because the
region is increasingly a political anomaly, but also because internal factors
are beginning to encourage better and more accountable government. For one
thing, the leaderships in nearly every Arab country are aging. A new
generation of leaders will inevitably take power, and indications are that
many may be, if not exactly ideologically committed to democracy, then at
least aware of the advantages of more transparent, responsive forms of
government.
At the same time as MENA governments have largely stagnated, civil
society in many countries has grown far more active. In the absence of
representative democracy, NGOs and trade associations have increasingly
assumed the role of advocacy groups. Except in the economic sphere where
business associations have succeeded in pressuring for liberalization, these
groups have yet to register a significant impact on policy. However, they
have affected the public agenda. Questions such as the importance of good
governance, the right of NGOs to operate, human rights, women's and
minority rights, as well as a host of other issues, are being debated more
actively than ever. This change in the nature of public discourse presages
future changes in policy. MENA's legislative agendas in the coming decade
are likely to reflect trends towards greater pluralism, renewed attention to
social justice, and administrative reform.
Section 2: Emerging issues in development research
Water, land and environment
Problematics
1. Water. Water remains a crucial development issue for MENA
countries. This is not surprising, considering that although the region
contains 5% of the world's population, it holds only 0.5% of the
planet's fresh water resources (Larsen 1998).
Depletion and degradation of these meager resources are
proceeding with frightening speed. MENA's fast-rising annual
utilization rate of renewable water supplies currently approaches 60%,
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compared to an 8% average for the rest of the world's regions. It is
predicted that within the span of one lifetime — from 1960 to 2025 —
the region's per capita renewable water supply will fall from 3 430
cubic meters per year to 667 cubic meters (Berkoff 1994). Already, all
of North Africa is under water stress (World Resources Institute 1992),
and according to the World Bank, a further ten MENA countries
consume more fresh water than can be renewed.
Some areas are actually mining irreplaceable aquifers. Ground-
water pumping in Saudi Arabia exceeds recharge by five times. The
Gaza Strip and parts of Jordan can be said to have entered water crisis
since their minimal resources are so overexploited that they may
represent health risks to consumers. Gaza's water situation has been
described as "desperate from both quantity and quality perspectives"
(Lonergan and Brooks 1994). Jordan disposes of only 300 cubic meters
of renewable annual supplies per person, and Yemen only 200 cubic
meters, compared to 120000 cubic meters per person in Canada
(Berkoff 1994). The critical nature of Jordan's water supply was starkly
underlined in August 1998, when the government of Prime Minister
Majali was forced to resign after many residents of the capital city,
Amman, fell ill from drinking tainted water. Most Jordanians believed
this water was supplied by Israel in accordance with its peace treaty with
Jordan — which again highlights the political sensitivity of the issue.3
It also underlines the importance of water quality, which is
seriously declining in many parts of the region. Inadequate treatment,
uncontrolled industrial effluents and misuse of agricultural chemicals
all contribute to this problem.
The aspect of equity in water distribution is a critical issue, too.
Lopsided consumption patterns punish Palestinian farmers and
householders. During the summer of 1998, water supplies to the
Palestinian city of Hebron were cut repeatedly, while adjacent Jewish
settlements continued to irrigate their lawns by spraying. In many
countries, high water-demand farming techniques are often used
inappropriately. For example, one water expert describes the continued
cultivation of thirsty oranges in Gaza as "ludicrous — a romantic
anachronism."4
3 Interview with Seteney Shami, Middle East Awards coordinator, Cairo 1998.
4 Interview with water consultant Gerd de Bruine, water consultant, Jerusalem 1998.
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The inexorable rise in demand made by growing populations is
likely to bring more and more of the region into serious water stress. In
the Maghreb countries, the dependence of agriculture on very erratic
winter rains has led to severe fluctuations in farm output and rural
income. In turn, this has caused waves of immigration from the
countryside into urban slums. In addition, 35% of MENA's renewable
water resources are derived from outside the region. The Tigris-
Euphrates basin, where water is shared by Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, is a
zone of particularly dangerous contention.
2. Land. Land use is another serious environmental problem. Population
growth has produced both pressures of urban expansion and pressure to
expand cultivated areas in order to meet increased food consumption.
Arab countries currently import some $25 billion of food a year. They
import 30% of their cereal consumption, with this proportion expected to
rise to 36% by 2020, despite a projected doubling of local production (de
Haen and Lindland 1996). But the proportion of Arab land that is
arable — 4% — is less than half of what is available in other regions.
The per capita share of arable land in MENA is only 0.224 hectares, and
much of this is marginal and not fully cultivable (UNDP 1997).
Many countries are already suffering strains on land use brought
about by the need to increase agricultural output. Morocco is losing an
estimated 40000-50000 hectares of forest a year to expansion of
pasture and cropland. The result has been a soaring rate of soil
erosion.5 Syria suffers similar problems.
Land reclamation projects in Egypt are bringing similar acreage
into use every year, but of far less fertile desert land. Meanwhile,
seepage of irrigation water from the higher-altitude reclaimed lands is
causing increased salinity on the fringes of the lower-lying Nile Valley.
Although Egypt's pinched water resources present a severe constraint on
further reclamation, the government is pursuing a long-term policy to
reclaim as much as a quarter of the 97% of the country that is desert.
3. Environment. Inadequate urban planning and zoning has inflicted
severe damage, both environmental and aesthetic, in many MENA
countries. A side-effect of Lebanon's 16-year civil war has been the
uncontrolled building which has ravaged mountains near Beirut and
rimmed 60-70% of the coastline with a "wall of concrete."6 Much of
5 Interview with Larbi Zagdouni, Director of Research, Ministry of Agriculture, Rabat,
Morocco, 1998.
6 Interview with Fouad Hamdan, Greenpeace, Beirut 1998.
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the rural West Bank is rapidly losing its traditional character, not only
due to construction of Jewish colonies but also to the sprawling growth
of Palestinian villages and towns.7 The 40-kilometer strip from
Ramallah through Jerusalem to Bethlehem is an unbroken line of
unplanned building developments. Considering that tourism is a
mainstay of the local economy, and also a key area of potential growth,
this aesthetic blight has serious practical consequences.
In many MENA countries, laws and traditions exacerbate land
degradation. Islamic inheritance rales lead to fragmentation of
landholdings into unsustainable units. Unrestricted grazing on
commonly-held lands affects pastoral zones of Maghreb countries,
Jordan, and Syria. This results not only in depletion of soil resources,
but also to loss of biodiversity.8 Property registration systems are
severely deficient in Egypt, Lebanon, and the Occupied Territories,
leading to disputes, marginalizing whole communities from public
services, and excluding the poor from leveraged sources of finance.
Urban air pollution affects 60 million people in the region.
According to the World Bank, this number could increase to 160
million, or half of the population, within ten years. Cairo is currently
the most dangerously polluted of MENA cities, but has recognized its
problem and begun to take serious countermeasures such as de-leading
all gasoline. Beirut, however, has some 1 million cars, most of which
are over 10 years old. Use of leaded gasoline exacerbates the problem.
Lastly, solid waste disposal remains a serious challenge. The
problem is particularly severe in the overgrown villages of Egypt and
the Levant region. An issue of pressing concern is that few MENA
countries have taken adequate measures for disposal of toxic and
hospital wastes.
Research issues
1. Water. Considering the MENA region's unique scarcity of fresh water,
water supply and management will remain crucial research issues.
Development professionals interviewed in a range of MENA
countries (Jordan, Palestine, Morocco) concur that broadly speaking,
the question of water supply is widely recognized and is currently
receiving adequate funding from governments and donor agencies. For
7 Interview with Ala Eddin Shawa, Director of the Development Research Center,
Ramallah 1998.
8 Interview with Nasri Haddad, ICARDA, Cairo 1998.
example, USAID has just increased its budget for Jordan by 50%, to
$235 million a year, half of which is intended for water projects.9
Yet this does not mean that further research into water supply
would be superfluous. Much promising preliminary research in a
number of areas could use substantiation. For example, the IDRC-
funded study of undersea freshwater springs on the Lebanese coast has
established that one of these springs probably generates as much fresh
water as the Litani, Lebanon's largest river system.10 Similar springs
occur at two other sites in Lebanon, and-also off the coast of water-
starved Gaza. Methods of measuring and capturing this water have yet
to be developed.
In another example, knowledge acquired by IDRC from projects
that are examining how to trap and store domestic rainwater in Gaza
could have applications in many other MENA countries. Also, many of
the region's large aquifers have been inadequately studied. The effects
of exploiting international aquifers, and the potential for using brackish
underground water supplies (in the Sinai Peninsula, for example) need
further research. Another area of knowledge deficit is waste-water
reuse and disposal — particularly in small towns and villages where
cost recovery is difficult. In densely populated Gaza, for instance, only
a quarter of households are linked to sewage networks.
Lastly, there is a serious shortfall in comparative cost-benefit
analysis of the above-mentioned water supply options, as well as
others. Although large-scale desalination of seawater is at present
prohibitively costly, for example, advances in technology must be
continuously monitored. The practicality of importing fresh water from
outside the region, whether by pipeline or by more innovative methods
such as Medusa bags11, should be systematically weighed as a
potentially cheaper alternative to local resources.
Despite this proliferation of fields for research in water supply, it
is the demand side of MENA's water equation that currently offers the
most productive potential for research. To date, questions such as
management of demand, water quality versus quantity, and the issue of
equity in water distribution have attracted relatively little attention.
9 Interview with Yousef Mansour, Director of Aid Coordination, Ministry of Planning,
Amman, Jordan 1998.
10 Interview with Dr George Ayoub, American University in Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon,
October 1998.
11 Medusa bags are floating plastic containers, pulled by boat to transport water.
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Therefore, countries must become aware of the whole range of
approaches to demand management that may be considered, from
education and awareness programs to adoption of appropriate
conservation technology, to metering and pricing, and to quantitative
restrictions. Some MENA countries — such as Jordan and Tunisia —
have already begun shifting emphasis from raising water supply
(through construction of dams and conveyance systems, tapping
unused sources, or reuse of water) to rationalizing water demand
(Beltagy 1997). Their experience must be properly appraised to see if it
can be duplicated elsewhere.
Solutions to water management problems vary enormously from
one country to the next. For example, stressing appropriate pricing
structures for water may not be acceptable in some countries. In the
Nile Valley, historically farmers have always received irrigation water
free of charge. In Egypt, this represents a $5 billion annual hidden
subsidy and encourages misuse (Berkoff 1994). But the advantages of
this system must also be weighed: 15 million poor peasants benefit, as
well as millions of poor urban Egyptians for whom the cost of
agricultural produce is lowered. In addition, while individual water use
in the Nile Valley is wasteful, the overall system achieves an efficiency
rate of 80% (Rosegrant 1997).
The need for varied approaches to water demand management
underlines the necessity for a much wider intra-regional sharing of
information. The IDRC's Water Demand Management Network
represents an important and timely initiative in this direction. Areas of
urgent concern should include the Euphrates Valley, where political
tensions are partly generated by the lack of pooling of knowledge
between the countries that share this system (Naff 1997). In the context
of Jordan, Palestine and Israel — countries that compete for extremely
meager resources— the question of water equity should also be a
fruitful area for further investigation. Decision-makers should be made
aware that per capita water modeling could provide a more appropriate
method of distribution than the division of gross resources. For
instance, because Israeli per capita consumption of water is far higher
than Palestinian, it is conceivable that Palestinians should sell water
19
rights to their neighbors.
12 Interview with Gerd de Bruine, water consultant, Jerusalem 1998.
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2. Land. Given the region's need to greatly increase agricultural output to
meet its growing food deficit, improving farm production will continue
to be a prime focus for research. An area of regional weakness with
particular promise for research is the application of biotechnology.13
Yet, although the region's research institutes are poor (see below,
section on Production and Sharing of Knowledge), most countries are
already devoting considerable efforts to raising production and
increasing yields. Indeed, there may be a degree of over-emphasis on
improving commodity outputs.14
What is lacking is a more balanced approach to resource
management. For instance, methods of integrated management of
livestock for the kind of small-scale producers that are typical of the
region have been inadequately studied. More careful consideration is
needed of the environmental impact of production inputs such as
fertilizers and pesticides. There is considerable evidence that chemicals
are dangerously overused in Lebanon and Egypt.15 As well, the
region's farmers also need advice on methods of storage, packaging,
transport and marketing. These are especially pressing needs in
countries which are entering into free trade agreements with Europe,
such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine.
Great improvements must be made if they are to comply with stringent
European standards.
The question of credit for small-scale farmers is also
inadequately addressed. In Lebanon, for example, the agricultural
sector is allocated less than 0.5% of banking assets, even though it
represents 10-12% of GDP. Farmers frequently have to resort to
informal sources of credit, where interest rates range up to 100%.16
Within this broad context, agricultural policymaking requires
support in many countries, particularly Lebanon, Palestine, and
Yemen, which have weak outreach programs. MEN A governments
often overlook the needs of small-scale producers in favor of
agribusiness. To improve farmers' participation in decision-making,
advocacy organizations need strengthening, as do agricultural
information networks. Aside from traditional extension services,
13 Interview with Said Belcadi, Undersecretary for Scientific Research, Rabat 1998.
14 Interview with Nasri Haddad, ICARDA, Cairo 1998.
15 Interview with Shadi Hamadeh, AUB, Beirut 1998.
16 Interview with Youssef al-Khalil, Banque du Liban, Beirut 1998.
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broadcast media are currently very much under-utilized in bringing
timely and useful information to farmers.
Also, in many MENA countries women are important— and
often dominant — agricultural producers, especially in the rearing of
farm animals. Yet rural women are also the poorest and least-educated
segment of MENA societies. Few outreach services cater specifically
to their needs.17
3. Environment. Lack of adequate knowledge continues to be a severe
handicap in addressing the region's many pressing environmental
problems. Some of these require the straightforward approach of
classical research. For instance, air pollution in Beirut has never been
properly studied, even though anecdotal evidence suggests it is a major
health hazard. Seacoast pollution in Gaza and in Lebanon has not been
analyzed, despite its evident seriousness. Nor has effluent from villages
in the West Bank, which generally flows untreated directly into
adjacent wadis.
In the field of solid-waste management, improved sharing of
knowledge across the region is vital, since there are numerous
examples of small-scale successes that could easily be duplicated.
Examples include waste disposal projects in Nabatiye in Lebanon and
among the Zabbaleen communities of Cairo.18 Hospital and toxic
wastes are issues of immediate concern.
In a broad sense, the MENA region has failed to give sufficient
attention to the question of land use. Systems for allocation,
registration, and zoning of both urban and rural lands are seriously
inadequate in Palestine, Egypt, and Lebanon. Strictly speaking, such
tasks are within the purview of governments alone, But there is ample
room for research interventions to investigate how inappropriate land
use has led to both environmental and aesthetic degradation. In
Gaza — the most crowded territory on earth — research is needed into
how the government can make land use more equitable. In the West
Bank and Lebanon, little research has been done into how to preserve
what remains of a rich traditional rural architectural heritage that is
rapidly vanishing. Research in Egypt has shown that impossible land
registration requirements both ghettoize the poor and exclude them
17 Interview with Nasri Haddad, ICARDA, Cairo 1998.
18 Interview with Fouad Hamdan, Greenpeace, Beirut 1998.
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from public services, including credit facilities (de Soto 1997). This
study has wide-ranging implications. It should be duplicated in many
other settings where a significant proportion of property is held
informally and cannot be fully mobilized for both the benefit of its
owners and the wider economy.
Social issues: poverty, unemployment and small- and micro-sized enterprises
Problematics
Despite considerable improvements in quality of life indicators for MENA
over the past three decades, the region still faces serious social problems.
Indeed, social pressures have increased during the past decade as a result of
continued rapid population growth and urbanization, compounded by
declining oil prices and the impact of structural adjustment programs.
Real per capita GNP actually dropped by 25% between 1980 and
1996, making MENA the worst-performing of the world's regions.19 (World
Bank 1997). In constant terms, oil prices have declined by over two thirds
since their 1980 peak, affecting not just oil producers but also other countries
that rely on worker remittances from oil-rich neighbors. Long-overdue
structural adjustments have caused shocks, especially to the poorest segments
of MENA societies. Their impact includes the lifting of subsidies on food
and housing, rising costs for public services, and rationalization of market
prices such as agricultural rents. And while Arab fertility rates have fallen by
a third in the past 20 years, from 6.5 to 4.5 births per child-bearer, population
growth rates remain above norms in the developing world (Courbage 1998).
This growth maintains the stresses on the provision of public services. For
instance, public school systems in many MENA countries can barely keep
pace with rising demand.
1. Poverty. The proportion of people living in poverty appears to be rising
in most of the region's middle and lower income countries. However,
because of a lack of standardization in methods of measuring poverty,
it is difficult to quantify this shift accurately. National statistical
agencies suffer a shortage of trained staff, rely on outdated or
inappropriate models and techniques, and frequently lack adequate
political backing. Moreover, within these countries, internal
governments often interfere with independent social surveys citing
reasons of national security. In Jordan, for example, poverty statistics
19 It should be noted, however, that much of this fall is attributable to fluctuations in oil
price.
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are considered highly sensitive. And that country's government forbid
a Norwegian-sponsored, in-depth household survey conducted in 1997
to publish its results.20
Nevertheless, evidence gathered in Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and
Morocco— through interviews with poverty experts and after
researching available documentation — points to an incontestable
diminution of social equity since 1990 (Fergany 1998a, 1998b). Dr
Saad Nagi's as-yet unpublished 1997 household survey of poverty in
Egypt (sponsored by the Ford Foundation) is one of the more rigorous
studies to have been conducted in the region. Using both subjective
and objective measures of poverty, Dr Nagi's team concluded that over
a third of Egyptians live in poverty. Over 7% endure "ultra poverty,"
where their expenditure is less than a third of the national average and
where they experience "severe difficulty" in affording food and
clothing. Moreover, Dr Nagi finds that while the share of the poorest
quintile of Egyptians in national income fell drastically, from 3.9% to
1.7% between 1991 and 1995, the share of the richest 20% rose from
41.1% to 46%.
A range of studies in Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco have shown
a similar sharp deterioration in the equity of income distribution and a
steep rise in the number of poor. For instance, according to Lebanon's
Central Bank— which is privy to unreleased reports from the
UNDP — the proportion of Lebanese below the poverty line increased
from 28% in 1992 to 34% in 1997. In 1992, 3% of bank depositors
held 40% of bank deposits, whereas in 1998 the same proportion of
national savings was held by only 1% of the population.21
Among all MENA countries, only Tunisia has achieved
improvements in equity— and this through a sustained and costly
effort by a government that has made poverty eradication a national
priority (World Bank 1996). Other countries have instituted programs
to soften the impact of structural adjustment. Yet programs such as the
$600 million Social Fund created in Egypt have been criticized for
using a scattered approach that looks good on paper but is unlikely to
90
achieve long-term improvements.
20 Interview with Jorgen Lissner, UNDP, Amman 1998.
21 Interview with Dr Youssef al-Khalil, Banque du Liban, Beirut 1998.
22 A range of development professionals in Egypt concurred with this view, but
preferred not to be named in writing.
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Meanwhile, Jordan and Lebanon have been slow to recognize
the severity of the poverty problem. According to the UNDP's Jordan
Country Director, the drop-out rate from rural schools has soared
because many families cannot afford fees of $5 a year. "The political
elite in Amman are not taking poverty seriously," he added, affirming
that this issue should be the country's top priority, if only for the sake
of political stability.23 Drop-out rates in Lebanon have also climbed.24
MENA governments have also largely overlooked the needs of
particularly disadvantaged groups. Isolated communities and
regions — such as more remote parts of Morocco, some provinces of
Upper Egypt, and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Gaza, and the West
Bank— endure particular hardship. Regional disparities in the
standard of living can be startling: in Morocco, only 1% of rural
households have a telephone, compared to 28% in cities (UNDAF
1998). In Lebanon, some 350 000 Palestinian refugees are denied basic
rights including citizenship, the right to own property, and the right to
work in white-collar professions.25 In Gaza and the West Bank,
Palestinian GNP per capita is barely a tenth of GNP per capita in
Jewish settlements that are merely a stone's throw away.
The specific problems of women and youth also suffer
widespread neglect and in many cases this constitutes outright
discrimination. Although women represent over 50% of college
students in Lebanon and enjoy the highest female literacy rate in the
Arab world, the country has never had a female cabinet minister.26 And
in parts of rural Morocco and Upper Egypt, female literacy is barely
10% — less than one third that of men in the same regions (UNDAF
1998, UNDP 1996)
2. Unemployment. Severe unemployment is a salient characteristic of the
MENA poverty profile. The region's average jobless rate is 15%,
double that of any other region (ERF 1998). In Gaza and urban
Algeria, youth unemployment rates approach 50%, while in Morocco
and Egypt, joblessness among university graduates is a source of social
unrest. In the summer of 1998, for example, Rabat riot police crushed a
23 Interview with Jorgen Lissner, UNDP, Amman 1998.
24 Interview with Randa Aboul Hosn, UNDP, Beirut 1998.
25 Interview with Wafaa al Yassir, Norwegian People's Aid, Beirut 1998.
26 Interview with Mona Khalaf, Director of the Institute for Womens' Studies in the
Arab world, Beirut 1998.
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month-long sit-in by unemployed graduates in front of the parliament
77building, injuring 100 people.
Moreover, in spite of the global fall in birth rates, the high
population growth rates of the past are continuing to push new entrants
into the job market more quickly than the ability to generate jobs.
Between now and 2025, MENA countries will have to absorb a further
160 million adults of working age (Williamson and Yousef 1998).
Egypt alone faces the daunting task of finding 500 000 jobs a year.
Such pressures come at a time when labor markets in oil-rich Arab
states — long an outlet for the surplus labor of poorer neighbors — are
saturated. Indeed, the current combination of very high birth-rates in
the Persian Gulf states and a sustained low oil price will almost
certainly lead to cutbacks in their reliance on immigrant labor. The
potential impact of such cuts was dramatically demonstrated during the
1990-91 Gulf Crisis, when Kuwait deported 350 000 Palestinians and
perhaps half a million Egyptians fled Iraq.
At the same time, governments have been slow to understand
and respond to the implications of a changing demographic picture.
The ratio of workers to dependents in the region has long been the
highest in the world, where 30% of the population worked to support
the rest in 1990, compared to a world average of 48% (ERF 1998).
This situation is changing fast, since declining fertility rates mean that
more people will enter the economically active population every year
than will be born. Recent research indicates that this demographic
transition over the next 25 years will open a significant window of
economic opportunity for MENA countries. As happened in East Asia
during the past two decades, a proportionately bigger and growing
work force could potentially add 2% a year to economic growth rates,
while improving rates of savings and investment (Williamson and
Yousef 1998).
However, unless societies recognize and meet this challenge,
declining dependency ratios could simply translate into soaring
unemployment. In this context, MENA governments do not seem to
have grasped the urgency of their need to radically upgrade their
educational capacity, so as to improve the extremely low productivity
of their work forces, (see section on Production and Sharing of
27 Diverse press reports.
Knowledge). Nor have they worked hard enough to create an
institutional atmosphere geared to fully releasing the employment-
generating capacity of the private sector, especially of small- and
micro-sized enterprises.
3. Small- and micro-sized enterprises. Small- and micro-sized enterprises
are a vital — even dominant — component of most MENA economies.
In Egypt, for example, small- and micro-sized enterprises provide an
estimated 80% of private-sector value-added, employ two-thirds of the
entire labor force, and constitute 99.7% of the total number of non-
agricultural private enterprises (Ministry of Economy [Egypt] 1998).
Statistics on the small- and micro-sized enterprises sector in other
countries are less reliable, but in Jordan the "informal" sector is
believed to employ 35% of the work force, and in Yemen 45% of it
(ERF 1998). Similar ratios are likely to hold true in Morocco and
Lebanon, with slightly lower levels for Algeria, Syria, and Tunisia.
In spite of this obvious importance, small- and micro-sized
enterprises confront a range of obstacles to growth, as well as
numerous handicaps to improving competitiveness in the rapidly
globalizing world marketplace. Access to credit is one problem. In
Egypt, 94% of industrial credit is directed to the 2% of enterprises with
over 50 employees. And despite the existence of some 40 micro-credit
programs in the country, 95% of potential beneficiaries have not been
/^o
reached. Micro-credit experts in Morocco believe there are as many
as 1.5 million potential clients for their services, which currently reach
less than 20 000 customers.29
Small- and micro-sized enterprises throughout the region are also
burdened by structural deficiencies, such as lack of access to technology;
lack of marketing, accounting and managerial expertise; and lack of
access to information. Most such enterprises operate in relative isolation
from the broader economy. Their relations with suppliers and markets
are often personal, with work carried out on an order basis rather than
through continuous production and sales efforts. For this reason,
potential efficiencies through cluster linkages between these companies
are often poorly exploited, while large-scale national industries rarely
subcontract to local small- and micro-sized enterprises.
28 Interview with Dina Abdel Wahab, ESMA, Cairo 1998.
29 Presentation by Noureddine Ayouche, Director of Fondation Zakoura, Marrakesh
1998.
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On top of this, such small firms suffer from a legacy of
government negligence. MENA officials have long been fixated with
the idea that small enterprises are outmoded, whereas states have
Ort
wished to promote "modern" smokestack industries. Tax breaks and
other incentive programs have often targeted big businesses, to the
point of discriminating against small firms. For instance, until recently
under Egypt's investment laws, companies needed to have a minimum
capital of LE100 000 to benefit from 5- or 10-year tax holidays in
special industrial zones. In Palestine, where a body of commercial
legislation is being created from the ground up, the entire process has
been aimed at large foreign investors, not local businesses.31 Micro-
enterprises have also been denied equal access to subsidized
infrastructure and to development aid for training and technical
upgrading. In addition, such enterprises are ill-equipped to compete for
government contracts, and moreover, they are not encouraged to
compete.
With so little to gain, small- and micro-sized enterprises in many
MENA countries have felt it safer to remain outside formal licensing
so as to avoid regulations and taxes. In Egypt, entrepreneurs must
prove compliance with at least 11 laws before they can legally operate.
Just how time-consuming and expensive this procedure is can be
shown by the fact that it costs 30% more to rent licensed industrial
premises than it does to rent unlicensed ones. Imposition of taxes, as
well as health and other work place regulations, is arbitrary and erratic.
For all these reasons, 46% of Egyptian firms with less than 10
employees are not fully formalized in legal terms. Some 95% of small
enterprises do not even maintain a bank account (Ministry of Economy
[Egypt] 1998).
Efforts to reverse the discrimination against these small
enterprises have been launched by NGOs in most MENA countries.
Approaches have included provision of micro-finance, training
schemes and technical advice, and attempts to form advocacy groups.
Many of these efforts — particularly micro-finance initiatives in
Egypt, Morocco and Lebanon, and technical outreach programs in
Palestine — have proved extremely successful. However, according to
30 Interview with Heba Handousa, Economic Research Forum, Cairo, September 1998.
31 Interview with Salah Abdel Shafi, Development Research Center, Gaza 1998.
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the head of Economic Research, Dr Heba Handousa, there exists a lack
of coordination and cross-dissemination between various agencies.
Moreover, the effectiveness of virtually all programs targeting this
sector has been hampered by a lack of in-depth knowledge about
120
small- and micro-sized enterprises and the informal sector.
Research issues
1. Poverty. Any approach to the poverty question must begin by
addressing gaps in knowledge and awareness of the scope of the
problem. To begin with, there is an urgent need for coordinated efforts
to improve, standardize and deepen statistics-gathering capacity.
National statistical agencies can be helped with expertise and
technology. At the same time, independent social studies should be
encouraged to be more policy-oriented. Research should be aimed at
raising the efficiency of development efforts by steering poverty
interventions toward the neediest sectors. In this context, there may be
room for the elaboration of new social research techniques. For
example, traditional analyses of poverty based solely on expenditure
patterns are often distorting— they attempt to quantify what is in
effect a quality.
There is a pressing need for research into the effectiveness and
sustainability of existing poverty programs. The work of Egypt's
Social Development Fund, for instance, is often touted as a success
story, but its work has never been thoroughly analyzed by independent
research. In addition, governments and development agencies in the
region need to be made aware of successful experiments in poverty
eradication, such as regional initiatives in Tunisia.
There is also a surprising lack of knowledge about the impact of
macroeconomic policies on the poorest sectors. Structural
adjustment— and accompanying inflation in the cost of public
services — may have unforeseen negative consequences. For example,
rising drop-out rates in Jordanian and Lebanese schools suggest that
increased financial strain on the poor may result in a less-skilled and
less-productive future work force. And, lowered tariff barriers within
the context of liberalizing world trade may have extreme negative
consequences for small-scale industries. (See section on
Macroeconomic Policy.)
32 Interview with Heba Handousa, Economic Research Forum, Cairo 1998.
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Helping the poor to better express their needs could be an
effective means of combating poverty. In all MENA countries, the
poor are politically disenfranchised. (See section on Governance). In
many cases, they are not sufficiently aware of their existing rights and
entitlements, let alone of the opportunities for taking action to secure a
fairer share. This is particularly true in the case of rural women.
Strengthening advocacy activity by local NGOs would help to expose
the consequences of government policies, and also to identify the most
disadvantaged groups.
2. Unemployment and small- and micro-sized enterprises. MENA countries
also need to improve coordination between research and policy with
respect to unemployment. Because unemployment statistics are
extremely unreliable in most MENA countries, statistics-gathering
capacity is an area that needs strengthening. Studies in Jordan, for
example, have produced national jobless rates varying from 15% up to
TO
as high as 29%. In Egypt and Morocco, there is evidence that
unemployment is actually higher among university graduates than
others. But research is needed into which disciplines are generating
surplus graduates, so that education policy can be better geared to the
marketplace.
The efficacy of job creation and training schemes is also poorly
understood. In general, government approaches to the unemployment
question have tended to overemphasize short-term public works
projects and vocational training in fields that are not always attuned to
the market's needs. Egypt's Social Development Fund claims to have
created hundreds of thousands of jobs, but it is not clear how many of
these are sustainable. Smaller, local projects have usually proven far
more successful than national schemes. NGOs providing vocational
training in Palestinian camps in Lebanon, for example, have found that
flexibility is a key to producing useful skills. Being able to transfer
resources away from classic industrial training into nurse-training and
computer training allowed one of these groups to maintain high
employment rates for its graduates.34
Over reliance on top-down approaches has also tended to
obscure the existence of untapped potentials among the poor and
33 Interview with Jorgen Lissner, UNDP, Amman 1998.
34 Interview with Wafaa al-Yassir, Norwegian People's Aid, Beirut 1998.
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disadvantaged. In many cases, the poor are unable to mobilize their
own resources because of simple legal and administrative obstacles.
This is particularly true for the securing of credit. "Contrary to
widespread belief," an Egyptian government report on small- and
micro-sized enterprises notes that "several facts suggest that the
problem does not lie in the physical absence of collateral. Rather, the
problem lies in its official invisibility; i.e. its legal absence." (Ministry
of Economy [Egypt], 1998.) Citing a study by Peruvian economist
Hernando de Soto which estimated that Egyptians hold an estimated
$240 billion in unregistered property, this report suggests that by
simply easing the process of formalizing their property holdings, the
government could help millions of poor Egyptians gain access to
consumer and investment credit (de Soto 1997). Although Egypt's
problem in this regard is particularly striking, it is a matter of urgency
that studies like de Soto's should be duplicated in other MENA
countries.
Micro-finance schemes have become an increasingly popular
vehicle for supporting the poor and as well as small- and micro-sized
enterprises. However, most MENA countries have yet to begin
institutionalizing the exchange of information between micro-finance
programs. World Bank regional workshops on micro-finance, and the
creation of umbrella organizations such as the Egyptian Small and
Micro-Enterprise Association, have improved cross-fertilization. Yet
even in countries where the sharing of information between micro-
credit agencies is beginning to be institutionalized, there is room for
improvement. For instance, the pooling of credit information in central
databases would greatly improve efficiency. Customers also need to be
made aware of the range of available credit schemes. At the same time,
research is needed into the market demand for micro credit in order to
make sure that appropriate credit schemes are offered, and to define
standard criteria for loan assistance. For instance, in relatively well-off
Lebanon, it is likely that many potential clients require longer-term
credit lines rather than small loans.35
Greater information pooling would not only help to standardize
best practice, but also to increase the lobbying power of credit
associations. This is very important since governments often do not
35 Interview with Randa Aboul Hosn, UNDP, Beirut 1998.
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realize that laws need changing to allow micro-credit operations to
proliferate. For instance, an outdated Egyptian rule requiring the
personal signature of the Chairman of an NGO on every loan check
makes it physically impossible for NGOs to sponsor large-scale credit
schemes directly (Ministry of Economy [Egypt] 1998). Also, lobbying
has, in some cases, produced favorable responses from the private
sector. In Morocco, for instance, five commercial banks are supporting
microcredit schemes with interest-free loans to the credit agencies.
Regarding the promotion of small- and micro-sized enterprises, a
major obstacle is scarcity of knowledge about the sector. This holds
true for all MENA countries, but there is a particular research gap in
comparative regional overviews to sort successful interventions from
failed ones. For instance, the work of Palestine's Development
Research Center— which operates as a full-range service center
supplying training, marketing, technical and financial know-how to
small enterprises— is unknown outside that country.36 The DRC's
work in trying to promote industrial cluster linkages also deserves
study and possible emulation.
Production and sharing of knowledge
Problematics
The production and sharing of knowledge represent a field where MENA
countries unquestionably lag behind, particularly in the field of applied
research.
The problems begin with levels of literacy that are generally low
compared to other developing regions. The overall adult literacy rate in
MENA is 55%, compared to a world average of 77% (UNDP 1997). Despite
a steady advance in scholarization, this shortfall is still compounded by very
poor standards in basic education. For example, Jordan and Kuwait are
considered to have among the best public school systems in the region. Yet
in the only comparative tests to have been conducted between Arab high-
school students and students from other countries, both scored at the bottom
of the chart in mathematics and science. Furthermore, it is often the case that
while gross enrollment ratios in primary education may be high (around 90%
in Egypt and Morocco), this does not necessarily translate into the
acquisition of useful skills. By the measure of functional literacy, for
36 Interview with Ala Eddin Shawa, Director of the Development Research Center,
Ramallah 1998.
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example, only 15% of Egyptians may be adequately educated, compared to a
nominal adult literacy rate of 51% (Fergany 1998a, 1998b).
These failings are largely a result of education policies that have
emphasized quantity over quality — which is understandable in a situation
where schools have had to cope with soaring numbers of students. In Gaza
and in Egypt, for example, many primary schools must operate several shifts
a day to cope with a volume of students that often exceeds 60 per class. At
the same time, most Arab curricula have also emphasized fact-acquisition
rather than the development of cognitive skills. Learning has been seen as
mastery of an existing body of knowledge, rather than promoting the ability
to seek out, analyze or generate new knowledge.
These problems persist at higher levels of education, where the
advancement of research has also been a casualty of demographics. For
example Said Belcadi, Moroccan Undersecretary for Scientific Research,
notes that his country had only one university in 1975. Today it has 14. Until
now, he says, the obvious priority has been to train lecturers to teach, not to
37produce research. By one calculation, spending per student in Egyptian
universities dropped from $100 in 1980 to $25 in 199338. Not surprisingly,
the creation and maintenance of libraries, databases and university research
facilities has also lagged behind. The gross enrollment ratio (GER) at
university age in Arab countries rose from 9% in 1980 to 13% in 1995. Yet
the university GER in industrialized countries grew faster during the same
period, from 36% to 60% (Fergany 1998a, 1998b). Furthermore, only 6% of
Arab university students are in graduate studies, a figure representing the
lowest proportion in the world (UNESCO 1998).
In Arab countries as a whole, spending on research and development
represents just 0.14% of GNP, compared with 3% in developed countries
(UNESCO 1998). Despite the existence of numerous research institutes,
meager state funding (and the almost complete absence of private funding)
has kept scientific output to a minimum. Egypt's National Research Center,
for instance, is the largest in the Arab world. It employs 2 200 researchers
spanning 65 disciplines. However, salaries absorb 75% of its budget. Only
10% of the budget is devoted to equipment and research39. Similarly, Egypt's
National Agricultural Research Institute employs 3 000 PhD holders, but
produces relatively little useful research.40
37 Interview, Rabat 1998.
38 Fergany, Al Ahram 24/9/98.
39 Fergany, Al Ahram 24/9/98.
40 Interview with Nasri Haddad, ICARDA, Cairo 1998.
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Throughout MENA, the number of research institutes has recently
begun to grow rapidly. Nevertheless, the lack of well-defined national
research strategies limits their effectiveness. Links between policy-making
and research projects are extremely weak. Much university research tends to
be abstract rather than applied. In the social sciences, research is usually
designed to promote the researcher's own academic career rather than to
produce policy options. Much of this effort "simply gets left in drawers."41 In
addition, many independent organizations that produce social research are
regarded as adversaries to governments rather than collaborators.
Government interference often limits their ability to produce critical
information. As a consequence, government decision-making tends to
operate in isolation from research results, leading to inefficiencies in policy.
Agricultural research represents the sole area of scientific research
with a relatively well-developed infrastructure in most countries of the
region. Yet, as noted above in relation to Egypt, the mere existence of
institutions does not translate into high productivity. Rigid command
structures that resist innovations in methodology, poor standards of
equipment and training, and the rarity of interdisciplinary approaches inhibit
the production of useful knowledge. Moreover, because of the paucity of
local funding, research priorities are increasingly set by external funding
agencies whose agenda is not always in-tune with local development needs.
Such funding tends to be short-term and project-oriented, which damages the
continuity and sustainability of research efforts.42 Research funding by the
private sector, meanwhile, is extremely limited.
The weakness of national research outputs is exacerbated by a generally
low level of regional information-sharing. Despite the existence of a common
language in the region — Arabic — links between its research institutes are
poor. For example, very few national scientific journals enjoy regional
circulation. Computerization offers possibilities for rapid progress in regional
networking, but computer literacy and Internet access are not widespread. At
the same time, minimal knowledge of foreign languages limits access to
international research advances. This is compounded by a split between the
Francophone Maghreb countries and the more Anglophone Mashreq. This
legacy of colonial history means that those who do speak foreign language
often find that they have separate channels to the wider world.
41 Interviews with Paul Salem, Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Beirut 1998, and
Heba Handousa, Economic Research Forum, Cairo 1998.
42 Interview with Nasri Haddad, ICARDA, Cairo 1998.
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Research issues
The poor achievement of MENA countries in education should make this
issue a matter of priority, particularly in the light of current demographic
transitions.
National education policies of most MENA countries are poorly geared
both to labor market needs and to improving the research environment. They
are clearly in need of a major overhaul. This task is overwhelmingly the
responsibility of governments. Nevertheless, outside research should provide
strong support to educational reform. For example, a dearth of detailed
knowledge about the efficiency and quality of the region's education systems
remains a key obstacle to reform. "Crucial types of data are rarely collected,"
notes Nader Fergany. "The prime example is solid assessment of the quality
of education." (Fergany 1998a, 1998b). Efforts to gather, analyze and
disseminate such information should be encouraged.
Regarding production of knowledge in broader terms, the capacity-
building of existing research institutes should be as much of a priority as the
funding of applied research projects. Local research institutes lack the know-
how to access funding and technology. Skills in up-to-date methodology, in
program conceptualization, and in the application of inter-disciplinary
approaches are also lacking. Initiatives to upgrade statistics-gathering and
analysis are of particular importance. Efforts to computerize should be
encouraged, as should the creation of Arabic-language computer research
tools and databases. In addition, efforts to improve the applicability of
research— whether through linkages with government policy or private
industry — should be strengthened.
A very positive development in recent years has been a rapid growth in
independently-funded region-wide research initiatives, institutions and
information networks. Despite their limited impact to date, organizations
such as the Economic Research Forum in Cairo and the Arab Institute for
Research and Communication in Beirut deserve enthusiastic support. They
offer excellent possibilities for wider dissemination of knowledge and for the
upgrading of research skills and standards. They are also likely to enjoy
better access to policymakers, which is crucial given the current absence of
cooperation between governments and independent research institutes in
most MENA countries. Another type of initiative that should be encouraged
is the awarding of scholarships, fellowships and prizes for excellence in
social and applied research. These are cost-effective means of familiarizing
key personnel with advanced techniques and international norms, and also of
raising the profile of research.
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In terms of specific research priorities, there is a need for greater
emphasis on applied science that offers potentially significant rewards.
Biotechnology and genetic engineering with respect to local agricultural
conditions, for instance, are poorly funded at present. Integrated natural
resource management is also a promising field. (See section on Water, Land
and Environment.) In the social sciences, initiatives that address specific
development challenges should be encouraged. In many cases, inadequate
knowledge of the scope of problems — particularly in terms of statistical
data — is a basic obstacle to effective intervention. In addition, there is a
lack of cross-regional comparative studies. Support for social research should
also take into account the gaps created by inadequate government
sponsorship for certain fields of inquiry, for instance into the impact of
structural adjustment and trade liberalization on the poor, into gender issues,
or into potential models for democratization.
Macroeconomic policies
Problematics
Almost without exception, MENA economies are emerging from a long
period of overwhelming state domination. They are also becoming much
more open to the world. These fundamental macroeconomic shifts offer the
promise of releasing powerful potentials, but at the same time carry dangers
that appear to have been inadequately addressed.
Despite having adopted (or being in the process of adopting) a whole
range of policies that are more friendly to private business, most MENA
countries remain fairly uncompetitive in international trade. The opening of
national economies to the world marketplace, which most MENA countries
are now bound to through the GATT and subsidiary agreements, presents
considerable risks. Constraints to the position of MENA countries include:
a heavy legacy of import substitution policies (trade protectionism in
particular) which has saddled many MENA countries with industries
that cannot compete with more efficient and larger international
producers;
small internal markets;
lack of access to wider markets;
lack of experience in dealing with wider markets;
reliance on commodity exports with volatile prices — especially oil;
poorly educated work forces;
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costly industrial inputs — for example, the exorbitant price of land and
electricity in Gaza and Lebanon;
high transaction costs — relatively high prices for licences, for
example;
inefficient infrastructure— long delays at ports and poor
communications facilities, for example;
administrative bottlenecks;
poor government capacity in providing information and technical
outreach; and
lack of linkages between economic sectors — marginalization of the
informal sector from decision-making, for example.
It is with a view to addressing some of these issues that several
countries—Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and
Lebanon — have either entered into or concluded negotiations with the
European Union to form free-trade associations. These arrangements come
within the context of a European initiative aimed at creating a Mediterranean
free-trade area. At the same time, most Arab countries have also embraced
the creation of an Arab Free Trade Association (AFTA). However, since
intra-Arab trade currently accounts for less than 10% of the Arab total, the
fruits of this initiative lie a long way off (Zarrouk 1998).
While worthy in their end goals, these approaches have so far been
piecemeal and poorly coordinated. Regarding Europe, if MENA countries are
not careful they may end up facing hazards. There is a clear danger that Arab
industrial sectors may not become competitive quickly enough to counter an
expected massive inflow of European industrial goods. At the same time,
rules-of-origin requirements in many of the Euromed deals suggest that a
hub-and-spokes relationship will emerge, with MENA economies linked
umbilically to European suppliers and markets rather than to intra-regional
partners. This implies that MENA industrial producers will still have
problems achieving economies of scale (ERF 1998).
Because of their low technological and marketing base, small and
micro-enterprises are expected to be particularly hard-hit by the increase in
industrial imports. This potential impact has been very poorly studied,
however. Moreover, generous European initiatives to assist MENA industries
to upgrade their capacity so as to compete with European firms have largely
overlooked the small- and micro-sized enterprises sector. Only large-scale
industries have been able to cash in on this restructuring finance. One reason
for this imbalance is that there are few institutional channels for getting aid to
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small- and micro-sized enterprises. Another is that MENA governments have
viewed this type of aid as a form of compensation — a hand-out rather than a
hand-up.43
The agricultural sector is also poorly equipped to meet the challenge
presented by wider export markets, and greater competition at home. The
European market offers great opportunities for MENA's agricultural
producers. But the rigid standards it demands represent a serious barrier. The
financing and know-how needed for producers to meet European criteria are
lacking, especially at the local level.
In broader terms, the rush by MENA countries to improve their
macroeconomic image— and in particular to conform to the emerging
international standard of economic liberalization — has often come at the
cost of attention to local equity considerations. While marginalization of the
poor has been a clear effect of recent policies, attempts to address this issue
have been tentative and shallow. An extreme example is Lebanon, where the
government has financed its determination to rebuild showpiece
infrastructure through heavy internal borrowing. By soaking up 50% of
banking assets in treasury bills, the state is effectively starving the private
sector of investment capital. Stunted industrial growth and increasing poverty
are results of this policy.44
The emphasis on balancing government books has put the provision of
social service under severe strain in many countries. Yet, while governments
can no longer maintain promises of free education and health care, initiatives
to share costs with the private sector have been poorly articulated. In Egypt,
for example, despite strong interest from international donors, reform of the
health sector has been stymied by lack of government commitment. In
Lebanon, a tradition of reliance on private education is now being undercut
by the fact that fewer Lebanese can afford its cost.
Research issues
In general, throughout the MENA region, the impact of macroeconomic
policies at the small scale is poorly understood. In the absence of government
initiatives to investigate this question, it is imperative that independent
economic research be supported.
An issue that is of immediate relevance is the effect of liberalized trade
regimes on small- and micro-enterprises. The need for research is urgent, not
43 Interview with Paul Bonnefoy, EU Representative, Rabat 1998.
44 Interview with Youssef al-Khalil, Banque du Liban, Beirut 1998.
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just because this sector requires support, but also because governments that
are in the process of negotiating trade arrangements are often unaware of the
implications for MSMEs. Ways of helping MSMEs to meet the challenge of
greater competition must be explored. Local agencies that offer advice and
technical know-how — particularly in fields such as packaging, industrial
standards, and micro-marketing — should be supported. This priority holds
true for agriculture. In this context, it is important to remember that the lack
of detailed knowledge about the composition of the MSME sector remains a
major handicap for such efforts.
Another key research issue is the impact of structural adjustment on
poverty. Development of macroeconomic methods to reduce these negative
impacts have not received sufficient attention. Programs such as Egypt's
Social Fund are laudable, but they tend to sideline an issue which should be
mainstreamed into government economic policy. For example, many MENA
governments rely largely on regressive taxes — such as customs duties and
flat sales taxes — to finance their budgets. Obviously, these taxation regimes
unfairly punish the poor. Governments can be assisted to devise and apply
more equitable means of taxation, such as progressive income taxes and
property taxes. Innovative and equitable measures for cost-sharing in the
provision of social services also needs further exploration.
The ill-effects of macroeconomic policies have not been given due
consideration primarily because affected groups have been unable to
articulate their needs. An encouraging sign in this regard is the emergence of
powerful business associations throughout the region. However, these groups
mainly serve the interests of large-scale entrepreneurs who are well-
connected to the international economy and whose views already carry
influence with governments. By contrast, MENA governments are often
scarcely aware how important small- and micro-sized enterprises have in
their economies. For this reason, organized advocacy for sectors such as
these, along with small agricultural producers, must be strengthened.
Although still in its infancy, the Egyptian Small and Micro Enterprise
Association represents a model initiative.
Despite the present weakness of intra-regional trade, greater
integration of the region's economies should be a long-term goal. While
governments will take the lead in promoting these efforts, a supporting role
can be played by research institutions. It is particularly crucial that the
obstacles to integration should be identified and analyzed. For example, the
lack of uniform industrial standards, or of rules for patents and trademarks, is
an issue that has not been widely addressed.
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Governance
Problematics
As an accelerating process of economic reform and development reshapes
MENA countries, poor governance is increasingly seen as a key hindrance to
further progress. It is often observed of the region that state administrative
capacity and responsiveness are largely stagnant, while societies themselves
are undergoing rapid change. This is leading to what one long-time observer
of the region describes as trying to ran with one short and one long leg.45
By bucking the global trend towards greater democracy and local
autonomy, the MENA region has increasingly become a political anomaly.
Its countries are characterized by highly centralized states with very weak
representative institutions. For instance, the proportion of public spending in
Arab countries undertaken by locally elected officials is below 5%, compared
to 20-70% in OECD countries (Salem 1998). The people at large have
extremely limited political franchise, and play virtually no role in policy-
making. Government accountability is universally low. Top officials have
great discretionary power, and decision-making procedures are often opaque.
Even in countries whose constitutions theoretically allow for rotation of
power, heads of state are essentially life-long rulers: currently the average
tenure of Arab heads of state is 23 years. This is more than three times the
average for the rest of the world.
Lower down, administrative structures allow for little initiative or
flexibility. State bureaucracies are unwieldy and underpaid. The Palestine
National Authority employs 90 000 people out of a 700 000-strong work
force. The Egyptian public payroll lists some 5.5 million government
employees, or more than one in four working people. On average, Egyptian
government salaries are barely half of industrial wages. This compares to
double industrial wages in Korea and three times in Singapore for public
service employees.46 As a result, government employment in Egypt and other
MENA countries is widely considered a low-prestige profession, which has
the effect of repelling the best minds from state service. Not surprisingly,
these mammoth, under-fed administrative machines suffer from poor
motivation, rigid command structures, corruption, and unresponsiveness to
public needs.
45 Comment by George Vassiliou, former Prime Minister of Cyprus, Cairo 1997.
46 Lecture by Saad Nagi, American University in Cairo, 1998.
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Considering the lack of restraint on governments, it is hardly surprising
that MENA is probably the bleakest region of the world in terms of human-
rights issues. There is no need to go into great detail on this matter here.
Suffice it to say that there is not a single MENA country where torture by
security forces has not been documented in recent years. With few
exceptions, the press remains severely restricted. Most MENA governments
operate broadcasting monopolies that serve essentially as propaganda
vehicles. This generalized restriction of access to information creates an
atmosphere where public debate is either muted or conducted in ignorance of
essential facts.
Legal systems in most MENA countries are inefficient and
unpredictable. The overwhelming dominance of non-elected governments
allows for considerable interference in the judicial process. Even where
courts have a tradition of some independence, such as in Egypt and Lebanon,
justice is often painfully slow. Because of the absence of serious and open
debate, legislation is often introduced in arbitrary fashion, leading to tangled
and contradictory laws. The effects of this can be seen, for example, in the
near-impossibility of registering informal property holdings in Egypt (de
Soto, 1997).
All these factors have powerful implications for development. Recent
research, for example, has shown that far from being a neutral economic
factor, corruption is a serious retardant to growth (Kaufmann 1998). Analysis
of poverty as a quality rather than a quantity reveals that lack of access to
justice is an important component of deprivation. A recent opinion survey in
Egypt, for instance, revealed that over 70% of respondents thought there was
no equality in public affairs between rich and poor47. Lack of local
autonomy, meanwhile, often leads to gross misallocation of resources. It is
broadly true of MENA countries, for example, that capital cities absorb a
disproportionate share of state spending.
Some countries have embarked on administrative reform. Morocco has
made strides towards improving administrative efficiency at the local level,
and has begun to address the human rights issue seriously. Egypt has made
some progress in streamlining legislation, particularly with regard to
commercial law. Lebanon held its first municipal elections in 25 years in
May, 1998.
47 Al Ahram 26/9/98.
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But the overriding trend is towards a deterioration in governance
issues. A relative move towards democratization during the 1980s (the freest
elections in their modern history were held in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and
Tunisia) has gone into sharp reverse in all these countries during the 1990s.
In the past three years, further restrictions on the press have been introduced
in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS).
Opposition activity has fallen under tighter control in many countries. Syria,
Iraq, and Algeria remain glaring examples of countries where civil liberties
are minimal. In Lebanon, an international index registered a doubling of the
perceived level of corruption between 1995 and 1998 (Kaufmann 1998).
Even Tunisia, which stands out in the region as a development success story,
rates very poorly in terms of governance issues such as transparency, and
civil and human rights. And in virtually all countries of the region,
entrenched bureaucracy remains a major obstacle to both economic
development and public well-being.
Research issues
The acuteness of the governance problem in MENA countries suggest that a
broad-based approach is needed to confront it. While it is important that the
strength of government institutions be maintained, there is a need to support
counterbalancing forces that enhance the degree of dialogue between rulers
and ruled, that promote accountability and transparency in policy-making,
and that raise the standard of public debate.
MENA governments need assistance to readjust the state's role from
controller and patron to regulator and arbitrator. In terms of research, the
focus should be on identifying areas where poor governance creates
bottlenecks for growth. Inefficient and arbitrary customs regimes in Jordan
would be one example.48 Property registration rules in WBGS, Lebanon and
Egypt, and industrial licensing for small- and micro-sized enterprises in
Egypt are other examples.
The question of corruption requires sustained investigation. Recent
experience in other developing regions points the way to innovative and
systematic approaches to diagnosing and tackling this issue that have not
been attempted in MENA countries (Kaufmann 1998). For example, Bolivian
administrators have identified a "corruption equation" that makes it simpler
to analyze administrative habits that help corruption to flourish (Klitgaard et
48 Interview with Yousef Mansour, Ministry of Planning, Amman 1998.
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al. 1998). According to this model, corruption is an outcome of monopoly
over a resource combined with discretion in distributing it. (The formula is
this: corruption = monopoly + discretion.) Applying this to identify
administrative areas that are prone to corruption could be a useful beginning.
Given the sensitivity of the issue, however, priority should be given to the
involvement of administrators so as to build the political will to combat
corruption.
Given the weakness of MENA's representative institutions, there is a
need to support organizations and activities that help the public— and
particularly disenfranchised groups such as the poor, youth and women — to
express their needs and to Influence the political agenda. The conducting of
opinion polls and the wider dissemination of survey results on social
questions should be encouraged. For example, there exists a broad consensus
in Lebanon regarding vital reforms in governance, yet these attitudes are
seldom expressed through the existing political apparatus. At the same time,
there are no agencies which have the means or commitment to sponsor
opinion surveys.
A key component of efforts to improve governance should be support
of NGOs that are active in public advocacy, and particularly those that
monitor governance issues and promote democratic practice. Human rights
organizations and women's rights groups are obvious candidates in this
regard. It is encouraging that such groups have multiplied and grown far
more active in many countries in recent years. Yet these organizations are
often in need of capacity-building in such basic areas as accounting practices,
computerization, and familiarization with best international practice. Forums
that foster exchange between such organizations, both regionally and
nationally, should also be encouraged.
The weakness of representative institutions can also be addressed
directly through enhancing their own decision-making capacity. For
example, the Palestinian National Assembly — the legislative body for the
WBGS — faces the task of creating an entire body of legislature within a
short time. Yet it has very limited resources for information-gathering at its
disposal. In Lebanon, a Canadian initiative has helped establish a Lebanese
Parliamentary Institute that serves as a forum for dialogue between NGOs
and legislators. This idea could be applied elsewhere.
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The special case of Palestine
Problematics
By standards of income and human development, the Palestinians of the
WBGS appear to be doing relatively well by regional norms. However, the
Palestinian Territories suffer from a broad range of unique problems that
merit special attention.
It is not simply that ordinary Palestinians endure difficult, frequently
traumatic circumstances, or that their long experience of military occupation
has crippled their institutional development and left them isolated from the
surrounding region. And nor is it just that continued Palestinian support for
the Peace Process is likely to be predicated on tangible improvements in their
living standards.
As noted in the introduction, the failure to resolve their suffering has
region-wide repercussions. The Palestinian-Israeli problem is not only
geographically central to MENA, it bears implications for a range of issues
including regional trade and integration, the diversion of many countries'
resources to defense, and their internal political stability. Moreover, the
fragility of the current Peace Process carries with it the danger of a serious
and sudden collapse in Palestinian security and living standards. Without
sustained and effective support from the outside world, these dangers would
loom even larger.
The Palestinians' recent regaining of a degree of control over their
destiny has created challenges across the spectrum of development issues,
from severe environmental and social stresses to acute problems of
governance. Efforts to meet these challenges fall within the context of a
tenuous situation, where state institutions are in a formative stage and lacking
key structural ingredients.
The Palestinian economy is extremely frail. Production, services and
markets are all severely fragmented. Movement of goods and people — not
only to and from the outside world, but also between areas of Palestinian
autonomous control — is still completely beholden to the whims of Israel.
Indeed, arbitrary Israeli strictures on movement have throttled Palestinian
economic prospects in recent years, despite the $500 million a year of
international aid that has flowed in since the signing of the 1993 Oslo
Accords. It is estimated that Israeli border closures and curfews stripped $2.8
billion from the Palestinian GNP between 1993 and 1996, which is nearly
double the amount that foreign donors funneled into the territories during that
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period (UNSCO 1998b). Without foreign aid, the Palestinian economy would
have shrunk by a further 6%-8%. Even when the territories' borders are
open, as at present, Israeli security checks and delays make transport
expensive: it costs more to ship a container over the 50 kilometer distance
from the West Bank to Gaza than over 3 000 kilometers from Gaza to Italy.49
The cost of inputs in the WBGS are also high, which hampers the
ability to exploit cheap and abundant labor. For example, electricity costs in
Gaza are almost double those in Israel. Land prices are prohibitively high, at
$2 000-3 000 a square meter in Gaza City.50 At the same time, pervasive
uncertainty about the future has bottled up productive investment. An
indicator of this is that Palestinian banks have substantial assets, largely due
to remittances from overseas Palestinians. Yet loan-to-deposit ratios barely
top 30%, compared to around 80% in more "normal" countries. Furthermore,
most of this credit is directed towards housing construction rather than
productive investment (Barnett et al. 1998).
A generation of neglect under Israeli rule has burdened the WBGS
with a bleak legacy of environmental and social problems. The Gaza Strip,
for example, probably has the most precarious water-supply of any region in
the world. At the same time, it also has one of the world's highest population
growth-rates, at over 5% a year. Unemployment in 1997 was 37.5%, with a
level of over 50% for those under 25 (UNSCO 1998a, 1998b).
Underinvestment in infrastructure has bequeathed serious problems in solid
waste disposal, sewerage and most other public environmental services. For
example, only 25% of Gaza households are linked to sewerage networks,
despite the fact that the territory's one million people are crowded into an
area measuring just 10 by 40 kilometers. Nearly all sewage is pumped
directly into the sea.51
Constant Israeli pressure has also handicapped Palestinian efforts at
institution-building. These efforts are a necessity for improving the quality of
life, even if the question of actual statehood remains politically vexed. The
Palestinian government, or Palestinian National Authority (PNA), has little
control over land, finances and other resources, yet it is expected to carry out
fully-fledged governance roles. In addition to this structural weakness, the
PNA is also crippled by the imperatives of its leadership, whose chief
concern is not development but the maintenance of its own control for the
49 Interview with Alex Pollock, World Bank, El Ram 1998.
50 Interview with Salah Abdel Shafi, DRC, Gaza 1998.
51 Interview with Dina Assaf and Said Jalala, Ministry of Planning, Gaza 1998.
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achievement of political objectives. (Or, as the leadership would see it, the
maintenance of "national unity.") As a result, the PNA is characterized by
cronyism and a rather haphazard approach to the core business of public
administration. Crucial governance issues, such as the elaboration of an
adequate and just legal system, have not been addressed with sufficient
seriousness. Human rights abuse is rampant.
Given this situation, many of the functions of government have
necessarily been adopted by NGOs. Most of these organizations were created
during the Israeli occupation, and so have a very strong tradition of grass-
roots support in the territories. Their activities range from the provision of
basic social services, to scientific and social research, to monitoring human
rights, and to promoting small industries. Most Palestinian NGOs, however,
are heavily reliant on foreign aid. And while Palestinian society has benefited
enormously from their work, there are signs that civil society is taking an
increasingly adversarial attitude to government. Although many NGOs have
created both plans and suggestions for improving resource management, few
of these initiatives have been adopted by the PNA. In interviews, numerous
development experts in the WBGS warned of this danger, and stressed the
need for greater government-NGO synthesis and cooperation.
Research issues
Given the array of development challenges facing Palestinians, sustained
efforts to improve knowledge and support research activities are crucial.
Sponsorship of these efforts must, however, take into account several
overriding considerations. The political situation remains highly volatile.
Therefore, multi-scenario models must be adopted, and creative thinking
encouraged. Very large volumes of international aid are pouring into the
WBGS, with literally hundreds of agencies involved. This makes it vital that
a high degree of coordination and information-sharing be maintained. Lastly,
the Palestinian territories have suffered three decades of isolation. For this
reason, it is important that development initiatives should promote links
between the WBGS and the rest of the region, including beneficial contacts
between Israelis and Palestinians.
Despite the handicaps that burden the Palestinian territories, the
WBGS also enjoy strengths that should be systematically grown. Chief
among these is a high standard of human capital. In the long term, it is this
factor alone which will have to compensate for the extreme shortage in
resources such as land and water. Emphasis should, therefore, be
concentrated on institutional and technical capacity-building.
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In this regard, the strength and vitality of Palestinian NGOs and
independent academic institutions are significant advantages. However,
cooperation with these institutions should take into account two important
factors. Firstly, the need for NGO activity to be policy-oriented, and to be
operated with a view to supporting the role of the state — within the context
of good governance. Secondly, the proliferation of NGOs and aid agencies in
the WBGS creates a highly competitive atmosphere. The degree of donor
overload is such that research proposals may often be tailored more to
pleasing funding agencies than to achieving results on the ground.
Despite the huge investment in Palestinian development, particularly in
infrastructure, gaps in knowledge remain impediments to development in
many fields. For example, key components of the Palestinian economy are
still poorly understood. The informal sector has not been adequately
analyzed. Nor has the very large but volatile phenomenon of labor migration
to work inside Israel. Numerous initiatives have been taken to support and
improve the performance of MSMEs, which are crucial to the creation of
employment for a rapidly growing work force. But these efforts are in need
of greater coordination. Comparative research to identify best practices
would be useful. Areas that need particular attention regarding small- and
micro-sized enterprises are the upgrading of packaging to international
standards, improving marketing reach, and the consolidation of cluster
linkages. This is particularly true within high-potential industries such as
clothing manufacture, software development, and data processing.
Despite the devotion of significant resources in recent years, many
environmental questions have not been sufficiently explored. There remains
a pressing need to improve management of water resources and of waste-
water. Urbanization has been extremely rapid and disorganized, affecting
even remote villages in the West Bank which now sprawl out along main
roads. Means of managing urban expansion must be enhanced, not just in
terms of issues such as solid waste, but also in terms of preserving the
traditional appearance and physical identity of the country. This is necessary
not just for Palestinian well-being, but also for the encouragement of tourism,
which has a very large unexploited potential. This is even true of Gaza,
which has magnificent beaches that are marred by garbage, untreated sewage
and poorly controlled building.
Agricultural research must be better-integrated into government policy.
Some fruitful fields for future research include reuse of village waste-water
for irrigation and small-scale livestock management. In addition, the present
rudimentary government agricultural outreach services need upgrading.
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A range of governance issues remain areas of concern. The nascent
Palestinian legislature— the Palestinian National Assembly— faces the
daunting task of untangling past Ottoman, British, Jordanian and Israeli
military laws. The effects of these laws — for example on property rights —
need to be better understood. For this purpose, the PNA's limited research
capacity needs expanding. The expansion of government functions in other
fields requires research backing. For example, national social security and
integrated public health systems have yet to be designed.
At the same time, NGOs concerned with governance issues should be
encouraged to continue playing an important role in advocacy, in monitoring
human rights, and in keeping such issues as women's rights and
democratization on the public agenda.
In this regard, it should be noted that the extreme political constraints
necessitated by protracted conflict— and now protracted peace
negotiations — have the effect of limiting the sphere of open public debate
on some key questions. For this reason, forums that explore issues which
have been taboo for Palestinians should be encouraged. Such ideas might
include:
Learning Hebrew language in schools. Rarely practiced now for
nationalistic reasons, acquisition of their neighbors' language would
give Palestinians a useful window into a technically advanced society
on their doorstep, promote understanding, and also improve
Palestinians' ability to express and argue their rights.
Family planning. Until now, demography has been seen as a political
tool in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But continued growth at current levels
is simply unsustainable.
Voter participation in Arab East Jerusalem. Palestinian residents have
consistently boycotted elections so as not to give sanction to Israel's
unilateral annexation. While laudable, this rejection has resulted in
domination of the city by extremist Israeli elements, and to glaring
inequity in the provision of municipal services between Jews and
Palestinians.
Looking into unorthodox models for resolving aspects of the Arab-
Israeli conflict — for example the imposition of per capita quotas for
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Chapter 2.
Science and Research for Development in the Arab Region
Nader Fergany
Introduction
Science, technology and research, less-developed countries in a globalizing world
The benevolent view of science revolves around the accumulation of
knowledge in order to improve the human condition.
Research is the human endeavour meant to further this mission of
science. Through research, science aims at description, explanation (or under-
standing) and, some claim, prediction52 of natural and human phenomena.
Technology is the "solutions" part of the scientific endeavour.
Previously, technology was thought of as the application of scientific
knowledge to solve problems humanity faces. Currently, it is considered to
be grounded in the close interaction between knowledge and human industry,
in the widest sense.
This paper attempts the ambitious task of proposing a unified treatment
of science, including the practice of "science" in the social and societal
spheres of human existence. The inclusion of "the social sciences" in a
general treatment of science is rather unusual, and especially difficult. Social
sciences are often considered "soft"— if not outright non-science —
compared to the "hard" physical or natural sciences.
In addition, if science includes "social science," what is "social
technology"? That concept incorporates the know-how of societal betterment
and, in particular, the quest for progress in less-developed countries which is
termed "development."
Finally, aspects considered peculiar to a certain sub-domain of science,
particularly the social sciences, will be pointed out.
The benevolent view of science is not universal. Three quarters of a
century ago, in 1924, Bertrand Russell sounded a different view when he
wrote, "I am compelled to fear that science will be used to promote the
52 Recently, however, the prediction function has become the subject of controversy,
especially with the realization that social phenomena can be inherently chaotic.
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power of dominant groups." Near the end of this treatise, he intoned, "...
science threatens to cause the destruction of our civilization."55
Russell did not confine himself to the physical sciences but also
included the "anthropological" ones. More recently, in the West, writings by
scientists with such titles as, "Is science failing society?" are not uncommon.
Both views of science — the benevolent and the malevolent — do hold
aspects of truth. Perhaps more often than not, science has been exploited to
further the interests of dominant powers. But history also tells us that science
has contributed to empowering the weak.
In principle, science holds the promise of emancipation through
enlightenment. For this promise to be fulfilled, however, scientists have to
act as active members of an "intelligentsia," and must sometimes pay a price
that can be very heavy indeed in oppressive societies.
In the emancipatory sense, science is an especially crucial issue in less-
developed countries. As a means of empowerment in the national and
international arenas —- and hopefully as a path to improving human condition
at large — benevolent science is sorely needed in less-developed countries.
The two desiderata, empowerment and progress, are not independent,
particularly in this age where global financial capitalism dominates, at the
expense of human development.
On the eve of the third millennium, poverty — in its wider sense of
deficient human welfare— is still rampant in the third world. More
significantly, under runaway global capitalism, the welfare gap between the
rich and poor of the world has grown. Despite per capita income being an
inadequate measure of human welfare, the gap between the G7 countries and
the world's seven poorest countries has grown from 20 times in 1965, to 39
times in 1995 (UNCTAD, 1997).
Per-capita income measures neglect the distribution aspect. According
to UNCTAD, the evidence also proves that "polarization among countries
53 Bertrand Russell's paper, Icarus, or, the Future of Science, was delivered in response
to J.B.S. Haldane's paper, Daedalus, or, Science and the Future, which Haldane read to the
Heretics in Cambridge in 1923.
The allegories are enlightening. In Greek mythology, Daedalus was the personification
of the arts and crafts and a prolific inventor. Having murdering Talus, his nephew, because he
feared that his innovative genius would surpass his own, Daedalus fled, only to be imprisoned
with his son Icarus. The father and son made their escape, using wings made from wax and
feathers. But Icarus flew too close to the sun and plunged to his death in the sea. The
inventiveness of Daedalus tempted Haldane to adopt his name for the title of his speech. But
the dire fate of mixing science with evil, or rashness, seems to have escaped him. Hence
Russell's incisive reminder.
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has been accompanied by increasing income inequality within countries."
(UNCTAD, 1997) Indeed, utilization of any concept of human welfare
befitting the end of the second millennium reveals a starker dichotomy across
the globe. In one sense, the burden of welfare disparity has been mounting at
a higher rate than is revealed by any standard measure of welfare, as a result
of increasing longevity in the South. Longer years of relative deprivation are
now being suffered by the less-fortunate inhabitants of poor countries.54
The dilemma, however, is that the institution of science tends to be
grossly underdeveloped in poor countries and tends to be even less developed
than other aspects of human existence. This should not be surprising. Science
has generally been one of the finer, more expensive facets of human
societies. The crisis of science in less-developed countries is a frequent
complaint.
Naturally, as in all other spheres of human existence, the conditions of
science vary widely in less-developed countries, including response to the
global context. China, for example, is a huge exception that should be
excluded from the following characterization. But even when China is
excluded, the analyst is left with such dissimilarities that generalizations are
nearly impossible to make. For instance, Brazil, India, and Egypt are too
different to put in one category (the Egypt-India comparison is especially
interesting [Fergany, 1998c, in Arabic]).
Having served this notice, it is probably fair to make the following,
rather sweeping, generalizations.
The political economy of less-developed countries usually mitigates
against the institution of effective science. That is, decision-making is
normally limited to a small clique and thus it is not necessarily rational or
scientific. Academic and intellectual freedoms are routinely denied and
institution-building is thoroughly politicized. As a result, both resources and
societal energy that are allocated to such lofty issues as science are meager.
Furthermore, the predominance of advanced countries' agendas in science
and technology — often enforced through aid schemes — create a state of
"anomie" in scientific circles in the Third World. The end result is normally
ineffective utilization of personnel and facilities with output that often lacks
in relevance and hence has limited impact on indigenous development.
54 Exception has to be made in this respect for a number of countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa, where the prevalence of AIDS has resulted in declining life expectancy. In these
countries, the decimation of life by a disease that is essentially manageable in rich countries is
sad testimony to the selfishness of the powerful segments of humanity.
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There are also strong indications that global trends, as conditioned by
domestic power structures, are aggravating the "crisis" of science in less-
developed countries.
In the last two decades, capitalist restructuring— also termed
structural adjustment or, even more euphemistically, "economic reform" —
has been imposed on the people of many less-developed countries by a
coalition of international and local forces. A savage form of capitalism —
with neither the requirements of efficiency nor distributive justice as
exercised in mature capitalist societies — is being built in the Third World.
The primary motivation is to provide a level playing field, but in reality this
only applies to international capital. Little else seems to matter. The irony is
that this brand of global capitalism is almost certain to undermine the very
prospects for economic growth, let alone development in any meaningful
sense. In the words of UNCTAD again, "... liberalization of the world
economy has proceeded so far in a lopsided way that tends to prejudice the
growth prospects of developing countries..." (UNCTAD, 1997). The series
of advertised corrections to global capitalism, brought about by the aftermath
of the recent Asian-cum-Latin crisis, is a belated one. It does not promise to
go to the core of the problem.
This deformed capitalist restructuring is having a dire impact on human
welfare in many countries in the Third World. In this alone constitutes an
important argument in favour of benevolent science. But, in addition, this
brand of capitalism is placing science at greater risk through the downsizing of
the state —- as expressed through abdication of social responsibility coupled
with diminished public expenditure, especially in real terms.
It is not that the control of an authoritarian (i.e., unrepresentative,
coercive and unaccountable) as well as inefficient55 state has been good for
the cause of science — or of development, for that matter. But the model of
mature capitalist societies in the domain of science — i.e., of persistent,
generous support by the state, especially for basic science as well as for the
business sector, and most particularly in the area of technology
development — is not being replicated in most countries of the Third World.
Indeed, it is unlikely that it will ever, develop.
In these newly capitalist societies, no vigorous societal patron of
science is currently in place. Except in matters of regime security, the
faltering state is withdrawing and the business sector is neither willing nor
capable of investing intensively in R&D. The combined factors of small size,
55 Authoritarian, but efficient, regimes are known to have scored successes in the
domain of S&T.
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a penchant for quick profit, and subordinate affiliations with international
large capital conspire to minimize private-sector contribution to R&D in less-
developed countries.
Furthermore, the intensifying emphasis on S&T in the international
market — particularly for highly qualified R&D personnel — adds to the
predicament that poor countries are experiencing with respect to science. The
two challenges are the "brain drain" (the only truly international labour
market is for the highly qualified) and much tighter "intellectual property"
stipulations of the new world trade regime.
Why the "Arab region," and attendant problems
The purpose of this paper is to identify what place the Arab region has in
less-developed countries in the context of science and its contribution to
development. This is not an easy task.
For instance, this question might arise: Why call it an Arab region?
That is, why not describe it as "Arab countries," or some other regional
configuration?
In spite of persistent, recently strengthened and generously funded
efforts to define alternatives, the terms Middle East, MEN A, or "Arab
countries, Iran and Turkey," the definition of an "Arab region" is a coherent
and meaningful historical entity. This is also true in the context of science,
especially social sciences. The insistence on deconstructing the Arab identity
in favour of the forced insertion of Israel, or other countries, in regional
definitions rekindles the fears of imperialist designs for the Arabs, and
heightens the tensions attendant to the faltering peace process.
By comparison, the evocative term "Arab Homeland," which is used in
Arabic, is laden with cultural and functional connotations. The common
language, an essential medium for knowledge-generation and utilization, is a
potent reason. A distinguished history of achievement in science at the zenith
of Arab civilization is another reason — albeit used at times as the proverbial
"lamppost" by a drunkard, i.e. for support rather than illumination.
A long and active history of Arab cooperation in the field of education
paves the way for co-operative scientific activity. Major regional events (e.g.,
Israeli President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem and its aftermath, or Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait) affect the practice of science across the region,
especially in the social sciences, and particularly with respect to Arab
cooperation. A plethora of pan-Arab institutions exist— including some
specifically concerned with science, albeit relatively inefficient. Other
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institutions have been in the design, or advocacy, stage far too long.
Examples include an Arab university for graduate studies, or joint-research
programs in seawater desalination and solar energy. Due to strong
complementarities in the resource base and potentially huge economies of
scale, the vast potential of Arab cooperation in science and technology
development cannot be ignored.
In reality, however, the Arab region is clearly an entity in crisis.
Due to differences in historical development, including the colonial
experience and geological realities (varied fossil-fuel resources) there is
extensive diversity in Arab conditions, science and research included.
In particular, the region is increasingly fragmented. Indeed, the
prevailing response to globalization has been for every Arab country to
negotiate terms with global markets on individual basis. As a result, all are
collectively and individually quite weak in the international arena.
Notwithstanding the inherent hypocrisy of the present unipolar international
order (e.g., Israel's possession of weapons of mass destruction, Serbia) the
plight of the Palestinians, Iraqis, Sudanese, and Libyans — though in no
small measure brought on by corrupt governance — is only one of many
sinister manifestations of this frailty.
In consequence, the considerable potential for science in the Arab
region is almost totally wasted. Worse, prospects of Arab cooperation in
S&T are plagued by seemingly insurmountable practical problems.
One glaring symptom of the weakness of science in the Arab region is
the severe lack of information on science, especially social sciences. Through
the good offices of UNESCO, a reasonably good information base on R&D
exists, particularly in the natural sciences. In preparation for the periodically
published World Science Report, regional studies are commissioned. The
UNESCO Cairo office regularly produces two basic studies: one on higher
education, the other on science and technology systems in the Arab region
(the two latest ones were published in 1996b and 1998). If it were not for
these studies — motivated by the international agency, rather than national or
regional institutions 56 — very little would be known about science and
technology in the Arab region regarding its institutions, personnel,
expenditure, and output.
56 In the 1970s, ALECSO, the Arab counterpart to UNESCO, sponsored a similar
activity. This is no longer done, which serves as another reminder of the dwindling fortunes of
Arab institutional cooperation.
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Though social sciences are quite "old" in the region, nothing similar
seems to exist in the case of social science. Unfortunately, as we shall see
later on, UNESCO's efforts in this field are still nascent. As a result, the
patchy nature of information on the social sciences in the region is shocking.
This situation will force our quantitative assessment of science inputs
and outputs to be mostly restricted to R&D in the natural sciences and
technology.
More significantly, the pervasive lack of information from national and
regional authorities proclaims two depressing facts: a lack of serious concern
for science, and the deplorable absence of a strategy for scientific
development.57
Finally, as shall be discussed in the next section, the challenge for
science in the Arab region is daunting: the human condition in Arab
countries is bad and deteriorating.
All these considerations render the topic attempted here hard to cover
adequately, especially in a paper of the present size. The only way to cover
the vast and complex terrain specified for this paper is to resort to (hopefully)
meaningful generalizations with perhaps a spattering of (relatively) solid
evidence and salient examples of countries, institutions or fields of science.
Indeed, the difficulty encountered in the preparation of the present
paper, and the tentative nature of the output, represents a strong summons to
structure a research program aiming at a comprehensive and rigorous study
of science in the Arab region.
The region's human condition: the challenge
Science
Improving the human condition represents the benevolent view of science.
Using such definitions of science as a premise, it should be enlightening to
outline the contours of the human condition in the Arab region. Such an
exercise helps to define the task science must face here.
The ultimate objective of human society is supposed to be the
attainment of the highest level of welfare for all. This objective means that a
minimum level of basic needs — those that are consistent with human
57 A solid information base is needed to formulate a valid strategy scientifically. More
importantly, effective implementation of such a strategy — which is, by definition, a process
incorporating effective monitoring and assessment — requires an information base that is even
more demanding to create.
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dignity as perceived at the end of the 20th century — must be satisfied for
every member of the society. Beyond that level, human progress has
opened — and continues to open — new vistas for social welfare especially
in the non-material domain. But these remain in the realm of dreams for most
people in poor countries.
In the Arab states, in particular, concern for attaining a minimum level
of standard of living for all continues to be paramount, indeed heightening.
This should not come as a surprise: according to the World Bank, economic
growth has been negative, or at best stagnant, for nearly two decades (see
Figure 1). The recent collapse of the oil market must have made the growth
scene even more bleak, at least for the oil producers, than the figure
indicates. (Note that the data stop at 1993.)
Figure 1. Annual GDP growth per worker, MENA.
Source: World Bank, 1995.
In many countries that are undergoing structural adjustment, the
poverty affliction is intensifying. In addition, economic output is being
increasingly unequally distributed, resulting in widening disparity in income,
wealth — and power. Worst of all, these conditions undermine the prospects
for future economic growth.
Within the (UNDP) human development paradigm, poverty is defined as
a failure of human capability. In other words, it is the inability of people to
generate the human capabilities required for the welfare entitlement of a social
entity: a person, a household or a community. Hence, poverty is not about low
income or expenditure, or even the failure to meet basic needs, but about
human-capability failure. In this perspective, poverty is almost synonymous
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with powerlessness. Powerlessness does manifest itself in income-expenditure
deficiency, a lower level of satisfaction of basic needs, and, more importantly,
in lack of access to, and control over, capital: physical, financial, human and
social. This denial of access to capital closes the vicious circle of poverty.
Poverty is estimated to have become massive, especially in rural areas,
and is generally expected to be on the rise. Estimates suggest that in the mid-
1990s, between 90 to 100 million Arabs (out of a total of about 250 million)
should be considered poor (UNDP 1997). However, this is an underestimate
of the extent of human-capability failure in the region.58 The same UNDP
publication asserts, "there is enough evidence to claim that [poverty] may be
rising."59 Many factors interact to shape this failure of human-capability
potential. Most fundamental is the inadequacy of the human-capital stock,
especially on the quality dimension.
Indeed, there are grave dangers in the continuation of the status quo in
human-capital accumulation in the Arab region as well as the crisis in its
linkage to the socio-economic system.
In spite of major quantitative achievement in enrolment, educational
attainment remains low due to widespread illiteracy and relatively limited
enrolment, particularly in the higher stages of education. Human-capital
accumulation (measured in mean years of schooling) has been lower than in
East Asia since 1960, at which time Arab countries enjoyed higher per capita
output. More significantly, the gap between the two groups of countries has
been widening, as far as educational attainment is concerned (see Figure 2).
Indications all point to a poor, and probably deteriorating, quality of
human-capital through education. In addition, contrary to a common
misconception, Arab countries are not big spenders on education. To the
contrary, expenditure on education is relatively low and — in real terms —
has been slipping (Fergany 1998d).
58 Sometimes, on authority of the World Bank, the incredibly low level of income-
expenditure poverty of 4% is quoted. In view of the miserable growth record indicated above,
simple common sense would lead to questioning the validity of this estimate. Seen in a
different light, Egypt has about one-fourth of the region's population. The most credible
estimate of income-expenditure poverty in 1995 is 44% (Fergany 1998b). Thus, the
contribution of Egypt alone to the regional level of poverty in the mid-1990s is about 11%.
And, what about poverty in the rest of Arab countries, especially Iraq, Sudan and Somalia?
The same reference shows that 44% is a gross underestimate of the level of poverty in Egypt.
59 Tunisia seems to be an exception, though not as glorious a success as hailed by the
international financial institutions. Morocco is even less of a success story if poverty is
defined in terms more meaningful than income-expenditure shortfall (Fergany 1997).
70 FERGANY
Figure 2. Mean years of schooling (25 years of age or older),
Arab region and three Asian Tigers, 1960-1992.
As could be expected, the poor are deprived of education at higher-
than-average rates, especially at higher stages of education and in quality
educational tracks, hence reducing their chances for good employment.
On the other hand, non-educational factors — the socio-economic
contexts of education — undermine the ability for human-capital stock to
serve as an engine of development in the region. The prevalence of illiteracy
and poverty — particularly as manifested in child malnutrition — are factors
that detract from the potential for learning.
The dearth of skill is finally driven by the absence of a dynamic training
and re-training system for life-long education. Such a system is essential,
particularly in a period of rapid transformation in the economic structure.
Consequently, high-quality human capital needs to be stressed as an
utmost priority in the Arab region. In particular, a bold overhaul of education
and training systems is long overdue.
Limited and deteriorating access to any means of building human capital
can also be traced to the domain of health, where the poor are increasingly
deprived of high-quality basic, curative, healthcare in most Arab countries.
Whatever human capital the region possesses should be effectively
utilized in the production of elements of welfare. Unfortunately, in the
regional classification of the World Bank, the Arab region suffers the highest
unemployment rate in the world (see Figure 3). And, unemployment is on the
rise.
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Figure 3. Unemployment rate by region, 1993.
Source: World Bank, 1995.
For the Arab region as a whole, an overall open unemployment rate of
at least 15% around 1995 seems reasonable. This corresponds to more than
12 million unemployed persons. The current climate of deepening
socioeconomic crisis in the region gives unemployment a sinister makeup.
Because it particularly affects poor and often educated youth in a context
marked by initially low levels of social welfare, virtually no unemployment
compensation, and worsening distribution of income and wealth,
unemployment has far-reaching social and political consequences.
The challenge of job creation is expected to become even more serious
with time. If we add future labour market entrants to the present pool of the
openly unemployed, the huge level of job creation that is required poses an
awesome challenge for Arab economies. This is especially true in the context
of the region's stagnant growth. If the current rates of unemployment persist,
the size of unemployment would almost double by 2010, to about 25 million.
Further, if the recent trends in productivity (stagnant or deteriorating) and
real wages (declining) persist, the spectre of even deeper underemployment and
more massive poverty is sure to haunt the region in the near future.
It is to be noted that poverty aggravates unemployment. For the vast
majority of the poor, work power is their only — or most important — asset.
It is their only access to livelihood. Accordingly, the poorest of the poor
cannot afford the luxury of open unemployment and have to find some work
as means of livelihood. But the consequent level of welfare could be
extremely low.
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A very strong link between poverty and unemployment is evident if the
low-income dimension of underemployment, or the miserable working and
living conditions endured by the working poor is considered. Indeed, poverty
and unemployment become almost inseparable when the wider aspects of
employment, (especially having a good job) together with poverty as
powerlessness are considered. In this context, "good" means jobs that are
productive, in which the individual utilizes skills and fulfils potential for
growth, under conditions consonant with human dignity, through which
enough is earned to avoid poverty and human degradation.
Unemployment is thus inextricably linked with poverty, in the widest
sense. Consequently, in a context of increasing unemployment and widening
poverty, particularly in societies where no effective social safety nets exist,
the role of productive and gainful employment as the conduit out of poverty
is crucial.
Growth leading to poverty eradication should be the overarching
objective of development policy in the Arab region. It is generally
acknowledged that large-scale generation of productive and gainful job
opportunities— in short full employment, an essential objective in its own
right — is a valid strategic path to this objective. Full employment should be
taken to mean good jobs for all who can work.
But in addition to feeble human capital and dearth of good job
opportunities, the poor suffer limited and diminishing access to physical
capital — particularly to land and water in rural areas — and finance.
One manifestation of this type of deprivation is the lack of effective
and integrated support to small- and micro-enterprises. This is true in spite of
the fact that private economic activity in the Arab region is overwhelmingly
small-scale, even when restricted to non-agricultural enterprises. Moreover,
small and informal economic activities are relatively successful in job
creation, though their low productivity is a problem. Nevertheless, support to
this sector is weak and has been further enfeebled under structural adjustment
that favors large capital (Fergany 1998a).
In order to construct a welfare-maximizing alternative to the present
development predicament, mass poverty must be understood as a product of
complex structural processes embedded in the political economy of Arab
countries. Within this complexity, identifying the key causes of poverty is a
precondition for formulating an effective anti-poverty strategy.
The primary cause of poverty can be summed up in the failure of
development strategies in the last four decades, including the more recently
introduced macroeconomic reforms. This failure has manifested itself in
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limited and inequitable access to all forms of capital: physical, financial,
human, and social. Deprivation from capital leads to lack of remunerative
employment and, hence, to poverty.
Government-led development is generally judged to have stifled
economic growth through undermining efficiency and distorting the price
structure. But the type of structural adjustment undertaken in most Arab
countries has also exacerbated poverty. In response to cuts in public spending
(particularly in real terms) basic services remained inadequate and
deteriorated. Privatization of public enterprises did not necessarily result in
significant improvement in total productivity or output growth. Under
recessionary macroeconomic stabilization conditions, unemployment rose
and real wages fell. Inevitably, poverty mounted.
The consensus now is that the most effective way to eradicate poverty
consists of empowering the poor to bail themselves out of poverty. But the
poor have no capital except their labour power and creative capabilities that
are suppressed by impoverishment.
Empowering the poor, therefore, requires that the state (not just
government) becomes the guardian of the interests of all citizens, and adopts
policies and programs that will equip them with all types of capital: social,
human, financial, and physical.
The most important capital is human capital — built through education,
training and health care. Financial capital is also essential to enable the poor to
set-up small- and micro-enterprises that represent one of the effective means
for job creation and income generation. In predominantly rural societies, as is
the case with the Arab region, access to physical assets such as land and
irrigation water are basic requirements for sustainable livelihood. Finally, since
poverty is synonymous with powerlessness, social capital is indispensable to
provide the poor with access to social and political organizations that will
ensure that their voices are heard and their interests safeguarded.
However, just because the state has the responsibility for empowering
the poor through provision of capital does not mean that it assumes the role
of directly providing of goods and services. This has failed. The requirement
is that the state guarantees the provision of different forms of capital to the
poor through distributive measures. The evolving supremacy of little-
regulated, private-sector activities are doomed to failure in combating
poverty — even if they succeed in generating economic growth, in the
narrow sense. However, it is now well established that significant economic
growth is unlikely to result in situations of low human capability and
rampant inequality.
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But success in growth leading to poverty eradication is conditional on
the evolution of a new social contract in which a synergy, not just
complementarity, exists between a revitalized and efficient government, a
dynamic and socially responsible private sector, and a powerful and truly
grassroots civil society.
The profit motive is, by definition, ineffective in equipping the poor
with the capital necessary to combat poverty. For example, providing basic
education, or health care, to the poor does not carry a profit margin to tempt
private-sector providers. However, means can be found to ensure that the
private sector contributes to this task.
In fact, the poor, indeed society at large, needs to be protected from the
forms of "savage capitalism" that could evolve in much of the Arab region if
the regulatory mechanisms essential to a mature capitalist society are not built
and continually reinforced. This is again a crucial function for the state to do.
The primary responsibility for empowering the poor in less-developed
countries lies with the state — as it is the case in mature capitalist societies.
But the present state is grossly inadequate for this task. Hence, government and
governance, as well as reform, which includes genuine local government that is
truly representative of and accountable to the people, all represent essential
components of the new social contract. A prerequisite for this is the existence
of a body of law guaranteeing basic freedoms and human rights. Rule of law is
to be ultimately ensured through a positively independent judiciary. In short,
the reformation of government is the critical link if an alternative vision for
human development in the region is to take hold and prosper.
Other than government, another significant social actor in empowering
the poor is civil society. If this potential is to materialize, however, two
conditions are required. One is that current constraints on forming civil
society institutions — and on their activities — must be lifted. Probably even
more important is building the capacity of the sector for effective contri-
bution to human development, on the basis of voluntarism and grassroots
collective social action.
The characterization of the human condition in the region and
alternative vision sketched above, while admittedly brief and coloured with
the author's own research interests, delineate a monumental agenda for
science as a force for progress.
But the characterization is also grossly incomplete. It does not tackle
many fundamental aspects of human society spanning the spectrum from the
social incentive system (such as norms and values) at one end, to the
ecological envelope of Arab countries at the other end. Between these two
points are crucially important dimensions of Arab existence. Two such
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dimensions are a critically narrow resource base60 and a backward, inefficient
production system. All represent vast arenas for S&T.
In conclusion, the challenge for science, as a force for progress, in the
Arab region is even more daunting than indicated by our partial exposition of
its human condition at the end of the 20th century,
The state of science in the Arab region
Contrasted to the immense challenges facing science in the Arab region, how
does the practice of science measure up?
As mentioned above, our treatment is constrained by dearth of infor-
mation, and is, on the quantitative plane, almost entirely restricted to R&D in
the natural sciences.
To motivate the discussion, however, a brief look on the contents of one
of the most venerable Arab periodicals over 20 years would be useful. Al-
Mostakbal al-Arabi (MA), or the Arab Future, is a journal which is the flagship
publication of the Centre for Arab Unity Studies (CAUS) in Beirut. As its
name implies, CAUS is concerned with pan-Arab issues, particularly in the
perspective of unity. The Centre, through a determined leadership, has also
been instrumental in creating, and supporting, pan-Arab associations, including
professional ones — notably in sociology, political science, and economics.
The MA is important in many ways. In the face of nearly insurmountable
odds, including years of devastating civil war in Lebanon, the vagaries of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and the catastrophe of the invasion of Kuwait, the
monthly periodical has been published with almost perfect regularity (230
issues in 20 years). By Arab standards, this is a remarkable record. Not only
for this reason, it has built a wide base of respect as a serious journal.
An index of the contents of the first 20 years of MA was published in
May 1998. Out of more than 2 500 articles, using the subject classification of
the index, only 84 fall under the category of science at large in the region.
These were split between the soft and hard sciences — with a small emphasis
on the latter. (See Annex, Table A-l.)
6(1 In historical perspective, the relative abundance of hydrocarbon deposits, which are
concentrated in parts of the region and home to a small fraction of the Arab population does
not represent a rich resource base. Due to human factors, huge oil reserves can coincide with
massive human suffering (such as in Iraq and Libya). In other Arab countries, oil wealth has
drastically improved the physical conditions of living, but left the human dimension of
development flawed. The collapse of the oil market should serve as a reminder of the fragility
of this type of supposed wealth. In real terms, for example, the price of crude oil in 1998 is
about one-fifth of what it was 20 years ago, while it was roughly equivalent in the late 1940s.
By comparison, scarcity of water resources (already critical in a country like Yemen)
is, in the long term, a more crucial constraint on human welfare. Nevertheless, very little is
being done about this matter.
The ideological-political orientation of MA notwithstanding — and
compared to the tremendous task facing science in the region — at roughly
3% of content, the concern for science as contained in this publication's
expression of "Arab thought" seems minimal. The evidence illustrates that
the quantity of published information on science, in Arabic, is minimal.61
The time-trend in this specimen of Arab scientific output is more
worrying: output is erratic, with no cumulative pattern emerging over the
twenty-year period (see Figure 4). But 1985 was a good year for the social
sciences. The mid-1980s witnessed CAUS's drive to set up pan-Arab
professional associations, followed by a drop in publication of articles in this
category in the period 1996 to 1998. Almost ten years later, a smaller peak
reflects a heightened concern for less politically-sensitive S&T concerns.
It is perhaps more important to try to answer the question: how does
the Arab region fare in science in the world context? The evidence presented
here is based entirely on natural sciences data on R&D from UNESCO. This
is in a sense fitting, since the hard sciences have always been more
"lobalized" in character.
Figure 4. Number of articles on S&T in the Arab states,
(the "Arab Future" Journal, May 1 978-Aprii 1 998).
61 Further investigation could consider more sensitive indicators. These could include
characteristics of all Arab scientific periodicals such as regularity, life span, and quality of
contents. It is widely believed, for example, that many such periodicals exist due to
promotional conditions, for instance, for publishing in a refereed journal, with little control for
quality — if any.
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An international comparison
Table A-2 in the Annex provides a synopsis of information contained in
UNESCO's 1996 and 1998 World Science Reports (WSRs) on science inputs
and outputs, supplemented by other sources, in ten "regions" in the early
1990s.62
The Arab population account for a little more than 4% of the world
population but, in spite of the proverbial "oil wealth", their gross economic
-CO
output (PPP as expressed in American dollars) falls short of that share (see
Figure 5).
Two standard quantitative measures of inputs into scientific activity
are used internationally: R&D personnel and gross expenditure on R&D
(GERD). According to UNESCO data, the Arab region fares rather well on
the overall size of R&D personnel (though proportionately it is still slightly
lower than its share of world population).
Figure 5. Arab states' share of the world total, basic and S&T indicators.
It is on GERD that the region performs miserably. At 0.2% of GDP,
compared to the world average of 1.4%, it is the lowest-ranking among all
62 The synopsis is not straightforward. For example, the definition of regions is not the
same in the sources utilized, even in the two WSRs. Data from the 1995 and 1997 UNDP
Human Development Reports were used to arrive at a comparable regional classification. In
addition, the time reference is not uniform, and data on R&D personnel (not provided in the
1998 issue) is derived from the 1996 WSR. However, data on expenditure is from the 1998
WSR. (See the footnotes of Annex Table A-2 for explanations.)
63 Purchasing power parity (PPP) is the preferred method for comparing gross
economic output internationally. Put simply, it adjusts monetary values to the varying
purchasing power of money in different countries. Normally, the gross output of poor
countries is adjusted upward.
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ten regions considered. In fact, it is actually lower than sub-Saharan Africa,
which is considerably poorer.64
Scientists in the Arab region, it appears, are in plentiful in number, but
starved for resources. Because of this, among other factors, scientific output
is low.
Two basic classes of indicators of scientific output are used inter-
nationally: publications (derived from the Science Citation Index) and patents
granted.65 UNESCO reports on two patent registration sources: European and
American.
The Arab region shows a modest share of scientific publication but
totally vanishes from the international map when it comes to patent
registration. This indicates two sorry realities of science in the region: lack of
a strong institutional foundation (publication can be easier achieved
individually and is required for promotion of academic institutions66) and
weak articulation with the •— to start with rudimentary — production system.
It is more instructive to investigate the productivity (output as related
to resources) of scientific activity in the region. Figure 6 compares scientific
productivity, measured by publications (not patents) relative to population,
R&D personnel, GERD and GDP (as a percentage of the world average) of
ten regions.
The Arab region's publication-productivity, relative to GERD, is above
average. In fact, on that indicator, the Arab region ranks even higher than
that of North America, Western Europe or Asia.67
To pursue a proposition advanced above, valuable individual product-
ivity is apparently squandered due to lack of resources. This relatively higher
publication productivity, however, can represent a waste of potential (on
account of deficiency of institutional basis for science in Arab countries) and
be a forerunner of an even more extensive brain drain of Arab scientific talent.
However, relative to R&D personnel, the Arab region's publication
productivity ranks lowest among the ten regions (slightly lower than sub-
Saharan Africa).
In fact, with the exception of publications per unit of GERD, science
productivity in the Arab region is considerably lower than the world average.
64 Per capita, PPP, GDP in sub-Saharan Africa is less than one-third of the Arab
region's level.
65 The regional classification (as derived from publications like the Science Citation
Index) is based on country of residence, not nationality.
66 Limited research work shows that research, and publication, grinds to a halt after
promotion to the rank of "professor"— a feat that takes about ten years. The career-
distribution of scientific output could be an interesting point for further research.
67 "Asia" as defined in this analysis, however, is a heterogeneous region.
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On all indicators of scientific productivity considered, the Arab region is
roughly comparable to the (much poorer) sub-Saharan Africa (though the
latter scores better relative to GDP — Arab wealth is quite ineffective in this
respect).
Figure 6. Indicators of S&T productivity measured in publications, by region.
The Arab-Israeli dimension
How the Arab region compares to its regional rival in the arena of S&T is
clearly crucial to the balance of power and to the future of regional
arrangements. In this respect, the huge, and widening, disparity in S&T
development between Arab countries and Israel is likely to hamper the
prospects for a just, enduring peace leading to prosperity for all in the region.
As is obvious in Figure 7, Israel is an exceptional case in scientific
productivity, as measured by publications. On three of the four measures of
publication productivity considered, it surpasses all other nine regions —
with a wide margin in two instances (relative to GERD and GDP). Relative
to R&D personnel, it is outdone only by Oceania. A direct, wider-ranging
comparison with the Arab region is presented next.
The Arab-Israeli competition in S&T is presented in Annex Table A-3
in the form of ratios of the value of indicators (Israel to Arab states) and
vividly illustrated in Figure 8. This figure presents a wide set of basic
indicators — including simple measures of human-capital accumulation and
economic structure and indicators of S&T, that is. inputs, outputs, and
productivity.
In terms of sheer size, Arab countries outnumber Israel in area,
population, and GDP, However, the relative superiority in size declines
steadily on moving from one of these three basic indicators to the next. As a
result, per capita GDP is considerably higher in Israel and has been growing
much faster.
The superiority in size of Arab countries continues in the domain of
science inputs. It is much less pronounced in GERD, however, than in R&D
personnel.
Beyond this, the relative positions are reversed — in some cases
wildly — when the more critical indicators are considered, such as:
intensity of inputs — GERD to GDP, GERD per capita, R&D personnel
relative to population, Internet connections relative to population;
quality of inputs— expenditure on education per capita, share of
industrial goods in exports;
gross output, particularly patent registration68; or
productivity— publications relative to GERD or GDP, to R&D
personnel or, especially, population (note that patents relative to
population is the truly critical indicator).
68 The source and time reference of the patent registration data in this analysis are
different from those used in the international comparison.
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Figure 7. Basic and S&T indicators, and the ratio of Israel to Arab states,
in the mid-1990s (log scale).
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Looking beyond quantitative characterizations, Israel is surely an
exceptional S&T case in many significant respects that are conditioned by
both the history and international political position of the country. Most
notable among the S&T related factors is the continuous infusion of highly
qualified personnel through Jewish migration (the opposite to Arab
countries). The largest such infusion followed the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The differences between Israel and the Arab countries do not stop at
the relative availability of R&D personnel, GERD or productivity. But it is
most crucial with respect to the institutional structure of S&T that is
essentially— though not exclusively— sustained by the state (Fergany
1998c, in Arabic).
Nevertheless, for the Arab states, it is the comparison with Israel that is
perhaps the most critical.
Diversity among Arab countries
So far, Arab countries have been pooled into the "Arab region." The
heterogeneity of Arab countries mentioned in the Introduction extends to the
field of S&T. It would be very instructive to investigate the extent and nature
of the diversity in Arab conditions in the field of S&T. But the constraints in
information becomes even tighter in this case.
International sources do not report the value of GDP for a number of
Arab countries. In such cases, it is impossible to find good data on R&D
personnel or GERD. Nevertheless, the 1998 regional study sponsored by the
UNESCO Cairo office provides data on R&D personnel69 and R&D
expenditure in 18 Arab countries (Qasem 1998). Annex Table A-4 provides
information derived from the UNESCO source as well as Qasem and others.70
As can be easily seen from the table, the conditions of science vary
tremendously among Arab countries, as reflected in the limited set of
indicators. A specimen of five countries, representing different types, is
shown in Figure 8.
69 The pooled figure for R&D personnel in 1992 from the UNESCO study is
considerably lower than reported in the international source (WSR 1996).
70 Ironically, it is possible to get good data on scientific output, as measured by the
indicators used in the international comparison, because the sources of information are in
developed countries. Annex Table A-4 contains individual US patent registration figures for
1997 for Arab countries. Output, as measured on this yardstick is rather trivial. But it is
interesting to note that productivity per capita is highest in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Saudi
Arabia, in that order. But note that patent registration is based on country of residence. It is
also possible, in principle, to use the citation index utilized in the international comparison to
construct individual Arab-country publication indices.
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Figure 8. Share of Arab countries' total population, GDP, R&D personnel
and GERD for selected Arab states, 1996.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia dominate the basic resource base; the former
with the largest population in the region, the latter with the greatest GDP
share.71 But with considerable GERD, Saudi Arabia has a small base of R&D
personnel — smaller, in fact, than significantly poorer Morocco. Thus, Egypt
has an overall edge in science inputs with close to 60% of R&D personnel —
considerably more than double its population share— as well as a larger
level of GERD than Saudi Arabia.
The differential in resource endowment between Egypt and Saudi
Arabia is a clear example of how complementarity justifies collaboration,
and how potential economies of scale can accrue from cooperation in the
region's S&T.
Morocco shows a rather balanced situation, with the resource base as
well as science inputs in the range of 10% of the regional totals.
Kuwait is distinguished by a higher intensity of both R&D personnel to
population, and GERD relative to GDP.
But, at the other extreme, Yemen represents least-developed countries
in the region. It has a relatively large population with a small R&D personnel
presence, and a low level of both gross economic output and GERD.
Trends over time are important. The same source depicts trends in
S&T inputs in the 18 Arab countries — but only starting in the 1990s.
71 The "total" GDP used here does not include values for countries on which data were
not available.
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According to the 1998 UNESCO study, the number of scientific
personnel (R&D personnel, or full-time equivalent researchers) has grown in
Arab countries between 1992 and 1996 at the rate of 6-7% per annum, more
than twice the rate of population growth. The relevant abundance in R&D
personnel is maintained and has, in fact, improved.
Some Arab countries outperformed the average. In order, these are
Oman, UAE, Tunisia, Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain, Egypt, and Libya. Nevertheless,
with the exception of Egypt, all had a small base to start with. Sudan,
Yemen, Qatar and Lebanon, however, have fared below-average in
augmenting the population of R&D personnel. In fact, Sudan has
experienced considerable decline.
GERD has risen, in current prices, by close to 9% per annum. To
account for population growth, growth in GERD needs to be reduced by
about 3%. In other words, in real terms, per capita GERD probably declined
in the region. In Arab countries, GERD is quite limited by international
standards.
The better-performers in increasing GERD were again the relatively
small countries of Bahrain, Oman, and Syria. In Iraq, expenditure is reported
to have declined, while the UAE — a rich country — only kept its level.
In terms of time trends, evidence shows that the more serious problem
with S&T inputs in Arab countries lies in the realm of financial resources.
But lack of these demonstrates poor institutional development. In its turn,
rudimentary institutional development reflects the lowly status of science in
Arab societies.
An attempt at understanding
The purpose of this section of the paper is to provide the beginnings of an
understanding of the rather sorry state of science in the Arab region. The
situation was discussed in the previous section through (often impressionistic)
examination of the institution of science.
The impressionistic nature of argument is forced by poverty of
information, as well as by limitations of time and space. It is because of these
conditions that the word "understanding" was preferred to the more rigorous-
sounding "explanation" in the heading to this section. Accordingly, this
section is somewhat controversial. Nevertheless, if it initiates serious
discussion and, more importantly, leads to more profound research on the
issues raised, it will serve a useful purpose.
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The context of science is framed in a disabling political economy in many
countries of the Third World. Arab countries are included, and this context
operates through a socio-political environment that is worth examining.
The socio-political environment of science
The overriding feature of the socio-political context of Arab countries is the
marginalization of the people by dominant powers.
For a start, the prevailing social system is paternalistic, based on
submission to and fear of authority. In addition, most Arabs72 lack the
rudiments of functional literacy; an even greater majority has lost the ability
to think critically and express themselves freely; and almost all are barred
from effective participation in public affairs. This situation stems from
unrepresentative and unaccountable governance regimes that control access
to wealth and power, manipulate minds, and that use brute force. Vacuous
trappings of western democracy are sometimes staged to camouflage the
grim political reality.
Supporting this type of governance is a state-enforced social-incentive
system. It decisively rewards access to power (organized coercion, political
authority, and wealth), glorifies material possessions, and consecrates
individualism at the expense of knowledge, work, and altruism. In the context
of bad governance, such a social incentive system underpins large- and small-
scale corruption. The rich want, and manage, to become richer, while the poor
simply have to find means of surviving. Resources end up being allocated —
and outputs distributed— among societal agents according to criteria other
than efficiency or the public good.
As a result, the state has generally managed to create a condition of
"negative consent" on part of the people at large. As could be anticipated in
such a situation, people are sinking into a morass of individual interest at the
expense of collective welfare. The apathy of the Arab masses, particularly
youth, is the other side of the coin inherent in this dominating state that
marginalizes its "subjects."
If all this sounds too extreme, suffice to note that the Middle East
region is shown to have consistently trailed all other regions in the world on
a democracy index throughout the period 1960-1994, (Jaggers & Gurr 1995)
In this socio-political context, the type of capitalist restructuring
undertaken in many Arab countries ensures the worst possible results of
unbridled free markets in a sea of market imperfections. This is manifested in
72 Officially 43% in 1995, but much higher in the author's reckoning (Fergany 1998d).
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barriers to entry, and competition such as red tape, cronyism, corruption, and
risk aversion. Ironically, capitalist restructuring helps reinforce these market
imperfections since government (and governance) reform is not high on the
agenda of global capitalism. In fact, such reform runs counter to the interests
of ruling coalitions, the "national" side of the capitalist restructuring contract.
Nor is it pursued by the international side of the contract with anything close
to the fervor of their insistence on macroeconomic stability, openness to
international trade, and private-sector supremacy. The end result (as
indicated earlier in this paper, under the heading "The region's human
condition: the challenge"), is increasing poverty and widening disparity in
income, wealth and, hence, power. All in all, this becomes a fertile breeding-
ground for discontent and intensifying social conflict.
An impasse is then created because of the absence of peaceful, effective
means of political action that enables the marginalized majority to work
effectively for societal change — in its own favour. Escalation resorting to
violence of different sorts often ensues. Violence by radical opposition forces
at the hands of the state can be the most visible. But generalized violence —
and violence against the rich — could be just as devastating.
However, knowledge is power. It can, in principle, be emancipatory for
the oppressed. Hence, science is not left to its ways by the state, especially as
science, much like art, needs patrons. This is because, like art, those who can
do science normally cannot fund it. Therefore, manipulation of the
institutions of higher learning and research (as well as scientists) through
either "gold or the sword" by the state is commonplace in Arab countries. It
is also one of the potent forces behind the deterioration in quality of scientific
output.
This is the admittedly taxing societal context in which scientists find
themselves in Arab countries. The scientists have two choices: the first is to
behave as socially responsible intellectuals; the second choice is to join
forces with the state to some degree or another. Scientists in the service of
ruling regimes are known to enjoy all that power can offer in an
underdeveloped country — and this cannot be lightly dismissed.
The choice is perhaps more critical and consequential in the case of
social scientists. Serious social science — especially of the critical variety —
is hard work and does not pay well. In addition, the state tightly controls
intellectuals who aspire to widespread influence over minds, or who have
access to mass media — particularly the omnipresent TV and radio.
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The first choice effectively means working for human progress through
knowledge as means of emancipation. Precious few seem to choose this
arduous path and remain in it. Some switch to the second path after suffering
the loss of influence and wealth that the state confers on its own allies.
Recently, a number of erstwhile liberals and leftists opted to support ruling
regimes ostensibly in order to help "prevent" an Islamic takeover.
Spanning a range from apologetics for ruling regimes through to active
elements of the state's intellectual apparatus, scientists who make this second
choice claim that they stand a better chance for doing good while "on the
inside." With the benefit of hindsight this choice turns out to be wishful
thinking, if not cover, for the true motives.
The truly sure loser, however, is science as liberator. People, the true
constituency of intellectuals, also lose an enlightening vanguard. The concept
of what constitutes treason could be an apt title for a study of the role of Arab
intellectuals since independence.
Between the socio-political environment and the output of science,




Studies of science institutions in Arab countries are rare and deeply analytic
ones are almost non-existent. Even directories and surveys of institutions in
Arab countries are hard to come by, and seem to be generally deficient.
Definitions, and more importantly coverage, of surveys vary with the
organizing institution. In some cases, inclusion in a directory is a matter of
submission of a freely available form, but with no criteria invoked. As might
be expected, the situation is especially bad in the case of social sciences.
An exception to this assessment is a study conducted by ESCWA
T\
(1997) based on information on 128 R&D institutions in 10 Arab countries,
interviews with personnel, and most importantly, in-depth case studies of the
prominent scientific research institution in five Arab countries: Egypt,
Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
73 Including some in the social sciences. Questionnaires were sent to 200 institutions.
Only 56 returned completed forms. Partial information was collected on additional 72
institutions from a variety of sources (ESCWA, 1997, p.10).
88 FERGANY
Nevertheless, the total number of institutions included in this study
seems small. Qasem (1998) reports on a total of 322 "R&D units" in 18 Arab
countries in 1996, including some in the social sciences. In the ten countries
covered by the 1997 ESCWA study, Qasem reports on 230 institutions. In
Egypt, for example, ESCWA includes 26 institutions, compared to
UNESCO's 64. (See Annex Table A-5.) But even Qasem's 1998 UNESCO
survey is likely to be incomplete as well.
Few sources on social science institutions in Arab countries could be
traced. UNESCO's directory of social science institutions published in 1996
included 109 entries in 17 Arab countries, and was updated to 127 in
September 1998. Again, this is grossly incomplete. The institutions listed
under Egypt, for example, numbering 20 in 1998, represent about one-third
of the 77 included in a survey conducted in 1994 (Higazi 1994, in Arabic).
Furthermore, some organizations listed in the directory should not, in the
opinion of the author, be considered institutions of "science."
A "wired" source, billed as Arab Social Science Research (ASSR) and
supported by the Ford Foundation, presents a network of 27 institutions in 7
Arab countries, all funded or otherwise linked to the foundation. The network
includes 11 institutions in Palestine, which remains a "country" that is not
included in the UNESCO list, and only 6 in Egypt, for example.
If this is the situation with regard to the number of science institutions,
the information base on structures, functions, resources, and outputs — not to
mention assessments of relevance and effectiveness — is likely to be even
more rudimentary.
In the diplomatic language expected from such a UN commission, the
ESCWA study mentioned above concludes (ESCWA 1997, p. 133):
A candid overall assessment of R&D in the ESCWA member countries
cannot escape the conclusion that much remains to be done at the
policy level, with regard to resources and organizational structures, as
well as linkages in the national, regional and the international arena.
That is very civil indeed. In reality, the situation is near catastrophic. In
Arab countries, the institutional problems related to science has changed
from that of a few decades ago. Rather than the absence of institutions, or
shortage of qualified personnel, the problem is the presence of inefficient,
ineffective — though sometimes very large — organizations. The national
research centre in one Arab country has on its staff five times as many PhDs
as the celebrated Technion of Israel, but little of its wherewithal, output, or
international reputation.
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Institution-building in the field of science after independence and in
response to Gulf oil wealth, apparently created mammoth sleeping elephants
that would not die gracefully. The time is ripe for a spate of "creative
destruction," preferably in conjunction with establishing new "centres of
excellence," in the socio-political environment described earlier.
The near absence of effective professional associations is another facet
of institutional deficiency.
Professional associations are essential. They advance the profession as
well as set and enforce standards, and in particular, ethical codes. Their
advocacy work is indispensable, particularly that which is aimed at
consolidating the institution of science in society, and especially vis-a-vis
dominant powers.
However, in countries of the Arab region, few strong professional
associations have been set up or have endured long enough to score
significant achievements in their presumed areas of competence. In many
cases, professional associations were torn by narrow-minded rivalries or
outright corruption.
Furthermore, professional associations are often politicized by ruling
regimes and by contending opposition forces (notably by Islamic
movements, the most potent political opposition force in the region).
Human power
A vicious circle has developed between the state of scientific institutions and
the quality of human talent inhabiting them. Horror stories of deteriorating
ability in Arab science institutions abound.
Assigning blame aside, and making due exceptions to a few noble and
towering figures, the problems are not entirely institutional. Human greed
and scientists susceptibility to the trappings of power are potent negative
forces.
The fate of human talent is not limited to decay, or being out of touch
with the modern world of science. But these are reaching the disastrous level
of depriving fresh intake from good basic training, let alone the possibility
for professional growth.
The poor and probably deteriorating quality of higher education is a
closely inter-linked malaise.
Though precise estimates are not available, the brain drain is clearly a
serious predicament that has been sapping the stock of R&D personnel in the
region. This situation will grow with the increasing globalization of the
world market for highly qualified personnel. A sinister twist of the brain
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drain is brought about by the official glorification of those "sons of the
homeland" who have excelled in the enabling scientific environment of
developed countries. The understandable chagrin of their once-equals, or
superiors, who in the past made the "mistake" of deciding to stay and serve
the patrimony, will only intensify the "talent flight," particularly among the
young.
Funding
The dearth of funding for science has been stressed in the previous sections
beyond repetition here. However, a number of additional points are worth
making.
The financial crisis of standing science institutions in some countries is
forcing near paralysis of the presumed function of these organizations. In a
large Arab country, for example, it is estimated that salaries — puny as they
are — account for more than three-quarters of the budget of the flagship
scientific-research institution, while the share of equipment and research
projects falls below one-tenth. This is a financial blueprint for an inept
bureaucracy, not a cutting-edge R&D organization at the end of the 20th
century.
Furthermore, an adequate level of funding for institutions is not, in
itself, sufficient for a dynamic R&D activity. Proactive funding for science
and research in the society-at-large is a most crucial aspect for support that
is, at present, acutely missing in Arab countries.
Finally, funding by governments is likely to diminish further in the
future, especially in real terms, if present trends of the state withdrawing
from erstwhile "obligations" continue. However, essential as the research-
business linkage is, especially in technology development, private business
does not represent a viable societal alternative to the state in supporting R&D
in Arab countries.
For one, the business sector is still tiny and does not show signs of great
social commitment. Secondly, even in mature capitalist societies, the state
continues to assume major responsibility for supporting S&T, particularly
basic science. This is essential because basic science— exactly like basic
education and health care— does not entail a lucrative profit margin for
private enterprise. But it does have a huge payoff for S&T development in
society-at-large and for pure technological development in the long term.
Privatization of science should not be flaunted as a panacea in Arab countries,
as the devastating sale of public enterprise has been in some of them.
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Arab cooperation
As indicated earlier, active Arab cooperation can be an effective way of
easing financial and R&D personnel constraints throughout the region.
Nevertheless, steadily weakening Arab cooperation resulted in a region-wide
aspect of institutional deficiency in S&T.
The days of working for Arab unity are long past. Treaties were
formulated, but not acceded to, or if signed, not implemented. Later on,
"charters" replaced treaties, and in turn were replaced by mere "declarations."
All this is perhaps understandable. Arab regimes have their own local
agendas — not necessarily served by close pan-Arab cooperation. In addition,
the Arab cold war (between "progressive" and "reactionary" regimes) was
followed by regional earthquakes (Sadat's "separate" peace and Sadam's
invasion of Kuwait). The grim repercussions of the latter are still with us,
particularly in light of the way the USA and Britain chose to handle it.
Understandable all of this may be. But it entails serious loss in the
precious potential for advancement of S&T in the region. Mention was made
in the Introduction of only a few aborted, or delayed, joint-Arab projects and
programs in R&D. More exist. Others, potentially more promising, have
never seen the light of day because of the generalized milieu of weak
cooperation. In short, it can be said that region-wide S&T development has
been trivially politicized by utterly myopic "national" policies.
In particular, the politicization of pan-Arab professional associations
was elevated to the level of petty regional power politics. As a result, they
met the fate of their national counterparts and their promise for enhancing
progress through science in the region was largely wasted.
Some issues specific to social sciences
It is probably fair to claim that generation of knowledge on social reality, and
social change, is grossly deficient compared to what is required of science as
a locomotive for human progress in the region.
This blight is not due to lack of social-science institutions in the
region. To the contrary, if we take the situation of a significantly large and
influential country such as Egypt, there probably is an abundance of
supposed social-research institutions, including universities and high
institutions of learning. In addition to mammoth government institutions, a
plethora of profit-seeking private-research centres sprang up in the last two
decades, almost all spurred on by donor-supported research activity. Neither
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of these, however, managed to produce a centre of excellence in social-
science research.
The problems of government research institutions are many and well
known. On top of the list comes lack of any active demand for the results of
research, and the restriction of the research agenda to topics subservient to
government interests. Other major ills of government agencies in less-
developed countries, such as bureaucratic red tape and corruption, have not
spared institutions of education and research in the social sciences. It is
probably in these institutions that such ills have produced the worst casualties.
In addition to the polluting influence of the profit motive in private-
research centres, these organizations have been generally weak, possessing
no research agenda.
A few small foreign institutions in the region, can, in theory, overcome
some limitations of the two main types of research institutions. However, none
has established a centre of excellence for relevant research. These institutions
cater to western research agendas through funding and/or affiliation.
Nevertheless, the social sciences are especially critical in the present
stage of Arab history, if only for their potentially decisive role in the all-
important dilemma of governance.
At present, the objective of social-science research in the region should
be to effectively contribute to an overall process of enlightenment as an
integral component of human development. In short, the objective must
mutate into genuine critical social science. This brand of social science is
crucially needed but it is constrained, even fought, by the powers that be.
Against this yardstick, it is pertinent to look into some salient aspects
of the crisis of social science in the Arab region.
Identity crisis
In the past, the scientific and intellectual traditions of the former colonial
powers left a disfiguring imprint on nascent sciences in Arab countries. The
potent medium has been the advanced training of Arab nationals in colonial
centres. Thus, social science in the region has suffered from being a poor,
and generally outdated, imitation of the original Western source.
Inappropriate conceptual frameworks and theories were often forced on
epistemologically alien social realities.
Furthermore, social sciences are especially susceptible to ideological
and political shifts, both locally as well as worldwide. In this age of the
triumph of capitalism and globalization, powerful international forces (with
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allied domestic powers playing second fiddle) have been pushing new
theoretical agendas, or paradigms, in support of required policy shifts.
Nowadays, with the blatant adverse impact of runaway global capitalism
evident for all to see, muddled "third-way" theorizing for the region is the
popular, all-pervading mantra.
Not that critical intellectual forces in the region have been sitting idly
watching. In response, and in rejection, some have advanced some elements of
Arab-Islamic social sciences. These attempts are generally considered to have
failed in advancing a coherent body of knowledge capable of serving the
presumed functions of science in modern Arab societies. In part, these attempts
consisted of re-interpreting Islamic tenets in modern-day terms, or projecting
such principles on contemporary social reality. To some analysts, endeavors in
this direction represent no more than the recasting of ideological positions in
the jargon of science. This is an expression of an identity crisis, not only for
science in the region but as an "Arab project" for progress.
Thus, as commendable as the quest for relevant social sciences is,
these trials have not succeeded in formulating a workable theoretical bearing
for what might be called Arab social sciences, or even an "Arab school" in
social sciences.
Data
Given adequate finance and qualified human power, hard science
automatically generates its own data. Due to its higher susceptibility to
politicization, however, the generation of data on social phenomena is much
more problematic. Data collection is tightly controlled in most Arab
countries, if not through direct legislation and administrative procedures,
through rationing of the normally large funding required.
Vulgar empiricism excepted, a solid Arab school in social sciences is
unlikely to develop without fertile interaction between relevant theorizing
and the rigorous empirical investigation of social reality.
However, with the exception of macroeconomic data required by
international financial organizations, data availability is becoming erratic;
data quality is generally poor, and perhaps deteriorating; and comparability
among Arab countries is hardly attainable.
With intensification of the human problematique in the region, not
only the generation of data, but also the publication of collected data is being
politicized to the detriment of scientific inquiry. Increasingly, collected
data— especially in areas such as unemployment, poverty and political
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participation— are "doctored" to match the claims of governments or
influential international organizations. Sadly, some "scientists" engage in this
activity.
Conversely, lack of high quality, up-to-date and comparable
information on social phenomena is a sign of lack of societal and state
concern for human progress, let alone a commitment to utilizing scientific
methods to engender human development.
Regional professional institutions
The region has been witnessing an incessant quest for establishing regional
professional associations in the social sciences, not always entirely driven by
forces from within. A brief history is instructive.
In the seventies there was the Organization for the Promotion of Social
Sciences in the Middle East, or OPSSME. The orientation was Middle East,
not Arab. After an initial flurry of a conference and a few workshops, the
attempt did not stand the test of time.
In the mid-1980s, in principle promoted by the Centre for Arab Unity
Studies (CAUS) in Beirut, a number of pan-Arab professional associations
were set up. The three principal ones are for sociology, political science, and
economics.
More recently, in the early nineties, when the Peace Process started
gaining momentum with the Madrid-Oslo trail, Middle East orientation
returned with a vengeance. This time it was centred on economic themes, the
preferred basis for cooperation under global capitalism. The Economic
Research Forum for Arab countries, Iran and Turkey was set-up at the behest
of the World Bank and IMF, though Arab and other international donors
contribute. The ERF is meant to function as a network for research in and on
this nebulous region. The issue of including Israel in the network has haunted
the ERF from its very inception. ERF's contribution to research capacity in
the Arab region, and in service of development as defined here, should be the
ultimate criterion for success. The constellation of operative forces, however,
casts shadows on the possibility.
On the other hand, one cannot but commend the establishment of the
three pan-Arab professional associations. But the road traveled by the pan-
Arab associations has been bumpy. For one, funding has been hard to come
by; compare, for example, the level of funding enjoyed by ERF and its
"indigenous" counterpart, the Arab Economic Association. Add to that, as a
reaction to an onslaught of donor funding and in the socio-political
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environment of science outlined above, the fact that voluntary contribution to
professional and public activities has considerably waned in the region.
As a result, achievement has been rather slim. For instance, in spite of
an annual grant to support the publication of one of the association's
journals, only one issue appeared in 15 years. In addition, the quality of
scientific output has been suspect.
In spite of valiant efforts by a few major figures, it is tormenting to
attribute the failings of these laudable enterprises, in large measure, to the
corruption of one-time hotly radical scientists. Such corruption has grown
into perpetual clique-leadership— one of the most vigorously criticized
flaws of governance regimes — and outright profiteering.
The troubles of social sciences in the Arab region are not confined to
an unfavourable socio-political environment, or the political economy
regime, which scientists have to contend with. Social scientists have a great
deal to answer to.
The role of donors
Donors, especially large ones, do condition research activity in Arab
countries. The emphasis on population control through family planning in
populous countries since the mid 1970s is a prominent example (Fergany
1998b). More recently, privatization— in the sense of divestiture— and
support to the private sector have become the new mantra. Under capitalist
restructuring, with governments reducing their spending and becoming
overly eager to attract foreign financing, the influence of donors and aid
agencies has mounted.
It is important to realize at the outset that donors are many and
different. Some donors are recognized to be more benign than others.
Unfortunately, these tend to be the smaller ones. On the other hand, the role
of international financial institutions, especially the World Bank, is becoming
the more dominant. These organizations are pursuing a global, rather than a
local agenda in less-developed countries. Dire "local" consequences, as
indicated in the Arab region above and as incurred in Asia and Latin
America, become irrelevant.
A beneficial role of donor organizations supporting research in Arab
countries should revolve around support for both the generation and
utilization of knowledge in service to human development.
It is clear that the concept of development adopted in this paper defines
areas of social activity that could be off-limits for aid agencies by present
standards. Nevertheless, this has to be measured against the low, or negative,
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"developmental return" of aid activities. The proposed concept also entails
redefining priorities among presently acceptable areas of support.
In particular, while a genuine process of human development requires
breaking the "vicious cycle" of bad governance and poverty, to varying
degrees aid agencies work with dominant powers. Some deal only with
governments— the very embodiment of the present coercive, non-
representative and unaccountable power structures. And, when dealing with
NGOs, many donors confine their support to ones that are like-minded. Such
practices help the dominant powers tighten their grip over societies.
In the admittedly difficult attempt to get closer to activities that would
help a genuine process of human development in the long run, lies the
challenge facing aid agencies that strive to truly serve the people of less-
developed countries.
Four approaches can help such agencies in this endeavour.
1. Developing a thorough understanding of the societies they aspire to
serve.
2. Actively involving the true stakeholders (people not governments,
grassroots NGOs rather than high-flying foreign or westernized local
ones) through widening the scope of consultation and decision-making,
involving projects and programs worthy of support. In the case of
research, this means wide dissemination of results in Arabic.
3. Insisting on quality and ensuring it exists through rigorous impact
assessment— not only financial accounting. The contribution of
supported projects and programs to human development should be the
main criterion for support, or for its continuation. Starting competition
for grants would be a good start.
4. Serving as a catalyst to mobilize local resources in order to enhance
sustainability in the long run. In research, this approach implies
encouraging the training of young scientists.
It was mentioned above that social sciences probably represent a more
critical arena for scientific development in the Arab region at present. Can
anything be done by donors in this area?
What is needed to help the development of social-science research as a
contribution to development in this part of the world, in the long run, is the
establishment of a number of independent, strong, non-profit research
institutes. They would be devoted to the creation of a school of social science
in the Arab region, with clear emphasis on human development, through
rigorous research and solid training.
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Thinking small will not do. Worse still is the current approach of many
small projects that spread available resources thinly and resulting in little or
no impact. It is also well-known that "reforming" inefficient and corrupt
academic institutions is nearly impossible.
A critical threshold on a new plane of rigour, efficiency, and relevance,
must be established in order for the metamorphosis mentioned above to have
a reasonable chance of success.
Nevertheless, the establishment of such institutions raises many
daunting questions. Even more difficult is ensuring the effective functioning
of the proposed institutes.
A critical problem is financing. For strength and independence,
institutions must command considerable resources with no strings attached
and which are secure for a long period of time.
An endowment of approximately US $10 million, whose income
would constitute the main revenue of an institute, would be the best modality
for initial financing. Ideally, the endowment should be raised from Arab
sources. This is not easy, and foreign contributions would probably be
needed. But foreign funding is fraught with liability. Further, not many
funding agencies are amenable to the idea of endowments and the amount
proposed is — by current standards — rather large.
A truly independent and non-profit status— not actually legally
feasible in many Arab countries— might help overcome some of these
problems. A consortium of donors might prove to be the optimum solution
for financing problems. The idea of a consortium would also have the added
advantage of reducing the stigma of foreign funding, particularly if Arab
donors join the consortium.
Now, would donors be interested in such a proposition to support the
development of independent social science in the Arab region?
The idea, and the sum, will raise some eyebrows. For a healthy dose of
perspective, however, consider this: one donor already gave ten prominent
businessmen in an Arab country a similar sum to set up a research centre
devoted to private-sector development. In a sense, it is ironic that a donor
supports several rich businessmen for an activity they should really be financing
themselves. In an ideal world, and as is the case in mature capitalist societies,
rich businessmen should be counted on to help support research at large.
It is an eloquent, but sad, commentary on the times, on the state of
social sciences, and the role of donors in the region, that a group of critical
social scientists would, most likely, be unable to garner this level of support
for establishing an independent research institution.
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What needs to happen?
Though the evidence available is rather rudimentary, it is safe to conclude
that science in the Arab region is feeble, and definitely much weaker than
required in order to significantly improve the poor and deteriorating human
condition.
Scientific output is meagre, especially when it comes to technology
development. R&D personnel are in relative abundance but financial
resources constrain their contribution to their own societies. Financial
resources, however, represent but one (measurable) facet of the complex
beast of institutional development. In itself, poor institutional development is
a clear expression of the low priority accorded to science in governance
regimes and social organization at large in Arab countries. Most important,
perhaps, is the impotence of social science as translated in its low
contribution to enlightenment and predisposition to corruption and
manipulation by dominant powers.
Ultimately, the pertinent question is this: Can science have a
significant role in advancing Arab societies as they are currently organized or
expected to evolve in the near future?
No prescriptions are intended here. To paraphrase J. Schumpeter,
prescriptions are available only at druggists. Furthermore, assuming it is
effective, a prescription must be taken — in this case by the power
structure — and be reflected in the institutional basis for science. This is a
big dilemma for contemporary Arab societies.
In contrast, if social scientists are to be successful, they can only
describe, explain and understand, or even more tenuously, predict. The
previous sections of this paper have attempted the first two tasks. Now, on to
predictions.
Prediction is here restricted to the obvious and simple statement that
the continuation of present trends can only lead to a catastrophe in the
domain of science and its contribution to development in the Arab region.
Instead of prescriptions, what is attempted below could be thought of
as a set of necessary, but insufficient, conditions that would, in the opinion of
the author, lead to a scientific revival in the Arab region.
A complex, and highly interwoven, combination of necessary
conditions is required.
To start, a great deal more needs to be known on the practice of
science in the region and its contribution to development. Much more, and
deeper research on science in the Arab region is critically needed.
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On the plane of power relations, governance regimes that place a high
priority on science as a major road to progress must emerge. Moreover, this
choice needs to be translated into an enabling environment: a social incentive
system that positively rewards contribution to knowledge, freedom of research
and expression, as well as independent and well-endowed institutions.
But governance regimes are not going to mutate in the desired direction
of their own volition. Nor is an enabling governance context enough by itself.
Indeed, that is unlikely to arise in the absence of significant change in the
institution of Arab science itself, particularly in the social sciences.
This leads to the second major condition.
The Arab scientific community, especially in the social sciences, must
undergo a metamorphosis into a high-quality, up-to-date, productive,
innovative, and above all, socially-responsible societal entity, which implies
relevance to the cause of human progress.
Clearly, synergy between transformations in the two spheres of power
and science, has to evolve.
It would seem then that the emergence of a scientific vanguard,
especially in the realm of critical social science, could be the only relatively
independent factor in this matrix of desired change. Thus an Arab
intelligentsia, in the full sense of the word, seems to be the critical condition
for an Arab renaissance founded on science. For this intelligentsia to emerge,
Arab scientists will have to pay the attendant price.
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Annex: Statistical tables
Table A-1. Number of articles on S&T in the Arab states.
Subject
Social research — Gulf
Social research — Morocco
Authenticity — social aspects
Sociology






Humanities — Arab states
Political science
Political science — Lebanon
Arab philosophy
Philosophy and religion
Social sciences & humanities
Scientific research — Arab states
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1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ -\
1 1 - 1
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ •]
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ -i
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_ _ _ 1
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1
1 3 1 16
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1
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2 - - - 1 1
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•|
_ _ _ _ _ -i
1 1
•j
- - - - - -
•j
3 1 - - 3 6
- 4 - 1
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 Total
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1
-i
-i
_ _ _ _ _ _ 5
1 1 14
_ _ _ • ] _ _ _ 2
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1
1 _ _ _ _ _ -(
_ _ _ _ _ _ 2
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ p
1
•j
1 _ _ _ _ _ 4
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2
2 1 2 39
- - 1 2 - - 8
(continued)
Table A-1. Concluded.
Source: Centre for Arab Unity Studies (1998), Index, Arab Future, May 1978-April 1998 (Issues 1-230), May.
Subject
Technology
Technology — Arab states
Nuclear technology — Arab
states
Technology & civilization — Arab
states
Science
Science — Arab states
Science & technology — Arab
states

























































































Table A-2. Basic and S&T indicators, by region.




















































































































































































*WSR, 1996: Arab states were part of the North Africa, Middle, and Near East Region and were excluded from using data from the 1995 and 1997 human
development reports. **WSR 1998: Israel was excluded from Western Europe, using its percentages in Western Europe in 1992. (1)USA and Canada. (2)ln 1992
this included Australia and New Zealand; by 1994 Oceania was expanded to mean Australia, New Zealand, Papua Guinea, and the Pacific Islands. (3)Central and
Eastern European countries includes the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In 1992 the GEE encompassed 15 countries of the European Union (EU), 4
countries of the former European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and Turkey. (4)ln 1994 WE included 15 countries of the European Union (EU), 4 countries of the
former European Free Trade Association (EFTA), as well as Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus. (5)Commonwealth of Independent States. (6)ln 1992 Asia meant Japan,
NICs (included Chinese Taipei, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong), China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other countries in the Far East. In
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Note: The outputs indexes to S&T inputs are calculated by dividing the percentage of the output in a region by the percentage of the S&T input in the same region.
Sources: UNESCO (1998), 1998 World Science Report. UNESCO (1996b), 1996 World Science Report.
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Table A-3. Basic and S&T indicators, Arab states and Israel, mid-1990s.
Indicator
Basic
Area (millions of square kilometers)0'
Population (millions)'21
Population less than 15 years of age (%)(3)
Literacy rate (%)(1)
Gross enrolment ratio for all levels of
education (%)(1)
Adult mean years of schooling'4'
Expenditure on education per capita (US $)<4)
GDP (world share %)(5)
GDP per capita (constant 1987 prices/US $)'1)
GDP per capita (PPP$)(5>
Exports of industrial goods (%)(6)
S&T inputs
R&D personnel (world share %)(7)
R&D personnel to GDP (x 1 0 000)(7)
R&D personnel per thousand people'7'
GERD (world share %)(5)
GERD to GDP (%)(5)
GERD per capita (PPP$)(5)
Internet connections per thousand people'8'
S&T outputs
Publications (world share %)'5)
US patents (world share %)(9)
S&T productivity
Publications index to GERD
Publications index to R&D personnel
Publications index to GDP
Publications index to population
US patents per million people'9'
US patents index to R&D personnel
US patents index to GERD
US patents index to GDP





























































































































(1) UNDP (1997), 1997 Human Development Report.(2) World Bank (1997), World Development
Indicators, on CD-ROM.(3> UN Population Division (1996), World Population, Department of
Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, New York, December.(4) UNDP (1994),
1994 Human Development Report.(5) UNESCO (1998), 1998 World Science Report.(6) World
Bank (1994), 1994 World Development Indicators.(7) UNESCO (1996), 1996 World Science
Report.(8) Internet website.(9) US Patent and Trademark Office website (1997).





































































































































































































































































































Sources: Qasem, S. (1998), R&D Systems in the Arab States, Development of S&T Indicators, UNESCO. Patents: US Patent and Trademark Office website




































































































































































































































































































Sources: ASSR (1998), Arab Social Science Research Web Site, visited on 14 November.
DARE (1998), UNESCO Web Site, Information Services, September. ESCWA (1997),
Assessment of Research and Development in Selected ESCWA Member Countries: Local
Technological Inputs, New York, August. Qasem, S. (1998), R&D Systems in the Arab States:
Development of S&T Indicators, UNESCO, Cairo. UNESCO (1996), Directory of Social Science
Institutions in the Arab Region.
Chapter 3.
Arab Social-Science Research in the 1990s and Beyond:
Issues, Trends, and Priorities
Saad Eddin Ibrahim
Introduction
This is a short research paper oil the state of social-science research in the
Arab world in the 1990s and its prospects in the early twenty-first century. In
its terms of reference (TOR) for this paper, the BDRC Cairo office specified
three sub-tasks:
1. identification and overview of major social-science research issues;
2. examination of social-science research; and
3. assessment of social-science research.
The paper, including its three sub-tasks, was to be a "concise and tight
analysis of 20-25 pages on the emerging issues of social-science research in
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)."
The TOR refers to a report previously presented to IDRC by Dr Saad
Eddin Ibrahim in April 1982, "Social Science Research in the Middle East
and North Africa: Priorities for the 1980s." Preparation of this publication
involved extensive field visits and the administration of a questionnaire-
based survey of several hundred MENA social scientists.
This report relies mainly on library research along with a short four-
question-survey e-mailed to directors of some 20 leading research centers in
Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan.
Whenever appropriate, reference is made to the 1982 report for
comparisons, thus using it as a baseline. This paper will be confined to the
Arab world and its social science issues, debates, and actual research trends.
Only minimal basic data on the socio-economic-political profile of the Arab
world is presented.
Between the early 1980s and late 1990s, Arab economists were heavily
researching the fallouts of oil wealth, its revenues, remittances, money
surpluses and shortages in the region, as well as the continuing problems of
underdevelopment (overpopulation, poverty, and external debts). At present,
in the late 1990s, Arab economists are heavily researching the processes and
fallouts of economic reform and structural adjustment policies (ERSAP),
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reintegration into the world market, attraction of foreign investment,
preparation for GATT and full-European economic unification, and the quest
for new regional economic paradigms.
Meanwhile, during this period, Arab educationalists were busy coping
with problems of quantities. That is, of the growing demand on education, of
drop-outs, multi-shift schools, private lessons, persistently high illiteracy
rates especially among women, and a shortage of quality technical and
vocational education versus an oversupply of college graduates without
proper skills for the market. In the late 1990s, many of these problems still
persist along with new ones. The contest over the educational arena between
secular states and a growing Islamic movement, the rapid growth of private
education at all levels, and the shrinking public funds for public schools are
all major issues.
Demographic research still has continues to be intertwined with the
broader issues of development. But in the 1990s it has the added dimensions
of gender equity and reproductive health.
Sociologists were heavily researching the socio-cultural impact of oil
wealth, the rise of new social formations, and Islamic activism. The last two
issues continued to occupy sociologists in the 1990s. But, added to their
agenda are the social ramifications of ERSAP, growing poverty and random
violence in rapidly growing slum areas, and the rise of civil society
organizations (CSOs) and NGOs.
Political scientists were still heavily studying the various aspects of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, including the fallouts of the Sadat peace initiative,
inter-Arab and intra-regional politics in the aftermath of the Iranian-Islamic
Revolution, and the role of the military in politics. At present, Arab political
scientists have added issues of governance, public opinion, electoral politics,
democratization, politics of civil strife, new regional paradigms as well as a
growing interest in re-discovering non-Western worlds — especially in
Asia — to their research agenda.
Major Arab debates of the 1990s
Arab social scientists are an active part of the much bigger Arab
intelligentsia. Through their research, writings, and public discourse in the
mass media, they have contributed to the shaping of national and pan-Arab
agendas. The latter itself a function of the march of regional and world
events. While some crucial issues of the 1980s and earlier decades have
persisted, the 1990s have had some big bangs of its own.
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The three big bangs of the 1990s
Several significant events of regional and international significance have
greatly affected the Arab region in the late 1990s.
1. The Second Gulf Crisis. For the Arabs as a whole, the first big bang
was regional, the Second Gulf Crisis or War.
On 2 August 1990, the Arab region awoke to the shocking news
of Iraq's invasion of its Arab neighbor, Kuwait. That event divided the
Arab region as no other event had in this century. Other big calamities in
this century (the loss of Palestine (1948), or the 1967 defeat) did not
divide the Arab region as deeply or as widely. Instead, the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait had an immediate wrenching impact. For some, it heralded
the end of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism. Among many adverse
ramifications of the second Gulf Crisis, the international war led by the
USA against Iraq so as to expel that country's occupation forces from
Kuwait in January-February 1991. In the process, some 200000 Iraqi
soldiers were killed, with as many wounded, maimed, or lost (compared
to 200 casualties from the International Coalition). The material losses
of Kuwait, Iraq, and other Arab states in the second Gulf Crisis was
estimated at US $800 billion. In the IDRC 1982 Report, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait were listed in Table 1 of Appendix A as "capital-
surplus" countries. Ten years later, as a result of the Gulf War, all three
countries were running a state budget deficit of between 5% and 15%.
Arab social scientists were widely and deeply divided over the events in
the Gulf. Many Arab intellectuals took the defeat of Iraq in the second
Gulf War as a personal and a national defeat; completely overlooking
the fact that an Arab country (Kuwait) was liberated; and that major
Arab countries, such as Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, were members
of the victorious International Coalition. Many of the Arab research
networks and joint programs were among the casualties. Several
professional associations (the Arab Sociological Association [ASA] and
the Arab Political Science Association [APSA]) stopped holding their
annual meetings for several years. They would not recover from the
crisis until the mid-1990s, and even then, only partially.
2. The Collapse of the USSR. The late 1980s had already displayed
serious cracks in the countries of the Socialist (Communist) Bloc under
the hegemony of the Soviet Union. But few observers predicted that
the USSR itself would collapse so swiftly and without a single shot
from its long-time enemies: the West or China. It marked the defeat of
a superpower without war.
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More relevant to social science theory, this was a defeat of a
total system based on a visionary Marxist ideology, to which many
social scientists, including Arab ones, had long-subscribed and
zealously taught. Many Arab intellectuals engaged in reality-denial for
several years after the collapse. And, many Arab social scientists took
issue with Francis Fukoyama's thesis of the "End of History." In it, he
celebrated the triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy, not the
triumph of a classless socialism, as marking the "end of history" in a
Hegelian sense. For many Arab social scientists, the issue was not
Fukoyama's argument per se, but rather a more profound existential
issue. The Soviet Union was a counterbalance to the much-detested
USA in the Arab world. Marxism was an elegant alternative paradigm
to the American brand of Functionalism and Capitalism. Many of them
had literally built their intellectual career on the social science
derivatives of Marxism and neo-Marxism, viz., the Dependency
Theory and World System paradigms such as proposed by Samir
Amin, Gunder Frank, and Emmanuel Walerstein. Much research in
development, class, and politics from the late 1960s to the early 1990s
was guided by those models. Many Arab social scientists are still
struggling with the real "power shift" in the world and the need for a
corresponding "paradigm shift."
3. The Oslo Agreement. The Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestine have been
at the focus of regional politics for the last half century. For many Arab
intellectuals, it is a civilizational and societal conflict. Even though
President Sadat's 1977 peace initiative undermined that eternal
conviction, it still came as a bang when the PLO and Israel reached a
historical compromise in 1993, after protracted secret talks near the
Norwegian capital Oslo, which became known as the Oslo Agreement.
Like all compromises, the Oslo Agreement has been
passionately debated not only among Palestinians, but also among
Arab intellectuals at large. Those who have been against Oslo
overlapped a great deal with those who deeply lamented the collapse of
the Soviet Union and who resented the emergence of the USA as the
sole superpower in the world system. As well, such people had earlier
stood by Iraq against Kuwait and the International Coalition. Such
overlapping has created a new, broad polarization among Arab
intellectuals, which reflects itself in other debates of the 1990s. (See
the section on Emerging Issues, below.)
CHAPTER 3. ARAB SOCIAL-SCIENCE RESEARCH 115
But even more relevant to the Oslo Agreement is the sudden
explosion of research activities in the would-be Palestinian State,
provisionally called the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Some
twenty research centers or research groups sprang up between 1993
and 1998 in the West Bank and Gaza. Ambitious research agendas
were formulated and implemented— sometimes carefully and
thoughtfully— but more often in a hurry, to respond to emerging
needs. Such research agendas covered themes and topics of various
aspects of nation and state-building, refugees, Jewish settlements,
water, and social change in rural and urban communities in Palestine.
A new interest in the research and documentation of pre-1948
Palestinian communities, folk culture, and properties (especially in
West Jerusalem) has become a sole pre-occupation of several centers
and research groups.
Equally new after Oslo has been a robust public opinion survey
movement. At least two research centers are now specialized in public
opinion polls: the Center for Palestinian Research and Studies (CPRS)
in Ramalla, and the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center
(JMCC) in Jerusalem. Despite their infancy, their meticulous work has
been internationally acclaimed. Many observers believe that the two
centers, especially CPRS, had indirectly reduced potential conflict
among contending political factions, each of which had traditionally
claimed to be speaking for the majority of the Palestinian People.
Quarterly polling results have put to rest many such claims.
At any rate, the multiplicity of social-science research outfits has
led to the establishment of an Association of Research Institutions in
Palestine (ARIP), which is now in its third year, whose major aim is
research quality control. ARIP set stringent criteria for membership
and research accreditation. Although it has no governmental or official
status, ARIP has emerged as a forceful legitimizer to both PNA and
foreign donors.
Emerging social issues in the 1990s
The three significant events sketched above have cast their shadows on the
framing of new Arab social science issues of the 1990s. Less dramatic,
although more important in the longer run, were a series of UN-sponsored
global events: the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio; the 1993 International Human
Rights conference in Vienna; the 1994 International Conference on
Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo; the 1995 World Summit on
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Social Development (WSSD) in Copenhagen; and the 1995 Fourth World
Conference on Women (WCW) in Beijing. Each demanded advance country-
and regional-studies on a wide range of topics. In particular, the latter three
energized Arab social scientists and debates over new issues that had hardly
been dealt with in previous decades. Included in these topics were such
issues as the environment, gender, reproductive health, sexuality, cultural
dimensions of human rights, civil society, role of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), structural adjustment and privatization, social safety-
nets, and democratization.
While not being new, questions of religion, ethnicity, and women's
quest for equality have been revisited by both Arab social scientists and
ideologically inclined intellectuals on the occasions of the ICPD, WSSD, and
WCW.
In this process, Postmodernism, the New World Order, and
Globalization were invoked. Indigenous forces of Islamization, cultural
authenticity and specificity fought back against the new advances proposed
by UN documents, draft declarations, and plans of action on nearly all issues.
They found allies in the Vatican, among the intellectuals of the Old Left, and
the few remaining Communist regimes (such as China and Cuba).
Some of the above-mentioned emerging social issues are dealt with
below, but only insofar as they have materialized in the form of social
research projects, completed or underway.
1. Globalization. By the mid-1990s, this had emerged as a passionately
debated issue. For many anti-Western and anti-American intellectuals,
globalization is not just a historical process akin to industrialization or
urbanization of earlier times. Rather it symbolizes Western hegemony
and neo-imperialism. Fear-arousal permeates the concept. For the anti-
globalization forces, the challenging mission has come to imply the
protection of humankind in general, and the Arabs in particular, against
the evils of globalization.
While the ideologically disposed critic could hardly define the
process before attacking it, social scientists would offer a definition of
sort. For them, the process entails: growing dependence by the weaker
and poorer on the stronger and richer; spread of consumerism and multi-
national corporations; greater inequality in the distribution and flow of
wealth, technology, and information; imposition of Western values and
lifestyles; and the application of double standards in international affairs.
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For the Arab liberals who are not particularly anti-Western,
globalization has come to mean: growing interdependence among
nations, cultures, and markets. The free and rapid flow of information,
goods, and services is viewed as having a democratizing if not
equalizing effect. The Internet and CNN are often portrayed as
symbols of globalization and as having more positive than negative
consequences on people's lives.
Several conferences and research projects on globalization have
taken place in the Arab world in the mid-1990s. Four recent large-scale
events illustrate its importance. The first two took place in Egypt in the
Spring of 1998. The American University in Cairo (AUC) devoted its
fifth annual research conference (29-30 March 1998) to the theme
"Globalization: Blessing or Curse?" Participants debated or reported
research findings on topics such as: Globalization: Losers and Gainers
(Samir Radwan); Globalization and Human Development in Egypt
(Galal Amin); Globalization and Poverty Alleviation (Samir Ishaq);
Globalization and Liberal Education: the Cloning of American Mind?
(Robert Switzer); and Globalization and Identity (Ernest Wolf-Gazo).74
The last topic was the entire theme of another pan-Arab Conference
held in Cairo a month later and sponsored by Egypt's Supreme Council
for Culture, under the title, "Globalization and Arab Cultural Identity."
Some 200 leading Arab intellectuals and social scientists took up the
various sub-themes for heated debates, the broad lines of which have
already been identified above.
The other two recent large-scale events on globalization took
place in Morocco in the summer of 1998. The Arab world and the
West in the Age of Globalization was the theme of the annual Asilan
Festival (15-17 August 1998). During this event, Arab, European, and
American scholars debated and exchanged research findings on actual
economic, financial, and media exchanges between the Arab world and
the West. Despite some unavoidable incriminations, the bulk of the
conference papers were dispassionate and to the point. One sobering
conclusion was that the Arab world was far behind other developing
regions in catching up with the rapid forces of globalization. Similar
sobering conclusions emerged from the deliberations of the second
74 See more detailed account in the American University in Cairo, Proceedings of the
Fifth Research Conference, Cairo: The American University in Cairo, 1998.
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annual conference of the Mediterranean Development Forum (MDF)
held in Marrakech, Morocco, 3-6 September 1998. Under the positive
title, Benefiting from Globalization, some 150 participants of the MDF
offered and debated research papers on the best practices of case
studies from developing countries and economies in transition, in
which globalization has been utilized positively. These included papers
such as Managing Global Integration: Cost, Benefits, and Policy
Options, Informed Sector and Development, The Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership, Financial Flows and Capital Market, and Lessons from
East Asia.
2. Retreat and reconstruction of the state. The 1990s have witnessed
seemingly contradictory societal processes in the Arab region. Among
these are the retreat of the state in several Arab countries — and the
quest to build or rebuild the state in others.
Most of the overgrown states of the Arab world were associated
with populism and the revolutionary social contracts of the 1950s and
1960s. Simply put, following Egypt's example under Nasser, peoples
of the Arab world were led to believe that the state would grant or
provide consolidation of newly obtained independence, achieve rapid
economic growth (through industrialization), institute social justice,
march toward Arab unity, liberate Palestine, and maintain cultural
authenticity. All of this would be achieved in return for suspending
liberal Western-type democracy, at least for a while. Public policies,
central planning, and command economics became the order of the
day. State organs multiplied. State bureaucracies grew in size ten-
times, on average, between 1950 and 1980 (Ayubi 1995).
However, with external military defeats, civil armed conflicts,
economic mismanagement, and rising external debts, the populist
expansive state began to retreat in the 1970s and 1980s. Even the era of
the Arab oil boom following the 1973 October War came to an end by
the mid-1980s, followed by declining oil prices on the world market.
By the early 1990s, oil-rich Arab states were equally compelled to
retreat from their extravagant public expenditure. The retreat of the
state has often been disorderly, leaving in its wake a vacuum which
would invariably be filled by unexpected and mostly "undesirable"
new social forces.
While the state was retreating in some Arab countries, massive
attempts were being made to build or rebuild the state in other Arab
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countries. Thus, in Palestine, some embryonic PLO structures had been
almost force-fed in order to grow and to accommodate the imperatives
of a pending new state. New structures were started from scratch. This
gave rise to a flurry of research activities, mostly foreign-funded, some
of which have already been alluded to. Others will be elaborated upon
later.
Large-scale research projects have also accompanied the quest to
rebuild the society and state in Lebanon after its fifteen-year civil war.
Rebuilding central Beirut and the infrastructure of the Greater Beirut
Area (GBA) has proven to be more than a mere physical exercise. It
has involved socio-cultural-political restructuring as well, with new
elites and socio-economic formations emerging. Decentralization,
institutional and fiscal evaluation of municipalities, local governments,
corruption and transparency; judicial reform; role of civil society;
electoral reform, and election monitoring; gender and citizenship; and
environmental problems have been among the new research agenda of
Lebanese social scientists. Two new research institutions have taken
the lead in implementing this agenda: an Oxford-based Center for
Lebanese Studies (CLS), and the Beirut-based Lebanese Center for
Policy Studies (LCPS).
Similar research is planned or anticipated on state reconstruction
in war-torn Arab countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Algeria, and Iraq.
Some of this policy-oriented research is being carried out by native
scientists from these countries living in exile, such as the Center for
Sudanese Studies (CSS), in Cairo.
3. Economic reform and structural adjustment policies (ERSAP). The
retreat of the state in several Arab countries in the 1980s (such as
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan) was in favor of ERSAP
policies as recommended by external creditors and financial
institutions (the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank). Despite initial resistance, confusion, and half-hearted
responses, many of the Arab states have ultimately accepted and
implemented ERSAP. This simply meant a return to market-
competitive, or capitalist, economics.
Much of the 1980s witnessed heated intellectual and ideological
debates over ERSAP in general and specific measures in particular.
But by the beginning of the 1990s, several Arab research institutions,
both old and new, took the challenge seriously. Some ambitious
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research projects were commissioned, conferences and seminars held,
and training programs organized over ERSAP. Included among the
new leading research institutions are the Economic Research Forum
(ERF) for the Arab countries, Iran, and Turkey (Cairo); Institut Arabe
des Chefs d'Entreprises (Tunis); Jordan Economic Development
Association (JEDA); Moroc 2020; Palestinian Economists Association
(PEA); Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment
(SCBDI); Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESSF);
Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES); and Lebanese Center
for Policy Studies (LCPS).
Among others, many of these research institutions have been
generously funded by the World Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic
and Social Development (AFESD), and the Ford Foundation. Of all the
Arab social-science research in the 1990s, economic research has been
the most robust, systematic, and accumulative. Research covers a wide
range of topics from micro- to macro-level problems, using a range of
empirical and survey techniques. Topics have included eight sets:
a) labor markets, demography, human resource development, and
poverty;
b) economic management of growth, stabilization, and adjustment;
c) financial sector performance, portfolio flows and foreign direct
investment (FDI);
d) governance, institutional development, budget procedures, and
political economy;
e) trade, regional integration, and European community and
Mediterranean agreements;
f) sectoral economics, especially agriculture, energy, industry and
technology, and small enterprise development;
g) impact of the European monetary union on Arab and other Middle
Eastern economies; and
h) the impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement.
4. Growing Islamic activism. The retreat of the Arab states was mostly a
disorderly one in the 1970s and 1980s. The populist regimes which
hurriedly administered the retreat were the same ones which had
stunted the growth of the CSOs in their respective countries. Coupled
with other domestic, regional, and international developments, many
young people felt abandoned. Many of the casualties of the state
retreat, and the rapid ERSAP did not find the kind of "safety-nets"
which healthy CSOs and NGOs could have provided.
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As a result, many disenchanted youth turned to politicized,
radical religious organizations — either to receive material and socio-
emotional support, or simply to vent their anger and challenge the
ruling regimes. Under headings such as Islamic militancy, activism,
fundamentalism, revival, insurgence, and resurgence, people who
became so-involved have become a flourishing subject of Arab social-
science research from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s.
Taking the lead here were the Cairo-based National Center for
Sociological and Criminological Research (NCSCR), the Ibn Khaldun
Center for Development (ICD), and more recently Al-Ahram Center
for Strategic and Political Studies. The Tunisian Centre de Recherche
Economique et Sociale (CRES), as well as several individual
researchers investigated the phenomenon rigorously. Starting nearly
ten years after their Egyptian counterparts, the Tunisians had the
benefit of testing several propositions as substantiated by accumulated
Egyptian data. With the Hamas and Islamic Jihad emerging during, and
continuing after, the Palestinian Intifida (uprising), Ziad Abu Amr and
others reached similar conclusions about Islamic activism in the
occupied territories.
More comparative and longitudinal research is needed and
expected on the topic because the phenomenon is well into its third
decade. As well, it is taking on several faces in different MENA
countries, from pro-Taliban in Afghanistan, to pro-Erbakan in Turkey.
5. Growing civil society and democratization. Interestingly, the other
competing forces in filling the public space vacated by the failed
populist state have been the sprouting NGOs, or the broadly termed
CSOs. Despite governmental reluctance to allow them to exist, a series
of international events boosted Arab CSOs.
In the 1990s, for the very first time, the UN officially encouraged
and made ample room for NGOs in its world-wide conferences (that is,
in the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, the 1993 Human Rights Conference in
Vienna, the 1994 International Conference on Population and
Development (ICPD) in Cairo, the March 1995 Social Summit in
Copenhagen, the 1996 World Conference on Women (WCW) in
Beijing, and the 1997 World Conference on Habitat in Istanbul.
The above world events did at least three things:
a) They tapped the energy of actual and potential CSOs which had
been asked to contribute substantively to the subject matter of the
conferences. Responding to the UN request, thousands of NGOs
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from around the world — including hundreds of the Arab ones —
engaged in policy- and action-oriented research on the topics at
hand. In many ways, the NGOs and CSOs contributions were the
ones which were most noted in these international conferences.
b) The high profile of NGOs and CSOs, coupled with the role
assigned to them in the UN's Action Plans of the 1990s— for
example, the environment (the 2020 strategy), protection and
promotion of human rights, reproductive health, and empowerment
of women— alerted many social scientists to the growing
importance of NGOs/CSOs, not only as societal actors, but also as
a rich subject for research themselves.
c) Many Arab NGOs established networks of their own, either in
preparation for the above-mentioned conferences or as part of post-
conference activities to follow up on implementing UN Action
Plans.
The 1990s also witnessed a new growing research category on
CSOs and NGOs that had hardly existed in the 1980s or earlier.
Equally significant are the sprouting non-governmental research
centers, which consider themselves as an integral part of Arab civil
society. The most important of these networks are:
Beirut-based Arab Social Science Research centers (ASSR),
which includes ten of the leading research institutions in Egypt,
Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan;
Cairo-based Economic Research Forum (ERF), which includes
17 of the economic research institutions in the Arab countries,
Turkey, and Iran;
 Cairo-based Arab NGOs Network, which has more than
thousand active NGOs as members and issues a newsletter called
al-Mezallah (the umbrella);
Arab Democracy Network, which includes some 24 research and
advocacy organizations from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon,
Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco;
Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR), which is a loose
federation of some 20 country-based organizations, including
five chapters outside the Arab world (in Paris, London, Geneva,
Vienna, and Toronto);
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Arab Network for the Protection of Human Rights Activists
(ANPHRA), with membership from Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria,
Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine; and
Cairo-based Center for Environment and Development for the
Arab region and Europe (CEDARE).
All of the above networks were inspired or induced by the
world-wide UN conferences of the 1990s.
But there were also other older networks of social sciences
which were indigenously initiated during the 1980s. These include:
Amman-based Arab Thought Forum (ATF), created in 1981;
Arab Sociological Association (1983);
Arab Political Science Association (1985);
Arab Philosophical Association (1986);
Arab Economic Studies Group (1986); and
Arab Education Association (1988).
These five associations were all initiated by the same Arab
social-science activists who had intimidated the Arab human rights
movement following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Their
misgivings concerning the Arab governments' ineptness at the time led
many of them to take these initiatives to create new CSOs
autonomously, apart from the official governmental-controlled
professional unions. These include the Baghdad-based Arab
Economists Union, Arab Sociologists Union, Arab Historians Union,
Arab Women Union, and the Damascus-based Arab Journalists Union.
While these older professional organizations have continued, albeit in a
semi-stagnant form, it is the newer research and advocacy
organizations of the 1980s and 1990s which have produced most
social-science research.
6. Demography, rights, and politics of gender. Even though gender issues
have been salient in the West since the 1960s, it was not until the
1990s that the issues took off— both on activist and research levels.
Four of the six international UN conferences of the 1990s were
dominated by gender issues as human rights, the ICPD, the Social
Summit, and the WCW.
The International Human Rights Conference (Vienna, 1993)
devoted the lion's share to women's rights. The most dramatic event in
that encounter was the session featuring living case-studies of women
victims of domestic and political torture. These included several from
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the Arab world, notably from Algeria and Palestine, in which the
perpetrators were Islamic militants and Israeli jailers, respectively. In
turn, this prompted several Arab female social scientists to document
and analyze tens of similar cases in the following three years, and to
prepare for the Beijing fourth World Conference on Women.
The 1994 ICPD was far more controversial with regard to
women. Both the Christian Vatican and the Islamic Azhar coalesced to
block several sections of the ICPD-proposed Plan of Action on
women's equal rights, sexual education, sexual freedom, birth control,
and reproductive health. Feminists from all over the world fought what
amounted to a "trench war" for every paragraph in the document, and
won most of the ICPD's battles. But more relevant to this paper is that
the ICPD experience proved to be a watershed for Arab women and
social-science research on gender, women's autonomy, and
empowerment. Several new Arab women organizations initiated
research programs on their own and produced some first-class
research.
Conventional demographic research has continued through the
1970s and 1980s, with emphasis on growth, distribution, migration,
and urbanization. The Cairo Demographic Center, Egypt's Institute of
National Planning, and the Kuwait-based Arab Institute of Planning
continued their research programs on the major demographic changes
started in the 1970s and 1980s. Due attention was given to the inter-
Arab labor migration caused by the leaps of oil prices following the
1973 October war. Similar attention, though to a lesser degree, was
given to the labor migration from North Africa to Europe.
But the qualitative shift in Arab demographic research in the
1990s has been permeated by rising gender consciousness. The World
Population Council through its MEA Award, and the Ford Foundation
through its Middle East Research Competition (MERC), contributed
substantially to this growing trend. Thus, a convergence of UN
conferences, growing feminism, external donors, and re-emergence of
conservative forces have made the issues of population and gender
highly politicized in the 1990s. A case in point has been female
circumcision, or Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). Although long-
practiced in some Arab African countries, it was only in the 1990s,
especially around the 1994 ICPD, that the issue exploded and became
politically sensitive.
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Finally, health and demographic surveys (HDS) regularly
conducted in an increasing number of Arab countries are producing
ample sophisticated data for scholars with interest in gender research.
7. Externally - motivated environmental research. Environmental issues
and the social-science research around them is a phenomenon of the
1990s in the Arab world. In this respect, there is nearly a three-decade
time lag in comparison to the West. The driving force behind both
Arab states and non-governmental interest in environmental issues has
definitely been external, that is, from international organizations and
other bilateral foreign donors.
To substantiate the above, we reviewed 225 recent research-
project documents published by Egypt's National Center for
Sociological and Criminological Research (NCSCR), from the period
1970 to 1995. The NCSCR is the oldest and biggest social-science
research institution in the Arab world (established in 1957). Yet out of
these 225 projects, only three dealt directly with environmental
issues — and all were conducted in the 1990s. Individual researchers,
however, did not wait till established research institutions initiated
such activities. As well, researchers were substantially helped by
external development-aid agencies, especially from the Nordic
countries.
Issues of water shortage and the need for more efficient water
management systems have loomed large in Jordan, Palestine, and
Egypt in the 1990s. In addition, the Madrid Peace Conference (1991)
and the Palestinian-Israeli Oslo Agreement (1993) called for
multilateral as well as bilateral negotiations over environmental issues
in general. Rio's Earth Summit (1992) fell in-between Madrid and
Oslo, and called for various environmental measures to be observed by
all stakeholders. In response, all Arab governments instituted new
official bodies for the environment and appropriate environmental laws
were passed in several Arab countries. Equally, tens of environmental
NGOs sprang up in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, and
Lebanon and formed an Arab network of their own.
The American University in Cairo's (AUC) Social Research
Center (SRC) is the leading regional research institution on
environmental issues. AUC's SRC involvement in this area goes back
to its 1960s and 1970s' large-scale investigation on the social impact
of the Aswan High Dam. In the 1990s, the researchers dealt with more
micro-interactive issues at the grassroots levels. A case in point has
been the recycling of solid waste in urban areas. Several studies of
greater Cairo's garbage collection system and informal collectors
(Zabbalin) were conducted and attracted international attention during
Rio's Earth Summit and Istanbul's UN Habitat Conference (1997).
Equally, there has been increasing interest in alternative sources of
energy, especially the renewable variety of solar and wind.
Among the new features of Arab environmental research is the
growing interdisciplinary cooperation, not only among the social
scientists but also between them, natural scientists, engineers, and
lawyers.
Rediscovery of the non-Western worlds. Until the late-1980s, there
were very few Arab research institutions specializing in international
relations. The oldest and most established was the Al-Ahram Center
for Political and Strategic Studies (CPSS) and its affiliate quarterly of
Foreign Policy (al-Siyasa al-Dawliyya). By the 1990s, several research
centers were established to deal with strategic and international
relations, namely the University of Jordan's Center for Strategic
Studies (1988); the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of
International Affairs, PASSIA (1988); the United Arab Emirates
Center for Strategic Research (1994), and Damascus-based Center of
Arab Strategic Research (1995); and the Libyan-based Center for
Mediterranean Studies (1996). In the mid-1990s, Cairo University's
Faculty of Economics and Political Science (FEPS) — which had had
two centers for Political and Economic Studies since the mid-1980s —
added two centers devoted for the study of the non-Western worlds:
the Center for Asian Studies (CAS) and the Center for the Studies of
Developing Countries (CSDC).
All these institutions have produced an impressive number of
publications, including regular newsletters reporting on their ongoing
activities. Together they have not only introduced the Arab intelligence
to non-Western regions and peoples in a more profound manner. But
they have also trained a crop of young Arab researchers not obsessed
by the West.
Equally, the Arab Political Science Association (APSA) has
gone beyond the same obsessions with domestic and inter-Arab
politics. After recovering from the heavy trimmers of the Second Gulf
War crisis, the APSA has devoted all its recent seminars and
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conferences to the understanding of the New World System (1991), the
Global Technological Revolution and its Socio-Political Impact
(1992), the Arab-African Relations, and the Arabs in World Strategies
(1994).
9. Search for new regional paradigm. Related to the above research
concern about the non-Western worlds, many Arab social scientists are
cognizant of needing to revisit notions of regional integration. In view
of the new challenges posed by the European Community (EC), the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Association
of the South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), both politicians and
scholars have discussed schemes of a regional bloc in which the Arab
world is at the Center— or at least is a major player. Four such
schemes were debated in the 1990s.
First were attempts to revive an otherwise declining pan-
Arabism. The Beirut-based Center for Arab Unity Studies (CAUS) has
been the focal research point for this paradigm and has produced more
studies than any other research outfit in this regards. Some of these
studies involved sharp critiques of earlier attempts at pan-Arab
regional cooperation and/or unification. Some of the earliest large-
scale survey research projects as well as early futuristic studies were
undertaken by CAUS.
The second regional cooperation paradigm proposed in the
1990s was the pan-Islamic, advocated by the Iranian Islamic Republic
and supported by Islamic movements in many countries. Pan-Islamism
received a shot in the arm with the Erbakan Islamic Rafat Party
government in Turkey in 1996 and 1997. Erbakan proposed that such a
regional bloc be built around the eight big Muslim countries (Egypt,
Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Malaysia, and
Indonesia). Rigorous social-science research around this paradigm is
still limited, and the small amount that has emerged is shrouded in
ideology and advocacy.
The third scheme for regional cooperation was that proposed in
Barcelona in 1994 under the heading of Mediterranean Partnership.
Arab North African economists and demographers carried out more
research on the viability and utility of this paradigm than their
counterpart in the rest of the Arab world. By the same token, a network
of the European Association for Middle Eastern Studies (EURAME)
produced several studies on Mediterranean partnership. In the Arab
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East, interest among scholars was not as obvious, though one entire
issue of the Cairo-based Foreign Policy (March 1995) was devoted to
Mediterraneanism.
Finally, a Middle-East regional cooperation paradigm was
proposed after the Palestinian-Israeli Oslo Agreement (1993) and the
Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty (1994). Greater numbers of Israeli and
American scholars than Arab social scientists have done ample
research on this. Arab intellectual debate on it has been more
ideological than scholarly.
Summary of the emerging social-science research issues
Much of the Arab social-science research in the 1990s has greatly enriched
public debates and informed the public opinion. However, it has had limited
direct impact on top decision makers. The exceptions to this observation
include:
Language of leadership discourse. Whether or not they sincerely
subscribe to relevant social science findings, many Arab leaders have
increasingly used the social science vocabulary in areas of sustainable
development, social development, human rights, governance,
transparency, democratization, empowerment of women, and civil
society.
Cabinet level technocratic planning. Such planning especially comes
into play when decision-makers commission the researchers
themselves either in preparation for launching new programs, or for
project evaluation later on.
Public opinion surveys. Though relatively new in the Arab world, the
four newly-created countries (Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt)
have started to use public opinion surveys. These have been taken
seriously by the leadership, which occasionally tries to suppress or
dismiss the results— and often with contrary reactions (that is, it
backfires).
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Assessment of Arab social-science research
An overview
The number of Arab social-science research centers, the volume of research
on the topic, and channels of dissemination have at least tripled in the late
1990s, compared to the early 1980s.
The 1982 IDRC report, "Social Science Research in MENA..."
estimated the number of qualified researchers as 8 000 (2 000 seniors and
6000 juniors) in six fields of recognized social sciences: anthropology,
economics, education, political science, psychology, and sociology. Not
much direct field data presently exists. Therefore, only a "guesstimate" can
be made, which indicates that there are 50 000 social-science researchers in
the MENA countries (20 000 seniors and 30 000 juniors). This represents
more than an eight-times increase in 20 years. Much of the latter is in the
field of education. Numbers of institutions of higher learning have increased
nearly ten times, from 18 colleges of education to about 180 in the same
period.
Specialized research institutions as such (that is, not just degree-
granting) were estimated at 20 in 1982. At present, they are guesstimated at a
100, a five-times increase. Most are concentrated in Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey,
and Iran. By the late 1990s, Jordan, Palestine, Kuwait, UAE, Morocco, and
Tunisia have joined the list of countries with a disproportionate share of
research institutions in the MENA region. In other words, research facilities
and capabilities are more spread out presently than two decades earlier.
In the 1982 IDRC report, it was noted that the volume and quality of
the Arab social-science research output displayed a wide range of quality —
across countries, disciplines, and even sub-disciplines. The variance was
often contingent on a single leader in the institution. Twenty years later, the
range of quality and quantity of research output is far wider than before.
Significantly, one reason for the modest quality of research output is the
pressure to publish for promotion, without proper quality control.
Many observers have rightly noted that it all goes back to improper or
lack of research training both at the undergraduate and graduate levels. The
pressure for college degrees (not for higher education) has led all countries in
the Arab world to rapidly expand both in the number and size of colleges as
well as universities at a faster rate than providing qualified faculty members,
particularly those who are trained abroad. To meet the shortage, local, under-
staffed institutions began to grant PhDs to under-educated and under-trained
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students who hardly knew foreign languages or sophisticated
methodologies — much less mastering one. This has naturally led to the
reproduction of incompetence. This is the stark weakness of Arab social-
science research. When combined with the absence of other research
imperatives, this situation produces an anomalous scene of many structures
and actors milling about, while generating little of much value.
In the midst of this, a few centers of excellence exist. Also, several
competent social researchers do exist in every Arab country, some of whom
are first-rate by international standards. Most are Western-trained or have
had an extensive exposure to a master Arab social scientist who did the
nurturing and training. It is here that the strength of Arab social-science
research exists; more importantly, this is where the future lies. The cloning of
the excellent few is possible: it can and must be done. The question is
whether it will be done.
But a closer look must be given to the weaknesses, strengths and
current conceptual orientations of Arab social-science research. This
becomes more apparent when research relates to concrete issues of social
development. Development-related social research helps illustrate this
situation.
Weaknesses of current Arab social research
Quality demand is often what produces quality supply. But this does not
seem to operate in the case of Arab social research in general, particularly in
those areas of maximum demand, or social development/The weaknesses of
proper response to dire need take many forms and possess several
motivations.
1. Lag of methodologies. Much of the current Arab social research still
follows methodological tools and techniques which lag a few decades
behind their counterpart in advanced countries. Not only is it mostly
descriptive than inductive, but also more qualitative than quantitative.
In the fewer instances when quantification is used, it is often of a
cruder variety which does not enable the user to reach sophisticated
understanding or formulate rational long-term plans.
This methodological lag backfires in at least two ways. Resulting
social research may often be so defective that it brings about defective
results which, in turn, reduces or destroys the faith of users in the
proficiency of indigenous Arab researchers. Part of the chain effect is
either to rely on foreign "experts" or do away with research altogether.
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Foreign social researchers may be more methodologically
sophisticated but with no, or poor, substantive knowledge about the
social milieu. To gain the needed understanding, such expatriate
research would take a long time and cost tremendous amounts of
money. Sympathetic foreign donors may devise a way by which a
mixed team of expatriate and indigenous researchers can work
together, creating fruitful synergy between participants.
Doing away with research altogether, especially in the areas of
social development, under the pretext of previous bad experiences,
may result in ad hoc bureaucratic measures. This happens far too often
in programs and projects for the poor— such as family planning,
housing, micro-credit, education, and health provision. The results are
often disastrous both in human and material costs.
Occasionally, Arab social researchers may be well versed in
appropriate methodology for the case at hand, yet take too long to
complete the tasks required in time. This often leads decision-makers
or implementers to go ahead using their common sense and best
judgment without waiting for the research findings, which makes the
completed research become irrelevant. But irrelevance could also be
built into conceptual or theoretical orientation for the development
problem at hand (see the next point, Irrelevant conceptualization).
An equally noted exception to the above remarks about lagging
methodologies concerns economics and formal demography. Arab
researchers in both disciplines are more in tune with sophisticated,
qualitative techniques. The fact that their respective subject matter
lends itself to numbers makes it possible to use ordinal and interval
levels of measurement, and scaling devices help in practicing advanced
methods more easily.
2. Irrelevant conceptualization. Arab social scientists have traditionally
been heavily influenced by Western theoretical paradigms of social
science, particularly Marxism and Functionalism. Even when
revamped after WWII into Dependency and World System neo-
Marxism— or Modernization theory as the reincarnation of neo-
Functionalism— Arab social scientists followed closely in the
footsteps of the Western (including Soviet) "Other." There was little or
no Arab authentic theoretical innovation to guide research in their own
societies until the late 1990s.
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Most who were well versed in the above theoretical paradigms
were hardly equipped or even interested in the type of empirical field
work needed for social development schemes, and vice versa. The
result has been often endless theoretical debates without empirical
findings to settle or upgrade them. In some areas, there is abundant
empirical data that has no guiding theoretical system which can
decipher it.
3. The lag of participatory approach. Very little, if any, of Arab social
research in the 1980s and 1990s employed a participatory approach in
which the subjects, (women, workers, youth, farmers) were briefed
about the research objectives or given an opportunity to express their
opinion. The latter may bear on the objective itself, or reflect the best
way of achieving it. It may also include a feedback on the research
findings. Participatory research does not mean that the target group has
a free reign in defining the research problem or determining the
methods and techniques. But it does entail an active dialogue with
members of the target group — either individually or collectively. This
approach has proven to be very satisfactory to the research subjects, as
well as being fruitful and enriching to the researcher. More
importantly, it bridges the psychic and social gaps between the
researched and the researcher. Despite the egalitarian claims of many
Arab researchers, they still resist the participatory approach — partly
out of unfamiliarity and primarily due to condescension.
4. Lack of rapid research assessment. One reason why decision-makers
occasionally ignore social research is the time pressure in project
implementation. Many Arab social researchers, including senior ones,
have not adequately practiced policy-oriented, action-driven research.
Development practitioners as well as the German Development
Agency (GTZ) perfected methods and techniques which produce quick
findings without sacrificing much validity or reliability. In the jargon
of research language, this is termed rapid assessment research (RAR).
It is often more simplified and focused than the standard social
research methods taught in colleges and universities.
5. Gaps in Arab social research. There are many areas in contemporary
Arab life which are markedly understudied. These include the nature
and role of Arab military in shaping state, society, and overall
development. The subject is often considered too sensitive because of
national security. The same taboo or self-censor by Arab researchers
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apply to topics of sex and sexuality; religious, sectarian and ethnic
conflicts; elite recruitment, circulation and performance; corruption,
nepotism and graft. Public opinion research is still absent in the
majority of Arab countries. Urgent, but still lacking is Arab social
research inputs on the socio-cultural consequences of natural or man-
made disasters. The Arab world has a disproportionate share of these in
the second half of the twentieth century — with only 6% of the world
population, this region was home to 20% of the world's armed
conflicts and population dislocation.
Equally missing from the Arab social-science agenda in the
1990s is communication research. The rapid development of the
electronic media has affected this area as much, if not more, as any
region of the globe. Despite mushrooming academic departments in the
field of mass communication, little research in this area has surfaced in
this decade. This is a definite research gap. The number of Arab
satellites, broadcast television and radio stations, the number and
volume of newspapers and other printed media has at least tripled in
one decade. Yet this phenomenal growth is hardly reflected in Arab
social research.
Strengths of Arab social research
Points of strength in Arab social research remain relative — depending on the
yardstick being used. Thus if the comparison is "Arab time," the conclusion
can be made that there has been marked progress in the 1980s and 1990s
compared to earlier decades. However, by other international standards, Arab
social research in general (particularly that bearing on development) seems
modest, or average, at best. However, there is tremendous promise in Arab
social-research potential, previews of which have been displayed since the
mid-1990s. These promises are sketched below.
1. Cross-countries comparisons. There are at least ten Arab countries
(Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait,
Bahrain, and Yemen) in which there are comparable data on a number
of important issues, ranging from population and gender, to grassroots
initiatives in development, to attitudinal survey data. There are also
some 16 country-based surveys of civil society and political
development which represent a rich database for secondary and tertiary
analysis. Both the UNDP's Human Development Reports (HDRs) and
the worldwide Demographic and Health Surveys (DHSs) are now
available for several if not all Arab and Middle-Eastern countries.
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While some data are collected through governmental bureaucratic
machines, most data are obtained through well-thought-out fieldwork.
In the process, thousands of groups of Arab field workers have been
trained and are deploy able for further cross-country research. Even the
rich data already accumulated from the HDRs and the DHSs in the
1990s offer a great but still under-utilized and under-analyzed resource
for Arab social research.
2. Policy analysis. Since the mid-1980s, a social research effort has begun
to analyze many of the contested public policies, especially in countries
which were moving from a command to a market economy. These
policies included education, health, housing, agrarian reform,
agriculture, and food policies. Public-policy research has spread from
Egypt to Jordan and Lebanon. The latter, in fact, now has a specialized
institution in this area, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS),
established in the early 1990s. Among developing countries, this
research area is one that the Arab world can claim as a notable strength.
3. Public opinion research. Public opinion and electoral research
represents a research area in which Palestinian social scientists have
taken a definite lead. The Center for Palestinian Research and Studies
(CPRS) has emerged as a research leader whose work is highly
acclaimed. It was followed by the Jordanian Center for Strategic
Studies (JCSS), the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), and
Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (CPSS). While
still confined to four Arab countries, this is one of the most promising
areas of social research, in which Kuwait, Yemen, Morocco, and other
democratizing countries are expected to follow. Arab social research is
again emerging as a pioneer initiative among developing countries.
There is a growing community of researchers, at both the senior and
junior levels, who are developing their empirical and analytical
competence quite rapidly.
4. Economic research. Arab economic research is one social science area
that has always been considered as reasonably advanced by
international standards. In the 1990s, a new generation of socially
minded economists are producing a stream of solid studies on
economics of transition, such as structural adjustment, reform
strategies, social funds, and other safety nets. Many of these are under
the auspices of non-governmental research institutions. Most member
institutions of the Economic Research Forum (ERF) for the Arab
countries, Iran, and Turkey were also established in the early 1990s.
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With expanding markets and free competition, consumer behavior
research is becoming more prevalent. While commercially driven,
Arab consumer research examined by this author seemed of high
professional quality.
5. New social-science research networks. Probably the most promising
aspect in the area of Arab social research is the growing number of
centers and institutions, mostly non-governmental, which are getting
organized into networks. The two leading networks at present are the
ERF, described previously, which has 17 research institutions, and the
Arab Social Science Research Network (ASSR) which has ten research
centers. Both institutions are still growing. There are other emerging
networks doing social research as a secondary activity. These include
the Arab Network of NGOs (ANNGO), the Arab Network for the
Promotion of Democracy (ANPD), the Arab Network for
Environmental Associations (ANEA) and the Arab Organization of
Human Rights (AOHR).
in search of new conceptual orientation
It is premature to claim that new conceptual orientations in Arab social-
science research have materialized in recent years. Instead, there are building
blocs for new Arab social-science paradigms. With the obvious limitations or
even discrediting of older conceptual orientations — Marxism and neo-
Marxism, functionalism and modernization theories— three conceptual
orientations are being proposed by Arab social scientists in the 1990s.
1. Postmodernism. This is a predilection of Western-centric Arab social
scientists who still continue to take their cues from their Western
counterparts. The broad conceptual orientation loosely subsumed under
postmodernism has its followers among Arab social scientists. But it is
yet to translate itself into more usable research frameworks. The only
possible exception to this is its "de-constructive" mode of discourse
analysis. The closest thing to it is "participatory research," which does
away with a priori research assumptions and research techniques.
Postmodernist debates are common in the Maghreb countries,
especially Morocco and Tunisia.
2. Arabized social science. The 1980's witnessed an active conscious
movement among Arab social scientists to develop authentic Arab
paradigms. Several conferences, seminars, and workshops were held
for this purpose. As well, new pan-Arab professional associations were
established, for example, the Arab Sociological Association (ASA), the
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Third World Forum (TWF), Arab Thought Forum (ATF), the Arab
Political Science Association (APSA), and the Center for Arab Unity
Studies (CAUS). While nothing fully-fledged has developed yet, these
initiatives have resulted in some large-scale research projects in the
late 1980s and 1990s. These include the Future of Arab Homeland
(FAH), Alternative Arab Futures (TWF), and Educating the Arab
Nation in a New Century (ATF). Each of these projects resulted in the
publication of several volumes as well as significant debates, but these
only had a modest impact on Arab policy making. Symbolically,
several of the new social-science research institutions have adopted
names of noted Arab thinkers of the past, including Ibn-Khaldun, Ibn-
Rushd, Ibn-Saini, and al-Nadim. Some of the classic publications
authored by these and other Arab thinkers have been republished and
re-interpreted by contemporary Arab social scientists, all of whom are
searching for authentic paradigms.
3. An Islamized social science. The 1990's witnessed similar initiatives to
develop Islamic Social Sciences. This drive coincided with the
resurgence of Islamic social movements during the past three decades.
An Islamic Economic Research Center was established in Cairo in the
early 1990s to promote studies on Islamic rules governing Islamic
business transactions. Directed in its early years by Cairo University
professor of economics, Dr Abbed Halim al-Ghazali, the center was
funded by the mushrooming Islamic banks and investment companies
which operate on the basis of interest-free and risk-sharing
(mubharabah) business philosophies. Another research program started
at Cairo University by Professor Seif Abdel-Fattah and a new
generation of younger political scientists (such as Nevine Abdel-
Khalek and Nadia Mustapha). Parallel to this Arab-based initiative
were similar initiatives by Muslim social scientists based in the West,
the most notable of which is the newly established University of
Islamic Sciences (UIS) in the Washington DC area (USA).
Social research priorities for the 21 st century
Without getting into detailed specifics, the general trends of the early
decades of the 21st century are bound to be similar to those prevailing iii the
closing decade of the 20th century. There is an unmistakable quest for
participation and inclusion in public life — locally, nationally, and globally.
This quest is bound to have multiple and deep ramifications. As indicated in
the section on Gaps in Arab social research, this type of research has not kept
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in tune or at pace with these ramifications. Let us recap and suggest the
threads which must enter into a new Arab social science agenda for the 21st
century.
1. Communication and electronic media research. These involve patterns,
processes and trends, and impact on listeners as well as viewers.
2. Participation of the dispossessed and marginalized groups in public
life. This particularly affects women, youth, the poor, the disabled,
ethnic and minority groups.
3. Patterns and political economies of conflict. Arab human and material
resources have been wasted on intra-state and inter-state conflicts.
Little research was devoted to this area in the past. Filling this gap
makes it a research priority in the next century.
4. Post-conflict reconstruction. Very little Arab research has taken place
in the area of conflict management and resolution. That gap must be
filled. It should be complemented by research initiatives on post-
conflict reconstruction on the inter-personal, inter.-groups, and inter-
state levels.
5. Military and society. Related to the last two points above is the
complex relation between the armed forces, other armed groups, and
the rest of society. Part of successful post-conflict reconstruction is the
demobilization and demilitarization processes. How can this be
achieved with minimal disruption or threat of resuming armed
conflicts? How can former soldiers, militia personnel, guerrilla
fighters, and militants be reintegrated into the socio-economic
mainstream?
6. Social casualties of socio-economic change. With the massive
structural economic adjustment, integration in global economy, and the
anticipated stiffening competition on world scale, there are bound to be
far more social casualties than we have already seen in the 1980s and
1990s. Appropriate safety nets will have to be among the priorities of
policy research in the new century.
7. Gender and human security research. Although issues of women's
victimization and marginalization, and women's quest for
empowerment have become increasingly prominent in the 1990s, much
research is still needed in the general area of gender, with particular
emphasis on the interactive patterns between the sexes, from childhood
to old-age, as well as across classes. With the changing age structures
of the Arab population, numbers of older women will probably
increase proportionately. Since most Arab women are not part of the
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organized formal labor force, they will be outside the "social security"
(pension) schemes. Modalities to cope with this eventuality must be
anticipated by policy and action-oriented research.
8. Water politics research. Water is still the most scarce natural resource
in the MENA region. By the mid-1990s, the price of a litre of purified
drinking water was more than a litre of processed oil. Water
management and/or conflict over water are already and bound to be
even more prominent issues in the next century. The social and
community-related dimensions of water-sharing should find an easy
place on the research agenda of the MENA region. This is also an area
of research in which foreign funding does not cause controversial
debates.
9. Civil society and democratization. Already appropriating part of the
Arab research agenda in the 1990s, the processes of civil society and
democratization are bound to increase in the new century. Reversals
are also expected. Both advances and setbacks deserve as much
research attention. Work in the area overlaps research on the quests for
inclusion, participation, and conflict resolution.
10. Research institutions. Research on research institutions may sound like
a tautological luxury. Far from it. To carry out the above-mentioned,
nine new research priorities — along with continuing research agenda
from the 20th century— new breeds of social research institutions
must be developed. Research on research institution-building must
appropriate part of the agenda for the new century. Here we are dealing
with the infrastructure of future research. Several allusions were made
to budding new research networks in new centers. Being in embryonic
stages, monitoring and evaluating them constitutes is a worthwhile
research priority.
List of social-science research centers consulted for this paper
Alternative Information Palestinian-Israeli (AIPI), Jerusalem, Israel
Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center (AARS), Amman, Jordan
Arab Political Science Association (APSA), Cairo, Egypt
Arab Thought Forum (ATF), Amman, Jordan
Institute of Law, Birzeit University, Birzeit, Palestine
Center for Development and International Cooperation (CDIC), Cairo,
Egypt
Center for Environment and Development for the Arab region,
(CEDARE), Giza, Egypt
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Center for Maghrib Studies in Tunis (CMST), Tunis, Tunisia
Center for Political Research and Studies (CPRS), Giza, Egypt
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), University of Jordan, Amman,
Jordan
Inter University Consortium for Arab Studies (IUCAS), Montreal,
Canada
Institute of Jerusalem Studies, East Jerusalem, Palestine
Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), East Jerusalem,
Palestine
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
(PASSIA), East Jerusalem, Palestine
Palestine Economic Pulse (PEP), East Jerusalem, Palestine
The American Research Center in Egypt (ARCE), Cairo, Egypt
The Center for Lebanese Studies (CLS), Oxford, United Kingdom
The Economic Researcher Forum for the Arab countries, Iran, and
Turkey (ERF), Cairo, Egypt
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR), Abu
Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
The Institute for Palestine Studies (IPS), Washington DC, USA
•he Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), Beirut, Lebanon




Ayubi, N. 1995. Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East.
LB. Tawis, London, England.
Related references
ACPSS (Al Abram Center for Political and Strategic Studies). 1997. Annual Report.
ACPSS, Cairo, Egypt. [In Arabic]
Ajami, F. 1992. The end of pan-Arabism. Foreign Affairs, The Arab Predicament
(2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 57(Winter 1978-1979) 355-373.
American University in Cairo. 1998. Cairo Papers in Social Science: List of
Publications. American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, Egypt.
American University in Cairo. 1998. Globalization: Blessing or Curse? Proceedings
of the Fifth Research Conference. American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, Egypt.
Arab Thought Forum. 1998. Activity Report: 1997. Amman, Jordan. [In Arabic]
Cairo Papers in Social Sciences, n.d. The Development of Social Science in Egypt:
Economics, History and Sociology. Fifth Annual Symposium. Cairo Papers in Social
Sciences, Cairo, Egypt.
140 IBRAHIM
CDIC (Center for Development and International Cooperation). 1998. Annual
Reports of Activities 1996-1998. CDIC, Cairo, Egypt.
CEDARE (Center for Environment and Development for the Arab region and
Europe). 1994-1998. CEDARE Chronicle. CEDARE, Cairo, Egypt.
Center for Asian Studies of Cairo University. 1996-1998. Annual Reports. [In
Arabic and English]
. Asiana, half-annual newsletter. [In Arabic and English]
CPRS (Center for Political Research and Studies) of Cairo University. 1998. General
Orientation and Activities: 1996-1998. CPRS, Cairo, Egypt. [In Arabic]
ERF (Economic Research Forum). 1994-1998. FORUM. Newsletter of the
Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey, five volumes.
ERF, Cairo/Egypt.
Fukoyama, F. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. The Free Press, New
York, USA.
Ibrahim, S.E. 1997. Social Science Research in the Middle East and North Africa:
Priorities for the 1980s. International Development Research Centre, Cairo, Egypt.
IPS (Institute for Palestine Studies). 1997. Annual Report. Washington, DC, USA.
LCPC (Lebanese Center for Policy Research). Activities. 1998. Amman: [In Arabic]
Luciani, G., ed., 1990. The Arab State. University of California Press, Berkeley-Los
Angeles.
MDF (Mediterranean Development Forum). 1998. Catalogue of Activities.
Marrakech, Morocco.
MEAWARDS (Middle East Awards in Population and Social Sciences). 1998. List
of Projects and Publications: 1988-1998. The Population Council, Cairo, Egypt.
Palestinian-Israeli Center for Alternative Information. Alternative Vision (Arabic
Ru'aya Ukhra). Bethlehem. No. 23, August, 1998.
The Emirate Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 1997. Annual Report. [In
Arabic]
The National Center for Sociological and Criminological Research. 1998. List of
Publications. Cairo, Egypt. [In Arabic]
The World Bank. 1996. The World Bank Participation Sourcebook. Environmentally
Sustainable Development, Washington, DC, USA.
Chapter 4.
The Research Environment in Egypt
Karima Korayem
Introduction
The research environment is a function of four factors:
• the research institutes (the availability and scientific standard);
• the funding (how generous or tight the research budget is);
• the research personnel (the capabilities and potentials of researchers); and
• the research product (its quality and relevance to the country's priorities
and challenges).
The first three factors represent the inputs to the research environment,
while the fourth is the output. Thus, the quality and relevance of the research
produced in Egypt is determined by the quantity and standard of the research
institutes available, by the amount of funding allocated to research activity,
and by the capabilities and potentials of the researchers.
This report consists of four parts, in addition to an Introduction,
Appendix and Bibliography. The second part discusses the institutional setup
in Egypt; the third outlines the research funding; the fourth outlines the
research personnel; and the fifth and last discusses the research product.
The institutional setup in Egypt
The majority of Egypt's research institutes and centers are government-owned,
while some are privately owned by both domestic and foreign outfits.75 The
governmental research outfits (universities, institutions, centers) are located in
the production, higher-education, and services sectors. The research outfits in
the production sector are affiliated to the Ministry of Petroleum, Ministry of
Agriculture, and Ministry of Industry; in the higher education sector, they
belong to the Ministry of Scientific Research, and the Ministry of Education;76
and the research activity in the services sector are distributed among the
75 In a study conducted to formulate a guide for the research institutions that work in
social sciences in Egypt, out of a sample of 68 institutions, 45 are governmental institutes; 15
are private, Egyptian institutes; and 8 are private, foreign institutes (Hegazy 1994).




Ministries of Electricity, Housing, Transportation, Health, Social Affairs,
Irrigation, Planning, Labour and Emigration, and the Cabinet (Academy of
Scientific Research and Technology 1998).
The allocation of government research budget to the different sectors
provides an important indicator of the institutional setup of the research
activity in Egypt and its relative importance on the sectoral level. As shown
in Table 1, the largest shares of Egypt's research expenditures over the
period 1993/94 to 1996/97 were allocated to the production and services
sectors. The average relative share in total research expenditure is 38.3% and
40.8% in the two sectors, respectively, over the four-year period. At the
ministerial level, the lion's share of research expenditure is allocated to the
Ministry of Agriculture; EGP 244.4 million and EGP 285.7 million were
allocated to that Ministry in 1993/94 and 1996/97, representing 36.6% and
28.1% of total research expenditure in the two years respectively. The




1 . Ministry of Petroleum & Minerals
2. Ministry of Agriculture & Land
Reclamation
3. Ministry of Industry
Higher education sector
4. Ministry of Scientific Research
5. Ministry of Higher Education
Services sector
6. Ministry of Electricity & Energy
7. Ministry of Housing
8. Ministry of Transportation
9. Ministry of Health
1 0. Ministry of Social Affairs
1 1 . Ministry of Irrigation
12. Ministry of Planning
1 3. Ministry of Labour & Emigration
14. The Cabinet






























































































































































* The sum of the columns may not equal exactly to the total because of rounding.
Source: The Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, Expenditure Indicators on Scientific Research,
Annual Conference, Cairo, December 1 998, Tables 2 (in Arabic).
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Table 2. Sectoral allocation of research expenditure and research personnel
in some developing and developed countries in the 1990s.
Production sector
Expend-






























































































Source: The Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, Expenditure Indicators of Scientific
Research, the Annual Conference, Cairo, December 1998, Tables, 9 & 12 (in Arabic).
second-largest share of research expenditure is allocated to the Ministry of
Scientific Research; EGP 133.4 million and EGP 202 million were allocated
in 1993/94 and 1996/97, representing 20% of total research expenditure in
the two years. The Ministries of Electricity and Health follow. Each spent
more than EGP 100 million a year during 1993/94-1996/97 on research
activity. The Ministry of Petroleum has only exceeded the EGP 100 million
level in 1996/97. Other ministries spent small amounts of money on research
activity, the majority of them allocating less than EGP 10 million a year over
the period (see Table 1).
The shares of total expenditure on research in the production, higher
education, and services sectors reflects the relative importance of research
activity to them. Guided by this indicator, research activity is seen to
concentrate mainly in the production sector for the developed countries
(France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and USA). This is not the case in the
developing countries included in Table 2, with the exception of such newly
industrialized countries as South Korea and Singapore. As shown in Table 2,
more than 60% of total-research expenditure is allocated to the production
sector in the developed countries as compared to a ratio of 39% for Egypt
and as low as 24% for Turkey. Technology development is strongly
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correlated with investment in research. It is no longer possible to separate the
generation of knowledge from its productive use. The nations that make the
most important technological advances are those at the forefront of value-
adding manufacture activity (UNESCO 1998). This explains the high share
of research expenditure allocated to the production sector in the developed
countries as compared to the developing ones. This fact is supported also by
the concentration of research personnel77 in the production sector as
compared to higher education and services sectors. In developing countries,
the highest percentage of research personnel is located in the higher
education sector (as in Egypt, Turkey, and Argentina), or in the services
sector (as in Malaysia), with the exception of South Korea and Singapore
(see Table 2).
The research funding
Expenditure on research in Egypt has increased in real terms both absolutely
and as a percentage in GDP over the period 1993/94-1996/97. As shown in
Table 3, the annual rate of growth of real national expenditure on research
increased from 1.3% in 1994/95 to 7.4% in 1996/97. The share of national
research expenditure in GDP increased from 0.48% in 1993/94 to 0.63% in
1996/97. If we include foreign financing, the research expenditure share in
GDP increases to 0.7% in 1996/97.
Table 3. Research expenditure in Egypt and its share in GDP, 1993/94-1996/97.
EGP million
Year
1 . Urban consumer price index (1986/87 = 100)
2. Gross domestic product (GDP)
3. Expenditure on research from national sources
4. Expenditure on research from foreign sources
5. Total expenditure on research (3+4)
6. Real national expenditure on research
7. National research expenditure as % of GDP
8. Total research expenditure as % of GDP










































Source: The Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, Expenditure Indicators on Scientific
Research, the Annual Conference, Cairo, December 1998, Tables 3 & 4 (in Arabic); and the
National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, 51 (1), Table 2/8(b).
77 Those represent the researchers and the support staff (technicians and administrators)
who work in the research activity.
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Table 4. Distribution of research expenditure by source of funds in some developing
and developed countries in the 1990s and its share in GDP.
Country
Funding of
Government production firms Foreign
Year funding & private funds funding
Research
expenditures as
















































































(1) Research expenditure from national sources.
Source: The Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, Expenditure Indicators of
Scientific Research, the Annual Conference, Cairo, December 1998, Tables 5 & 11 (in Arabic).
Despite the rising trend in research expenditure in Egypt, it is still very
low if we compare it with the developed countries as well as with the newly
industrialized countries like South Korea and Singapore. As shown in Table
4, the share of research expenditure in GDP is above 2% in the sample of the
developed countries in the Table, reaching 3.4% in Sweden. In South Korea
and Singapore, it is 2.8% and 1.1% respectively. Some argue that the ratio of
research expenditure to GDP should not fall below the critical threshold of
1%, otherwise investment in R&D is a waste (UNESCO 1998; p.176).
Most of research activity in Egypt is financed by government funds. As
shown in Table 4, 90% of the research activity in 1996/97 is financed by the
government, while the remaining 10% comes from foreign sources.
Production firms and private funds play no role in financing research in
Egypt, in contrast with the developed countries and some developing
countries. Production firms and private funds finance 81% and 59.4% of total
research expenditure in Japan and the USA, while government funding
represent only 18% and 35.5% in the two countries. The negligence of the
research activity by the production firms is a common case in the developing
countries. Despite the importance of R&D in raising productivity and
accelerating economic growth, it is felt that national research institutions
have not earned sufficient credibility to justify their support. For example,
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industrialists in the African countries are seeking answers to their
technological problems abroad (UNESCO 1998). In fact, this applies to the
developing countries in general. Heavy reliance on government funding
impedes research progress because of the burden it imposes on the budget.
Increasing the private-sector's demand for R&D is needed, especially
in manufacturing, because of the strong correlation between technology
development and production growth. Current developments taking place in
many of the developing countries at the national level (for adopting
economic reforms) and on the international level (because of globalization
and trade liberalization) should increase the private demand for R&D in
those countries. Egypt is adopting a privatization program of industries that
were traditionally owned by the state, and is also negotiating free-trade
agreements with Europe and other countries. It is expected that these
developments will increase private demand for industrial R&D in Egypt so
that the quality and numbers of exports will improve, particularly considering
the tough competition in the international markets.
Foreign funding plays a major role in supporting the research activity
carried out in Egypt by both the research centers affiliated to the universities
and by the private centers (Hegazy 1994; 93-109). The contribution of foreign
finance to research expenditure differs among the centers and may differ with
respect to the type of research activity within the same center. In the Center for
Political Research, affiliated to the Faculty of Economics and Political Science
at Cairo University, foreign finance covers 100% — 40% of the total research
cost, depending on the type of research conducted. For instance, it covers
100% of the cost for studies on Egypt, especially in the areas of women, civic
society and human rights; about 60% of the cost for regional studies; and 40%
of the cost for studies on international issues. On the other hand, foreign
funding covers 100% of the research activity of the Center of Developing
Countries affiliated to the same Faculty, irrespective of the type of research
conducted. The Center for Strategic Studies at Al-Ahram, which is a
governmental institute, receives foreign funding on each individual project's
basis. For example, Exploring the Egyptian's View on Political Participation is
a project that is partly financed from foreign sources.
Some of the private research centers are totally financed by foreign
funding, such as the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES) and the
Group for Democratic Development. The most active sources for foreign
funding of research in social sciences in Egypt are USAID, Ford Foundation,
Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and Friederich Ebbert Foundation. There are
other foreign sources that finance research in social sciences, but on smaller
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scale. Among them are the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the
National Democratic Institution for International Affairs (NDI), the European
Human Rights Foundation (EHRF), and the Royal Netherlands Embassy in
Cairo. In the hard sciences, especially agriculture, the most active sources for
foreign funding are the German Ministry of International Cooperation, with
the technical support of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation
(GTZ), the FAO, the US AID, the European Community (EC) and the
Canadian Institution for Development and Agriculture (CIDA).
Does foreign funding have an impact on the direction and quality of
research produced? Foreign finance seems to affect research topics. A good
example is the Center for Political Studies and Research at Cairo University.
Here, 100% of the research cost is covered by foreign funding if the research
topic is on Egypt, while foreign funding covers only 60% of the cost if the
topic is on regional issues, and 40% if it is on international issues. Another
example is the research product of the ECES, which is funded by foreign
sources. In this institution, the overwhelming majority of the speakers
invited— plus the authors of its publications— are foreigners from
American universities and international organizations (such as the World
Bank and IMF). This directly effects ECES' publications with respect to the
research issues chosen, the academic orientation of the analysis and on the
conclusions reached. The outcome of this type of foreign-oriented research is
often inconsistent with the general outlook of the public as derived from their
day-to-day experience of current developments. Thus, the conclusions
reached may not give a good guide to policymakers and scholars in the
research arena. On the other hand, a positive impact of foreign funding on the
research environment is that there are research topics which would not have
been considered if they were not brought up by international and foreign
organizations. Among those are the topics which are deemed politically
sensitive, such as poverty, income distribution, corruption, and democracy.
The impact of foreign funding on the quality of research conducted
seems to be minimal; it does not have positive impact on the quality of
research, as one would have expected. It is difficult to rationalize the
indifference of foreign-funding institutions to the quality of the research
work produced. One argument is that they usually earmark a certain budget
to be spent on research in Egypt and, hence, they have no alternative but to
accept the low-quality research produced. But this argument is not
convincing. Despite the deterioration in the research environment in Egypt,
there are still good researchers who are well-trained scientifically, and who
can produce quality research if they are given the right opportunity. They
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must be supported by being allowed access to data, up-to-date bibliographic
material, sophisticated equipment (for the hard sciences), good remuneration,
and professional acknowledgment.
A second argument is that there is a "hidden agenda" for some foreign
donors, which makes them indifferent to the quality of research produced as
long as the research project they fund provides them with the required
research inputs (for example, data, Arabic references). This material will be
used afterwards by competent researcher(s) abroad who will cover the
subject efficiently. This argument provides a rationalization for the poor
quality of research product funded by some foreign donors, but it does not
apply to all.
However, to improve the quality of research produced in Egypt, it
takes much more than just funding. The quality of research is a function of
both the scientific background and training of researchers and the research
environment. Overhauling the education system is needed in this respect, as
mentioned above. As well, the research environment must be improved, for
example, by acknowledging the importance of research for growth and
development, or providing adequate national funding for research activity. In
addition, a coherent national policy for S&T is needed to address national
priorities in this vital area.
The research personnel
The research personnel consists of the researchers and the supporting staff
(technicians and administrators) who engage in research activity. The largest
number of research personnel in Egypt are located in the higher education
sector. As shown in Table 2, 71.2% of all research personnel are allocated to
the higher education sector as compared to 13.5% to the production sector
and 15.3% to the services sector. Those large numbers of research personnel
in the higher education sector are supported by the lowest research budget. In
1996/97, 20.2% of the expenditure on research in Egypt is allocated to higher
education which encompasses 71.2% of the research personnel in the country
(Table 2). The 20.2% of the research expenditure share in the higher
education sector is divided between the Ministry of Higher Education (0.3%)
and the Ministry of Scientific Research (19.9%). That is, the research quota
for the academicians in all the Egyptian universities in 1996/97 did not
exceed 0.3% of total research expenditure in the country, which amounts to
only EGP 2.9 million78 (Table 1).
78 This is equivalent to $0.85 million.
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With such a small research budget for the universities, not much can be
expected regarding the quality of research produced. As it has been pointed
out in the World Science Report (UNESCO 1998), research in the Arab
countries is gradually losing its competitive edge, both in terms of financial
benefits and societal recognition. This is attributed to several factors; the
heavy teaching load; the large number of professionals going into private
practice, particularly in areas such as law, medicine, and engineering; and the
growing opportunities for scientists to occupy attractive top-management
positions in the private sector. Those alternatives, among others, compete for
the time of potential quality researchers. Moreover, funds allocated to
journals, conferences, travel, research equipment and research remuneration
are decreasing on a per capita basis, given the growing number of
professionals in the universities and research institutes. In short, the
opportunity cost of quality research is high — and the research environment
is discouraging. Most of the research produced and published is done by
academicians to fulfill their promotion requirements. The quality of this type
of research is questionable, given the soft system of refereeing applied by the
promotion committees in most cases.
The poor training of the research personnel is one of the key factors — if
not the most important one — responsible for the deteriorating research quality
in Egypt. This is attributed to Egypt's education system, which is far from
satisfactory. There is a pressing need to change the human resource
development at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. As suggested by
UNESCO in 1998, there should be close links between S&T79 in the training of
primary- and secondary-level students. In addition, the curricula should be
reviewed constantly to ensure that up-to-date knowledge in basic sciences,
universal history and geography is reflected. At the university level, the
science courses that cover new technology should be taught. In short, the
undergraduate and graduate education in Egypt do not provide the appropriate
training for quality researchers neither in social nor in basic sciences.
Despite this gloomy picture, Egypt is taking the lead in research
activity in the Arab countries. Egypt's share in total number of Arab
researchers amounted to 57% in 1996. It allocates also a greater proportion of
its resources to R&D as compared to other Arab countries. In 1996, Egypt's
79 As cited in the World Science Report 1998 (UNESCO, 1998; p. 176), S&T is defined
by Adeboye as "a set of principles which guide the generation of, or contribution to, general
scientific knowledge and which govern the acquisition, utilization, adoption and further
development of technology for the purpose of achieving development objectives". According
to this definition, S&T includes R&D and a wide range of issues, actors, forces,
circumstances, opportunities, and constraints.
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share of gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) was 30% of the
GERD in the Arab region, while its share of GDP in the region was only
12% (UNESCO 1998; p. 162).
The picture is completely different if we compare Egypt with countries
outside the Arab region. As shown in Table 2, more than 50% of research
personnel in the developed countries are concentrated in the production
sector. On the other hand, in the developing countries (with the exception of
Singapore and South Korea), the percentage of research personnel located in
the production sector is around 20%, while the figure is 13.5% in Egypt.
To assess the financial support of the research personnel in Egypt
compared to those in other countries, two indicators are used: the research
expenditure share in GDP that supports each 1% of the research personnel on
average; and the distribution of research expenditure between capital and
current expenses. The higher represents the first indicator: the higher the
expenditure-share allocated to current expenses, the better-off the research
personnel, financially speaking.
Regarding the first indicator, proportionality exists between the
distribution of research expenditure and research personnel in the developed
countries. As shown in Table 5, each 1% of research personnel in the
developed countries' group is supported by research-expenditure share in
GDP equal to 1.1% in the production sector, 0.8% in the higher education
sector, and 1.3% in the services sector. In other words, the ratio between the
distribution of research expenditure and research personnel is close to 1:1 in
the developed countries.
This is not the case in the developing countries, where the distribution
of research expenditure and research personnel among the sectors are
disproportionate. With the exception of Singapore, each 1% of research
personnel is supported by a percentage of research expenditure which is
considerably higher, or lower, than 1%. In Egypt, each 1% of the research
personnel in the production and services sectors is supported, on average, by
a ratio of about 2.8% of research expenditure in GDP, while this ratio is 0.3%
in the higher education sector. This does not mean, though, that the research
personnel in the production and services sectors in Egypt are well paid. This
is because a large share of the research expenditure is allocated to capital
expenses whereas 40% and 52% of the research expenditure are allocated to
capital in the production and services sectors, respectively, in 1996/97.80 As
derived from Table 5, 44.3% of the research expenditure in Egypt in 1996/97
80 Calculated from The Academy of Research and Technology, 1998; Table 1, p. 14.
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Table 5. Distribution of research expenditure per research personnel
and per current and capital uses.


































































































<1) Current & capital expenditures refer to 1991.
Source: Columns 1 to 3 are computed from Table 2 in the text; columns 4 and 5 are from The
Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, Expenditure Indicators an Scientific Research,
the Annual Conference, Cairo, December 1998, Table 10 (in Arabic).
is allocated to capital expenses as compared to an average of 9.4% in the
developed countries and an average of 29.1% in the developing countries
group (excluding Egypt). The reason for the high capital-expenditure share in
research in Egypt and in the developing countries in general is that those
countries are still in the stage of building their research capacity. Thus, they
require more investment in equipment and other capital expenses.
Finally, comparing the supply of research personnel in Egypt with
other countries, one finds that for each one million inhabitants there are
1 128 scientists and engineers, as compared to an average of 2 714 in France
and Germany, 3 723 in Sweden and the USA, and 6 309 in Japan. With the
exception of Singapore and South Korea, Egypt ranks fairly high as
compared to Argentina, Turkey and Malaysia, where the number of scientists
and engineers per million inhabitant are 671, 261 and 87 respectively
(Academy of Scientific Research and Technology 1998; Table 7). Thus,
there is great potential in Egypt's case. But it needs to be realized.
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The research product
In order to assess the product of the research environment in Egypt, the
research product was reviewed in three disciplines in social sciences —
economics, sociology and political science — and two in the hard
sciences — agriculture and physics.81 In each, the focus was placed on the
product of the most important research outfits: universities, institutes, and
centers. Based on an extensive bibliography of the works of such institutions,
a sample was selected for closer examination (one to two studies each per
institute). The choice of the sample was guided by two criteria:
1. The research subjects should be relevant to Egypt's priorities and
challenges on national and international levels.
2. They should be published in the nineties, taking into consideration their
spread, as much as possible, over the specified time period. Therefore,
our assessment of the research product in the five disciplines was based
on both reviewing the bibliography and examining the sample.
Research in the social sciences
The publications and projects of the major governmental research outfits in
the three disciplines — economics, political science and sociology — have
been reviewed. Those are: Cairo University; Ain-Shams University; Al-
Azhar University; the research centers affiliated with the Faculty of
Economics and Political Science at Cairo University (which are the Center
for Developing Countries, the Center for Economic & Financial Research &
Studies, and the Center for Political Studies & Research); the Institute of
National Planning (INP); the National Center for Social and Criminological
Research; and the Center for Political and Strategic Studies at Al-Ahram. In
addition, the work of the following private research institutes has been
reviewed: the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES); the Group for
Democratic Development; and UNICEF (Cairo Office).
81 In social sciences, the disciplines of economics, political science and sociology are
chosen because of their interrelationship and their relevance while studying Egypt's priorities
and challenges on both the national and international levels. Another personal reason is that
the author's discipline is economics. The author is, therefore, more familiar with the state of
research in economics and the two interrelated disciplines as compared to other disciplines in
social sciences. In hard sciences, agriculture is chosen because of its important contribution to
the GDP in Egypt. The choice of the second discipline — physics — was guided by the human
resource availability; i.e. by finding a hard-science professional who is capable of doing the
job within the timeframe of the study.
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The review of the bibliography and the examination of the sample was
conducted with regard to the following five aspects.
1. The relevance of the research issues to the priorities and challenges of
Egypt on the national and international levels.
Assessing the research issues in terms of their relevance to
Egypt's priorities and challenges on the national and international
levels, one finds that most of the topics of the conferences that were
held in the nineties by the universities and research institutes addressed
the current issues raised at that time. For example, the conferences held
in the nineties by the Economics Department at Cairo University were
on: Economic Reform and its Distributive Impacts, 1992; the
Economic Cooperation in the Middle East, 1994; the Implications of
Uruguay Round for the Arab countries, 1996; and the Challenges of
Growth and Development in Egypt and the Arab countries, 1998.
Other examples are the conferences held by the Faculty of Commerce
at Al-Azhar University on: The Egyptian Economy: the Challenges
and Policies from Islamic and Secular Perspectives, 1995; the Egyptian
Economy and the International Challenges, 1997; and Women Role in
Sustainable Development, 1998. On the other hand, some of the topics
of the Symposia held by the universities were purely academic; like the
symposium held in the Department of Sociology at Cairo University
on Self and the Society in Egypt, 1996. However, most of the social
sciences publications in the journals are on applied issues, mostly on
challenges facing Egypt at the national and international levels. In
general, theoretical studies are scarce.
2. The analytical content of the studies.
Quite a few of the research studies in social sciences are
descriptive with poor analytical content. In a more intensive survey of
research in political science, for example, it has been found that many
of the studies carried out in the last 25 years in the area of comparative
politics were descriptive (Zarnouka 1998). Given the author's
experience in economic research and familiarity with the research in
sociology, the same conclusion can be applied to the research product
in economics and sociology.
3. The data sources used were primary field work studies versus
secondary data sources (desk-work studies).
The studies in social sciences differ with respect to their
dependence on field work using primary sources of data, or on desk
work using secondary sources of data. The nature of the problem, the
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availability of data, and the objective of the study, are important
factors that determine which approach to apply.
In the reviewed studies in social sciences, most of the work in
economics used published data (i.e. secondary sources of data). The
high dependence on published data and the limited use of field-work
data is a common practice in the studies in the economics discipline.
This may be attributed to the nature of economic research, which
cannot base its analysis on small samples as is done in sociology, for
example. Carrying field work with large representative samples is too
expensive to be done on individual basis. Instead, it must be carried out
with institutional support to provide necessary funding.
In sociology, data from primary sources are frequently used in
the studies. It is common to carry out field work with small samples.
For example, among the seven studies reviewed in sociology, four of
them depend on field work.
In this respect, the state of research in political science may fall
in-between economics and sociology. The exploratory studies of public
opinion on certain issues provide a good example of the frequent use of
field-work surveys in political science. It is also not uncommon in
political science to use a small sample in carrying out the field work.
For example, from the studies reviewed in the area of political science,
the study on the Middle Class and the State in Egypt (Lotfy and
Shehata 1998) based its analysis on field data of a sample of 50
respondents only.
4. The applicability of the research results.
The applicability of the research results in Egypt is marginal in
social sciences. The research outputs are not usually considered by the
policymakers, no matter how relevant the research topics to the
problems that the country is facing, or how sound the analyses and the
conclusions reached. In Egypt, the design and application of policies
are neither supported nor guided by serious research conducted by
competent technical staff. This applies to the decision-making process
in economics, education, and political science. The link between
researchers and practitioners is missing. But there are exceptions to
this general pattern. Among those exceptions is the study conducted by
the Center for Social and Criminological Research on Drugs (Sweif et
al. 1992). The objective of this study was to design a national strategy
to combat drugs and to provide treatment for drug addicts in Egypt.
The study was conducted by the consultative committee of the
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National Council for Controlling and Curing Addiction for the purpose
of finding out the appropriate strategy to be adopted by the Council.
One of the objectives of the government research institutions is to cater
R9
for the research needs of the relevant Ministries. " But in practice,
those institutions do not play an effective role in providing technical
support for policymakers. That is, they do not provide the link between
research and decision making, which was the idea behind building
those institutions. Most of the research activity conducted in those
institutes does not have any bearing on the decision-making process in
the country, and they are not used as means to seek solutions for the
problems and challenges that the country is facing.
5. The research issues that are frequently discussed versus those that are
relatively neglected.
It is clear from reviewing the bibliography of the studies made
by the chosen institutions in the nineties that some topics were
frequently covered, while others were neglected, or lightly covered,
despite their relevance to Egypt's priorities and challenges. But it
should be mentioned that frequent coverage of certain subjects does
not mean that they have been thoroughly discussed and investigated.
The adoption of inappropriate approach, and/or the poor analytical
capability of the researcher result in an inadequate handling of the
research problem, as well as in incomplete coverage of the research
topic. Therefore, important parts of the research issue could be left
unexplored. Given this reservation, among the research topics that are
frequently discussed in social sciences (economics, political science,
and sociology) are economic reform, privatization, the GATT, child
labor, squatter settlements, women issues, political parties, civic
society, globalization, and regional and international cooperation.
On the other hand, there are research subjects that have not been
sufficiently considered despite their importance to Egypt development.
Among those are subjects related to health economics, like the in-depth
analysis of the correlation between health and productivity; illiteracy;
the dynamics of poverty; development of human resources;
environmental issues; political corruption; changes in value systems;
or the assessment of the performance of bureaucracy.
82 The chairperson of the board of directors of the Center for Social and Criminological
Research is the Minister of Social Affairs, and the chairperson of the board of directors of the
Institute of National Planning is the Minister of Planning.
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Research in the hard sciences
As mentioned above, the two areas chosen are agricultural sciences and
physics. In agricultural sciences, a sample of research studies and projects in
the areas of field crops, plant pathology, plant nutrition and entomology were
reviewed and assessed. The research sample was chosen from the work
produced by the following important institutions: the Agriculture Research
Center (ARC), which is affiliated to the Ministry of Agriculture and is the
umbrella of several institutes (like the Cotton Research Institute, the Rice
Research Institute, the Soil and Water Research Institute); the National
Research Center (NRC); Al-Azhar University; and the German Agency for
Technical Cooperation (GTZ). In physics, a sample of studies was covered in
the area of solid state in the following research institutes: the National
Research Center (NRC); the Petroleum Research Center; the National
Institute of Standards; the Radiation Technology Center; Cairo University;
Ain-Shams University; and Al-Azhar University.
The following observations can be made with regard to assessing the
research activity in agricultural sciences:
1. Judging by the nature of the subjects addressed, the topics studied are
on the applied side. This does not mean that the findings of research
have been actually adopted. For example, one of the research topics
conducted in the Cotton Research Institute is on evaluating the
performance of new commercial cotton varieties to substitute old ones
(Abou-Tour et al., 1996). This is an important subject since cotton is
the largest exported crop in Egypt. The lint yield as well as the fiber
characteristics of the commercial cotton varieties deteriorate when they
continue to be planted in the same area for an extended period of time.
Therefore, new varieties have to be developed. The research exper-
iment was carried out in three regions (Northern Delta, Central and
Southern Delta and Upper Egypt) for three successive seasons (1992,
1993 and 1994), and gave promising results. However, this does not
ensure that this experiment has been— or will be— applied on a
wider scale in Egypt.
2. Research projects have been applied whose successes have generated
other affiliated projects. A good example is the project of
Micronutrients and Other Plant Nutrition Problems in Egypt. This
project started in 1977 and is still functioning. Its success generated a
complementary project in 1984 on Optimizing Fertilizer Use. The
latter project continues. The Micronutrients project is a joint project of
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the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the National
Research Center (NRC), the Academy of Scientific Research and
Technology (ASRT), and the Ministry of Agriculture. The project is
seated in the NRC. The objective of the project is to recommend a
special fertilizer regime to compensate for deficiencies in nutritional
components of soil. This nutrition deficiency causes reduction in the
crop yield which may amount up to 30% of total output. Different
types of soil suffer from different nutrition deficiencies which needs
different fertilizers regimes.
3. Reporting the experiment results may not be as precise or as
comprehensive as it should be. Some important variables may be
neglected despite their important impacts on the final outcome of the
experiment. For example, a research experiment was conducted with
the objective of raising the quality of Egyptian rice. This is an
important issue, since the quality of rice is a critical determinant of its
export value and, hence, of the country's foreign exchange earnings.
By experimenting with different dosages and timing of nitrogen
fertilizers, it has been found that the quality has improved. But nothing
was mentioned in the study on the impact of the quality improvement
on the quantity produced (Heggy 1993). It is quite common that
improving quality is accompanied by reducing quantity; if this applies
to the rice experiment, this factor should be accounted for in the overall
assessment of the experiment's outcome — and reported in the study.
In physics, 11 studies have been reviewed and assessed in the area of
solid state and related applied topics, specifically in petroleum industries.
Among the issues covered are those concerning the effect of temperature on
transport properties; the effect of heat treatment on borosilicate glasses;
preparation of fine resistant coatings; the adoption and upgrading of Egyptian
clays for oil well-drilling; the effect of gamma radiation on different materials
(polymers); the geoelectric investigation for groundwater; and solar cells.
The research in hard sciences in Egypt suffers from a deficiency in
state-of-the-art equipment; this makes advanced-technology research difficult
to pursue. Among other things, it result in poor training of present and future
professionals at both research institutes and universities. Unlike the social
sciences, advanced research in hard sciences is extremely expensive. It
demands sophisticated technical equipment, the prices of which are far
beyond the financial resources allocated to research in Egypt. The outcome is
that the Egyptian scientists are left behind with respect to their scientific
training and capabilities, no matter what their potential is.
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Looking at the applicability of the research conducted in Egypt in
physics, and guided by the sample of studies reviewed in the area of solid state,
one finds that some of them are applicable. But others may be classified under
academic research, done solely for the purpose to promote university or
research institute staff members. Examples of the studies in the first group are
the two studies on: "Adapting and Upgrading Egyptian Clays for Oil Well-
Drilling"; and "Geoelectric Investigation for Groundwater at Wadi Al Asyouti
(Egypt)". Examples of the academic studies include: "Effect of Temperature
on the Transport Properties of Znx Hgi_x Te"; and "Application of Least Square
Method for the Interpretation of Second Vertical Derivative of Gravity
Anomalies Associated with Three-dimensional Domal Structures".
Foreign financing seems not so common in hard sciences as it is in
social sciences. Thus, agricultural research seems to be exceptional in this
respect. After a review of studies in the agricultural area, two were found to
be financed by the German Ministry of International Cooperation, with the
technical support of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation. Those
are: "Smallholder Cultivation Methods, Economic Analysis and Assessment
of Production Potential for Sugar Beat, Sunflower and Rape Seed in West
Nubaria", (a joint project with the Agricultural Research Center); and
"Micronutrients and other Plant Nutrition Problems in Egypt", plus the
related project on "Optimizing Fertilizers Use", (financed jointly with the
National Research Center and other governmental institutes as mentioned
above). Apart from the German Ministry of International Cooperation, other
foreign donor institutions for agricultural research are the FAO, US AID, the
European Community (EC), and the Canadian Institution for Development
and Agriculture (CIDA).
In agriculture, research issues that attracted attention in the nineties are
fungal and wilt diseases in plant pathology; cotton leaf-worm (Spodoptera
littoralis), and pink boll-worm (Pedimophora gassypiella) in the area of
entomology; and rice, wheat and cotton in field crops. Research topics that
have been somewhat neglected, despite their importance to agricultural yields,
are biological controls, the rust diseases (for wheat), the leaf miner, drought
resistance, and the re-use of drainage water. In physics, the subjects that were
often studied in the area of solid state are work on polymers, glasses, and
semiconductors. There are numerous examples of advanced subjects in physics
that have not been investigated in Egypt. Some of these include nanostructures,
superconductivity, laser work, and very fast phenomenon like femtosecond
interactions.
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Chapter 5.
The Development Research Environment in Morocco:
Situation and Prospects
Driss Khrouz, AH Hajji, Mohamed Boussetta
Introduction
Nobody now questions the direct link between scientific and technical
research, and development, growth and economic competitiveness. All
developed and emerging countries— and even some of the developing
countries — are aware of this fact and, increasingly, are making R&D a
national priority.
While research has yet to acquire the status of a national priority in
Morocco, that country does have major assets that could transform its R&D
sector into a key vehicle for development. Contemporary Morocco has
excellent scientific and technical talent drawn from a young and vigorous
population trained in world-class centres. While their work and their
accomplishments rarely find practical applications in Morocco (due to lack
of organization and resources), they do offer evidence of the foregoing claim.
As well, relatively well-equipped research facilities have been established
that are funded entirely by the Moroccan government.
Despite these positives, Morocco's R&D sector suffers numerous
deficiencies, attributable mainly to the lack of a clearly defined research
policy, lack of funds, and lack of structures to guide, plan, coordinate,
evaluate, and promote research.
To be useful, an analysis of R&D in Morocco must take into account
the forces that have shaped the economy — and Moroccan society — over
the last four decades:
1. Resource-based economy
An agriculture- and mineral-based economy in which, despite some advances,
value-added and return-on-investment are low. GDP is largely dependent on
the vagaries of climate that dominate a poorly coordinated agricultural effort.
The output of processors is almost 60% exported, the main sectors being
textiles and clothing, agri-food and electrical goods.
What began as import-substitution industries have gradually become
more export-oriented, but have yet to develop a structured system of
production and supply.
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2. Historically mismanaged economy
Their economy has, historically, been badly managed. The impact of
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) has revealed serious shortcomings in
management and organization with respect to both training and education,
along with administrative, financial, and fiscal institutions in both the public
and private sectors.
Public bodies, which are in general poorly managed and unsupervised,
have not discharged the responsibility assigned to them in the early 1970s.
They were supposed to promote the establishment of those infrastructures
and sectors of activity that could underpin development, induce the private
sector to get involved, and accompany it along the road to modernization and
growth. Long protected and sheltered, private enterprise was incapable of
asserting its independence and taking its rightful place as a factor in social
change, as well as in the creation of innovative and efficient economic
structures.
The result is a market that lacks the essential economic and
institutional mechanisms through which the various players in an economy
make their choices, and by which their competitive activities are
automatically regulated.
Short of funds, the government has abruptly retreated into its basic role
without first going through an indispensable process of transition from its all-
pervasive control of the 1960s and 1970s to a new coordinating role
beginning in the 1980s.
Thus, an educational system was set up without any preconceived,
coherent or overall vision. It tried and failed to cope with the various
migrations of an exploding population. Designed to nurture the bureaucracy
and transmit the central culture, the schools were not intended to teach
pragmatism, critical thinking, and good citizenship. Unemployment in the
general population and, in particular, among Morocco's university graduates
illustrated the failed connection between training and educational institutions,
and productive activity. It also highlighted the gap between words and deeds
in relation to the guiding principles of the economy and of society. As the
new millennium begins, this is the problem posed by open, hands-off
government.
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3. Contending with the mismanagement
From the SAPs to the free trade area, the shapers of economic policy in
Morocco have had difficulty grasping the seriousness of the situation created
by disastrous mismanagement of the economy in the 1970s.
Burgeoning trade, great strides in communications and information, the
fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet world: these all
created a tidal wave that stunned society as well as political forces. The
openness that was the natural result of structural adjustment programs is still
insufficiently debated and accommodated either by economic structures or by
regulatory and sectoral institutions. Thus, the agreements on association with
the EU in 1995, the signature of the agreements that gave birth to the WTO
in Marrakesh in 1994, and participation in the Barcelona Protocol, have not
yet had the necessary mobilizing impact on vital issues.
The same is true in the area of R&D. Also affected are the
establishment of a fruitful relationship embracing the universities, research,
economic competitiveness, and business modernization; as well as the
creation of efficient, progressive, and democratic structures for development
research.
Since the early 1990s, R&D has been given fresh momentum by such
things as the establishment of the Hassan II Academy of Science and
Technology, and reform of the system for scientific research and
postsecondary education. Genuine debate has also been launched to define
the purpose and goals of the sector. This debate has been enriched by the
advent of the changeover government and the growing integration of
Morocco into the world economy.
Politically, the new government affirmed before Parliament that it is
committed to a national scientific research policy based on the identification
of research priorities, the establishment of a national fund to support
scientific research, and the promotion of Morocco's engineering talent. Thus,
the political will to develop this important activity has been emphatically
proclaimed by the public authorities. The next step is to strengthen and
restructure existing resources, clearly define the sectors that are to have
priority, and seek funding that is both sufficient and diversified.
Economically, the promotion of R&D has become an essential
precondition for economic development and social progress. This must
happen if Morocco is to successfully meet the challenges of an increasingly
open national economy (WTO rules, association with the EU) and of
globalization. R&D is also a vital element in coping with the worldwide pace
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of technological change. This new challenge for the Moroccan economy
demands a thorough upgrading of several sectors, including R&D, that has
now become an indispensable tool.
These political and economic realities have brought about the gradual
development of a truly national policy to promote R&D. It is now based on a
limited number of what are considered strategic sectors which include
specific, vital priorities; particularly agri-food, water, and energy.
Accordingly, Morocco has begun to make R&D a key factor in its
development and in its international competitiveness.
The objective of this study is to survey the present state of R&D in
Morocco. We shall begin with an outline of the institutional framework for
research activities and their general context, followed by a review of
Morocco's capabilities, particularly with respect to human resources and
available infrastructure. We shall then offer a diagnosis of the sector,
covering its strengths and weaknesses, and the prospects for promotion of
R&D through the reform project now being prepared by the agency whose
responsibility this is: the Secretariat d'Etat a la Recherche Scientifique
(SERS), [state secretariat for scientific research].
Constitutional framework and general context
From the regulatory point of view, the R&D sector in Morocco is governed
by a few terse references in a limited number of official texts. Institutionally,
it is characterized by wide dispersal of activities and much heterogeneity in
its constituent parts.
Legal and regulatory framework
R&D does not have its own framework in any real sense. The few official
texts that refer to it do so in a very sketchy way.
The first of these is Decree No. 2-96-793 of 19 February 1997, which
accords special status to postsecondary teacher-researchers as a group, and
Decree No 2-96-804 of 19 February 1997 which does the same for those
working in management training institutions.83 Both documents merely state
that teacher-researchers contribute to the development of basic, applied and
technological research and to the exploitation of its results.
83 Bulletin Officiel No. 4458 dated 20/02/1997 providing for special status for teacher-
researchers in management training establishments.
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Second, Law No. 1-76-50084 established the Centre National de
Coordination et de Planification de la Recherche Scientifique (CNCPRS)
[national centre for the planning and coordination of scientific and technical
research]. The Law refers to R&D in its second article, which states that the
CNCPRS "shall develop, guide and coordinate scientific and technical research
of every kind".
Third is Decree No. 2-91-68385 of 15 February 1993, which sets out
the powers and structure of the Ministere de 1'Enseignement Superieur de la
Formation des Cadres et de la Recherche Scientifique (MESFCRS) [ministry
of postsecondary education, management training and scientific research]. It
also defines the responsibilities of the Scientific Research Branch of the
Ministry, which are to:
• guide, program and evaluate scientific and technical research in the
universities;
» participate in defining priorities and drawing up plans and programs
for university research;
• promote scientific research by all appropriate means; and
• ensure the development and promotion of applied university research,
and the publication, development and exploitation of its results.
Last is Order No. 762-9S86 of the Minister of the MESFCRS, which
specifies that the SERS have signing authority for all matters related to this
sector, other than organizational questions.
Institutional organization
The institutional organization of scientific research in Morocco is notable for its
widely dispersed character. It is composed of a system whose components
appear heterogeneous, yet which operate in an anarchy of multipurposed
agencies. These varied and disparate elements do not possess cohesive structure.
Therefore, the system does not have a set strategy or an approach whereby it can
achieve those objectives expected of it. The reason for this is there has been no
consistent effort to plan and coordinate research — despite the existence of the
CNCPRS — an institution that was designed to do just this.
84 Bulletin Officiel No. 3327 dated 04/08/1976, order (dahir) No. 1-76-500 establishing
the CNCPRS.
85 Bulletin Officiel No. 4207 dated 16/06/1993, decree No. 2-91-683 dated 15/02/1993
establishing the jurisdiction of the MESFCRS.
86 Bulletin Officiel No. 4584 dated 07/05/1998, order of the MESFCRS No. 762-98
dated 17/03/1998 delegating signing authority to the SERS.
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Two types of institutions can be identified in this field of scientific
research: those that direct and coordinate research, and those that conduct it.
Institutions that direct and coordinate research
The CNCPRS
This is a public institution that has a legal personality and financial
independence. It was established on 5 August 1976 to develop, direct and
coordinate research. Its powers are numerous and varied, including:
• preparing and maintaining an inventory of the national scientific and
technical potential, and of achievements in this area;
• conducting studies to identify priority options, based on development
plan requirements, and to define avenues of research;
• defining the broad outline of research programs, arranging for their
implementation and monitoring their execution — all in conjunction
with the various research institutions; and
• encouraging and facilitating research by providing grants, organizing
practicums and seminars, and publishing and circulating research
documentation.
These powers indicate the scale and diversity of CNCPRS's
responsibilities. In theory, it plays a central role in the process of defining,
planning and evaluating all research activities. The results of its work remain
unimpressive, however, in relation to its powers and objectives. In fact, the
CNCPRS has not been unable to meet its responsibilities, except for the
creation of an inventory of scientific and technical potential (Direction de la
formation des cadres 1995). The reasons why are varied, and include:
• the growing magnitude of its responsibilities in relation to the very
limited financial resources at its disposal;
• the absence of any real national policy on research; and
• obstacles related to its internal organization: a board that rarely meets,
unsuitable consultative and decision-making bodies, and so on.
Institut Universitaire de Recherche Scientifique (IURS)
Originally set up in 1962 as Centre Universitaire de Recherche Scientifique
(CURS), and then renamed in 1975, the institute's main purpose is to:
• develop research sections operating within postsecondary institutions;
• orient research according to development requirements and planning
priorities;
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• make additional human and material resources available for research
activities; and
• participate in the training of researchers and publish their findings.
Its research is dominated by historical concerns. Most of its work is in
the social sciences (history, Islamic civilization, sociology). The Centre's
publications include some twenty makhtoutats on literary and historical
subjects, such periodicals such as the Revue de la Recherche Scientifique,
Revue de Geographie du Maroc, Les Signes du Present, Hisperis Tamuda,
and Le Bulletin Economique et Social du Maroc. It should be pointed out that
most of these have disappeared or are published only very sporadically. The
lURS's efforts thus lack continuity, and its work is partial and lacking in
practical application. Its shortcomings are due to structural inconsistencies
and shortage of funds.
This agency has not fully discharged the responsibilities it was given.
It produces little and most of its output is dormant due to lack of resources,
no clearly established purpose, and because there is no genuine national
policy on research.
Institutions that conduct research
There is a fairly large number of such institutions and their activities are
varied. While rich in potential, this infrastructure is characterized more by its
dispersion than efficiency. Public establishments account for almost all the
research centres surveyed by the CNCPRS (see previous section).
Postsecondary and management training establishments
In Morocco, the bulk of research is done in universities and management
training institutions. The two types of establishments are distinguished by
their legal structure and the nature of their activities.
Schools of management are predominantly scientific and technical.
Depending on the type of training they provide, they operate under the wing
of the ministry concerned: Agriculture, Energy and Mines, Trade and
Industry, and so on. Accordingly, the provisions that govern their operations
and the status of their staff are varied, and there are clear differences in the
way they are structured. Their primary role is to train a particular kind of
manager: this sometimes relegates their research — largely of the applied
variety — to the background.
Although they are all subject to the MESFCRS, universities share two
characteristics:
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1. they are not affiliated with a particular ministry; and
2. they share a particular status, which applies to all their teaching and
research staff (except for those who teach in schools of medicine).
Government agencies
Some agencies that are directly subject to a particular ministry conduct
research that primarily addresses practical concerns. Some have a substantial
national infrastructure, with local and regional branches and excellent
scientific staff. Examples are the Institut National de la Recherche
Agronomique (INRA) [national agronomic research institute), Bureau des
Recherches et des Prospections Minieres (BRPM). [mineral surveys and
research bureau], and the Laboratoire Public d'Etudes et d'Essais (LPEE)
[public research and testing laboratory].
Semi-public agencies
These agencies or boards are public bodies with legal status and financial
independence. Some have a substantial infrastructure and conduct research
and studies on a significant scale. Fairly well-equipped, and with a small but
usually highly skilled staff, their research is mainly applied and often sectoral
in character (mines, fisheries and so on).
The most important is the Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP)
[phosphate control board], which has its own phosphate research centre,
known as CERPHOS.
The private sector
Some companies engage varying degrees of technical-, social-, or economic-
development research. Most recently, the private institutions specialize in
well-defined fields such as: technical studies, quality control and standards,
informatics, or industrial management. The largest of this type is the
REMINEX corporation (Recherche Mines et Exploitation), which is a
subsidiary of Omnium Nord Africain (ONA), the largest privately-owned
group in Morocco. REMINEX performs research in mining operations, and
has a staff of eight researchers with a substantial budget.
In general, the private sector is the least active player in research
activity in Morocco. Private-research institutions face serious obstacles in the
areas of organization, management, and staff recruitment. In particular, they
are impeded by the lack of any national mechanism through which to exploit
and market the results of their research.
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Evaluation of current resources
Although Morocco has not made R&D a national priority, it does have
substantial assets capable of promoting the sector and turning it into a key
development vehicle. Morocco now has a substantial corps of highly
qualified young researchers trained in world-renowned institutions.
Relatively well-equipped research facilities have evolved and are doing first-
class work in a variety of sciences and technologies.
Research centres
Scientific research facilities in Morocco fall into four categories:
1. postsecondary institutions, including laboratories and research centres
affiliated with university faculties and engineering schools;
2. specialized public centres;
3. semi-public boards; and
4. the private sector.
The postsecondary sector currently includes:
« 14 universities, with 67 establishments of higher education, 4 institutes
and 2 research centres;
® 33 management training institutions, including 20 that are scientifically
and technologically oriented (engineering schools) and 13 in the legal,
economic and administrative fields; and
« some 30 teacher-training establishments (CNCPRS 1995).
Most of these are organized into departments which are, in turn,
structured into laboratories, training and research units (UFRs), or simply
research units. According to the CNCPRS survey, there are 910 research
units in a variety of specialties (Tables 1 and 2).
Table 1. Research units by discipline.
Discipline
Nuclear physics
Sciences of the universe
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In 1996-1997, the scientific staff (teacher-researchers, engineers and
technicians) surveyed by the CNCPRS numbered 13400 in all, with some
10 862 working in postsecondary education (universities, management-
training schools), and 2 538 in outside centres (specialized centres, as well as
the semi-public and private sectors), (CNCPRS 1997).
Table 3. Numbers of teacher-researchers in postsecondary
and management training institutions, 1993 to 1997.
Universities























Over the last five years, there has been a 5% increase in university staff
(Table 3) and a small decrease in staff in the graduate schools.
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of these researchers by specialty.
These numbers should be increased, to include the researchers in
public facilities within other ministries — in particular the staff of the INRA
and the LPEE — as well as private-sector researchers (such as in the sugar
industry or mining sector).
Research is carried out by teacher-researchers in the postsecondary sector,
particularly with postgraduate students preparing their doctoral thesis or diplome
d'etudes superieures (DES) dissertation. In 1996-1997, such students accounted
for 7.3% of all postsecondary students. A breakdown by discipline shows that
among DES candidates, 76% were doing research in human and social sciences.
However, the percentage was only 42 among doctoral candidates.
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Figure 1. Researchers by specialty.
Source: Direction de la formation des cadres. 1995.
The funding of R&D
In the main, research in Morocco is a public-sector activity. In the private
industrial sector, it is almost non-existent. The private sector is generally not
sufficiently advanced or developed to benefit from research.
Public spending on scientific and technological activities
Table 4 shows that spending on research totaled some 440 million MAD in
1995 (MESFCRS 1996). However, the pay and allowances of teacher-
researchers accounted for more than three-quarters of this budget. Grants to
doctoral candidates studying in Morocco or elsewhere represented a 38.5
million MAD.
The 1995 CNCPRS survey showed that most postsecondary
institutions allocated 12-15% of their operating budget to research. On this
basis, the combined research budgets of such institutions is estimated at 23
million MAD.
To this amount we should add 21.6 million MAD corresponding to the
operating budgets of the two research centres run by the MESFCRS:
CNESTEN (nuclear technology) and CNCPRS.
These amounts are complemented by resources from research contracts
and international cooperation totaling 20 million MAD.
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Table 4. Spending on scientific research in public establishments.
Type of spending/establishment (number)





Faculties of science (13)
Faculties of science and technology (6)
Faculties of arts (14)
Faculties of law (7)
Faculties of medicine (4)
Engineering schools (10)































The CNCPRS survey included estimates of non-salary R&D spending by
certain semi-public boards (see Table 5). These figures include amounts
attributable to contracts with postsecondary institutions. In many cases, the
contracts are for studies, rather than research.
Table 5. Spending on scientific research by semi-public boards.
Agency (sector) Amount (million MAD) %
BRPM (mines) 163 68.78




CNER (highway studies) 10 4.22
INRA (agronomy) 8 3.38
CDER (renewable energy) 4 1.69
CNESTEN (nuclear technology) 1 0.42
Total 237 100.00
Source: Jebli, A. (1995).
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The role of R&D
Usefulness of research results
In postsecondary institutions, where most research is done to earn a degree,
those involved rarely concern themselves with the practicality of their results.
Agronomy may be the only discipline in which research findings have a
direct application, for example, for the improvement of agricultural products
at the farm level; and in shaping of national agricultural policy, as defined by
the Ministry of Agriculture.
In this area, the INRA follows a rational methodology from the
definition of objectives to the transfer of findings (Moussaoui 1995). Those
working in this sector are part of a "systeme national de recherche
agronomique" (SNRA) [national agronomic research system] which embraces:
• the national agricultural research establishments;
• the postsecondary institutions; and
• the education branch of the Ministry of Agriculture.
The SNRA's accomplishments are substantial, enjoying both national
and international recognition. Examples include the results achieved in
genetic improvement (the development of varieties adapted to conditions in
Morocco), technology transfer, rural engineering and water management, and
agricultural extension.
Agriculture aside, we can say that research results have little influence
on the government's sectoral policies. There are frequent complaints that
very few technological innovations are actually used in production activities.
There are several possible reasons:
• conservatism among potential users;
• poor selection of lines of research;
• lack of an efficient interface between research and users; and
• lack of research resources.
The following sectors are amongst those strategic areas where research
is scant.
• Energy, where despite some attempts — such as the establishment of the
Centre de Developpement des Energies Renouvelables (CDER) [centre
for the development of renewable energy sources] — much remains to
be done to reduce Morocco's very substantial energy dependency and
the burden of the national oil bill.
« Civil engineering, where more cost-effective infrastructure solutions must
be sought in such areas as building construction, road works, and dams.
• Informatics and telecommunications, where Morocco persists in importing
solutions that are very expensive and not always suitable.
« Public health.
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Private investment in innovation
Private investment in R&D is practically non-existent, judging by figures from
the Office Marocain de la Propriete Industrielle (OMPI) [Moroccan intellectual
property office] on the production of patents. According to this agency, most
patents valid in Morocco are foreign. On average, patents issued to Moroccan
nationals account for only 6-10% of the total (OMPI 1997).
Diagnosis and prospects
Assessing the current status of R&D in Morocco demands that both the
positive and negative aspects of this key activity be exposed. In turn, this will
enable us to outline foreseeable research needs in this area.
Diagnosis is difficult because conditions in the various establishments
contrast sharply. For example, the main centres of excellence possess competent
staff, plus substantial financial and technical resources. But there are institutions
that lack even the most basic amenities. This is reflected in wide disparities in the
level of scientific output, in terms of both publications and patents.
Assets of the R&D sector
Despite the severe constraints that Morocco's R&D is subject to, it does have
two major assets: high-quality human capital, and a few centres of excellence.
A fairly substantial human capital
According to the CNGPRS survey, Morocco had some 13 400 researchers in
1997. Of these, 81% were faculty members in postsecondary institutions, and
only 19% worked in institutes or centres outside the universities (including
public, semi-public and private agencies). These proportions are almost the
reverse of what we find in most Arab countries (UNESCO 1995).
Of the permanent teacher-researchers in the postsecondary system, 88.3%
work in the universities (faculties, institutes and graduate schools), while 11.7%
are in management training institutions. More than 60% of the latter are in
natural sciences and technology, compared to 40% in social sciences.
Staffing trends in this area over the last five years show that the
number of teacher-researchers in the universities increased 33% between
1992/1993 and 1996/1997. Research staff in graduate schools and institutes,
on the other hand, fell 6% over the same period.
Despite the relatively substantial human resources involved in research,
the ratio of researchers to total population is still low in Morocco. There are only
about 0.5 researchers per 1000 inhabitants, against 1.5 in the industrialized
countries of Asia, 2 in the EU and 3.7 in the USA (UNESCO 1996).
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Centres of excellence
Of the 910 research units and 118 research establishments surveyed in 1995
(CNCPRS 1995), the public sector accounted for 90%, the semi-public for
9% and the private sector for only 1%. Postsecondary education alone
accounts for 80% of the total number of research units.
These various research facilities do not always have access to sufficient
human, technical, and financial resources. These are wide disparities between
institutes, universities, schools and research centres. We can point to the
existence of ten centres of excellence that are relatively well-equipped and
staffed, and financed exclusively by the government (Table 6). They conduct
research in such varied fields as space technology, mining operations and
research, and renewable energy.
The centres of excellence had an estimated budget of about 12.4
million ECU in 1996 (UNESCO 1995). They had some 550 researchers
working in five fields: advanced technology, energy, environment and water,
social sciences, agriculture and life sciences. These are the main fields for
R&D in Morocco.
Table 6. Main centres of excellence.















































Source: R&D Systems in the Arab States, UNESCO, 1995.
The contribution of these centres of excellence to government
programs and activities is substantial. They make possible the acquisition of
skills and know-how in certain sectors that are considered strategic. In water
management, for example, Morocco has many years of wide experience in
related S&T, particularly with respect to surface water. Efforts continue in
this area to promote R&D in exploration and in rational use of both surface
and underground water.
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In addition, the Centre des Sciences et Techniques de I'Espace (CSTE)
[centre for space science and technology] of the Mohammedia school of engin-
eering has established a national inter-university network (RUSTE) to develop
research in this area. The main accomplishments of 1996 and 1997 included the
creation of a ground station that can receive signals from a National Oceanic &
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) low-earth-orbit satellite.
These centres of excellence are developing the practice of providing
expert opinions that must become a key element in national policy. More and
more, they are placing their skills and expert knowledge at the nation's
disposal in preparation for administrative and political decisions based on
scientific opinion. The sectors involved include agri-food, environment,
water and fisheries.
Proximity of Europe
Morocco's geographical situation as well as its political and cultural
orientation enable it to be a powerful link between cultures. Plus, they place
the country at the crossroads of great civilizations. Thus, it is well-placed to
benefit from international cooperation, especially in research. The proximity
of Europe is a substantial asset in this respect.
Evidence of this truth is found in the magnitude of cooperation
between Morocco and Europe in R&D. This is a dominant force —
particularly in the public sector — whose relations are exclusively with such
countries as France, Spain and Belgium. Cooperation with the United States
is marginal and limited to the private sector. However, cooperation with
Canada is beginning to grow, through the IDRC. It should be said that the
historical, linguistic and cultural ties that bind Morocco and Europe serve
only to reinforce the domination by Europe (particularly France and Spain) in
the area of R&D.
Qualitative evaluation
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to make even a summary evaluation.
Because there is no system of evaluation, activity reports in the various
research facilities are simply unavailable. Only in special cases are they
produced, so that they are very sporadic. Thus, neither the activities, nor the
results, of Morocco's various centres and laboratories — whose resources are
in the main publicly provided— are not subject to any evaluation
whatsoever. This is a major shortcoming in the Moroccan R&D system. It is
also an anomaly that advocates of new approaches are seeking to correct,
through the creation of an independent review and evaluation commission.
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Constraints on R&D
Funding is unquestionably one of the main problems confronting R&D in
Morocco. Its financial resources are very thin in relation to its strategic role,
and it is further hampered by the persistence of unsuitable and completely
outmoded accounting and budgetary procedures, as well as by the lack of
interfaces between R&D and the production sector.
The funding issue
One of the indicators used by UNESCO to assess the status of research is the
amount of resources devoted to S&T activities. There are inherent difficulties
of applying such a yardstick, for example, the distinction between capital and
operating budgets, and the absence of budget items specific to research.
Despite these issues, an estimate of the R&D envelope can be made, based
upon R&D spending, and the payroll for research staff. According to a
CNCPRS survey (UNESCO 1996), the overall operating budget for research
was estimated at 439.6 million MAD in 1995.
Note that research allowances paid to teacher-researchers account for
more than three-quarters of the total budget for research (Figure 2). The
operations of the universities and research centres (CNCPRS and
CNESTEN) absorb 10.3% of it. Grants to doctoral students in Morocco and
abroad take 8.8%. This investment is not profitable, because many of the
recipients do their research abroad, and the subjects addressed by those who
stay in Morocco are not always relevant, their only criterion being success in
obtaining the degree they are pursuing.
Figure 2. Breakdown of public spending on research.
Source: Direction de la formation des cadres. 1995.
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Resources from research contracts and international cooperation
account for a mere 4.5% of the total research budget.
Despite this high estimate of resources devoted to research, they are
inadequate and fall far short of the needs of such an important activity.
Spending on research is only 0.15% of GDP, compared with 0.34% in Egypt,
1.32% in Asian countries, 2% in the EC and 2.8% in the USA. Similarly,
Moroccan annual R&D spending per capita is only US $2.40, compared with
US $2.60 in Egypt, US $275 in Israel, US $595 in Japan and US $630 in the
USA (CNCPRS 1995).
These indicators show that R&D spending levels in Morocco are far
below the threshold for real research. Added to this deficiency is the unsuitability
of the procedures that research institutes and centres currently follow.
Outdated and unsuitable procedures
Morocco's current accounting and budgetary procedures lead to major
distortions that place a real damper on research. The legal and regulatory
framework in which it takes place is completely rigid, and this leads to
wasted resources and crippling delays. The distortions caused by these
procedures include these realities.
• The procedures in place stress the resources committed, that is the
nature of the expense. The evaluation criteria used by institutions ̂ re
based on the legal and accounting framework, not the effectiveness of
the activities undertaken and the funds committed in relation to the
objectives pursued. The result is that the objectives of the research
establishment are totally ignored.
• The budget nomenclature used by research establishments is a mere
reflection of what is used in the public accounts. These are notable for
their rigid and archaic character. For example, what is the distinction
between instructional materials and research materials? What does the
term research operating costs signify? Similarly, the line drawn
between capital and operating costs, plus the separation between the
budget and the multi-year program of activities, eliminate all flexibility
and adaptability from research-funding mechanisms and procedures in
Morocco.
• The practice of a priori budget control on research expenditure
commitments is stifling and unwieldy. It has a disastrous effect on
efficiency because of the protracted delays, which contrast with the
flexibility that is indispensable to research activities.
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To summarize, the way in which research is funded in Morocco
excludes any resort to alternative solutions along the way (even if they are
better), once a given expenditure has been enshrined in the budget. In other
words, it is not possible to use the same funds in another way or change or
replace an item, once it has been provided for in the budget.
An isolated and unexploited activity
One of the great failings of R&D in Morocco is the lack of connection and
coordination between research units and laboratories, and the production
sector. Researchers work in isolation, within a closed environment.
This major shortcoming is due to the lack of infrastructure that allows
cooperation and partnership between the various sectors that are either
directly or indirectly involved in research. For reasons of organization,
among others, S&T achievements very rarely lead to widespread practical
application. This is true also of work done in semi-public and private
organizations (CERPHOS, REMINEX-ONA and so on).
The failure to exploit the fruits of research is due, also, to the lack of a
national agency to discharge that responsibility and secure the transfer of
technology from the researcher to the producer. Another consideration is the
lack of a clear national policy on research, coupled with the absence of
mechanisms and criteria for evaluating its results.
Figure 3. Researchers by sector.
Source: Direction de la formation des cadres. 1995.
Very limited use of new technologies
As Figure 3 shows, agriculture is the sector in which research is most
developed, with 55% of the research units surveyed. It is followed by water
with 16%, health with 12% and energy with 7%. Research activities are
modest in the other sectors, such as fisheries with 4%, construction and
public works with 3%, and environment with 3%. Also note the lack of
research in the new technologies, including informatics, and yet such
research is not expensive and the results can generate substantial revenue.
Other constraints
Additional constraints represent other deficiencies that afflict the R&D sector.
• A very low priority is given to research. Modest public outlays on R&D
are allocated because this sector does not have the high priority that is
placed on agriculture, education or health. The result is that there is no
clearly defined policy on such activities, which remain marginalized.
• There is almost a complete absence of an evaluation system— or
incentive measures. The salary and career path for researchers are
preordained and bear no relation to their productivity or the usefulness
of their findings.
• The use of research facilities is irrational. Scientific facilities, which are
often very costly, are not used to best advantage and are not properly
maintained. This leads to constant deterioration and to their eventual loss
or obsolescence.
Scientific and technological output
Scientific research activity is measured by the publication rate as listed by
UNESCO and evaluated by the science press (UNESCO 1995). According to
1996 data, Morocco and the North African countries contribute only 0.4% of
the world's scientific output. By comparison, the USA dominates with 36%,
followed by the EC with 31.5%; Southeast Asia (including Japan, India and
Australia) accounts for 15.6%.
Technological activity is measured by the production of patents, which
have developed into an industrial weapon of war. According to Morocco's
OMPI, most patents that are valid within Morocco are acquired abroad. On
average, patents issued to Moroccan nationals make up only 6-10% of the
total (OMPI 1997). The patents of foreign origin (which represent 90-94% of
the patents registered in Morocco) belong to multinational corporations.
180 KHROUZ, HAJJI & BOUSETTA
CHAPTER 5. DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT IN MOROCCO 181
If we exclude patents registered by individuals, as has been proposed
by UNESCO, both scientific and technological output in Morocco appears to
be insignificant, because an average of three-quarters of the patents of
Moroccan origin are attributable to individuals. Patents registered by
individuals should not be included in the technological statistics, because
they are not continuous, structured, systematic or institutional in character.
As well, between 1995 and 1996, not a single Moroccan patent was
registered abroad, and during the last three years, no patent has been
registered by, or issued to, a postsecondary institution in Morocco.
The role of Arabic
As far as research is concerned, Arabic is used only in certain faculties of arts
and social sciences. Most research in other fields — particularly the exact
sciences, but even economics — is largely based on bibliography in French
or English, and reports are written in French. According to estimates by
people in the research sector, only 5 to 8% of research in Morocco is carried
out in Arabic. This low proportion is due to two factors:
« The marginal character of research done in faculties of arts and human
sciences, which have inadequate budgets and resources. On average,
the research budgets of such faculties represent just 2% of university
budgets. The bulk of the resources are allocated to S&T, which do not
use Arabic.
• The almost complete absence of research cooperation with other Arab
countries also helps to marginalize the use of the language. The
cooperation that has just begun with certain joint projects shared by
Tunisia and Morocco is being conducted wholly in French.
The latter cooperation is very limited, involving very small projects
with insignificant budgets. It began on 1 January 1998, with some fifteen
joint projects with budgets of no more than 40 000 MAD each. They are in
three main areas: life and earth sciences (7 projects), earth and space sciences
(6 projects), and economics (2 projects).
R&D outlook and challenges
R&D has become a precondition for coping with the challenges of
globalization as well as the association with Europe. The ability to be
innovative and imaginative in the face of new technologies is fundamental to
ensuring economic competitiveness and social progress.
Creating a new policy in this area is critical, and more urgent than
ever. Morocco has invested heavily in the human side of R&D. However,
R&D remains subject to severe constraints that are related insufficient
funding, the barriers between research structures and the production sector,
and the absence of a clearly defined policy.
In March 1998, a state secretariat for scientific research was created.
Since then, a genuinely clear and coherent national policy on research is
being developed (Institute for Prospective Technological Studies 1997). The
goal is to make R&D a national priority and increase its effectiveness so as to
make it an essential factor in national development.
Accordingly, framework legislation is being developed to define an
R&D policy, to establish necessary institutions, and to give R&D some
visibility and a better impact on development.
In Morocco, R&D policy will be based on a reorganization of types of
research. Appropriate structures to reinforce and develop research will be
established involving such institutions as the Conseil Superieur de la
Recherche Scientifique (GSRS) [higher council on scientific research], and
the Fondation Nationale de la Recherche (FNR) [national research
foundation]. Their objective will be to establish a culture of innovation, to
coordinate R&D efforts, and to channel the country's potential in this area.
The CSRS will be responsible for developing and proposing a national
research policy based on national priorities as well as on a development
strategy. It will also identify and review resources for the policy's
implementation. It is an instrument through which the government can
encourage excellence, and will be one of the main levers in structuring
research — as well as being the chief means of regulating it.
The FNR's role will be to define and secure financing for priority
research projects and programs along the lines set out by the CSRS. Its
mission will be:
• to define priority programs and approaches for research activities;
• to select research proposals for funding and promotion; and
• to call upon national or international expertise in this area.
The FNR will work to generate and develop a national research fund,
supplied both by government and by contributions from economic agents —
and from international cooperation.
In the context of the 1999-2003 five-year plan, new orientations for
R&D by the year 2003 have been proposed by the changeover government.
These are designed to give it a second wind, make it more effective and
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visible, and increase its impact on development. The aim is to give it
appropriate structures and mechanisms to make research cost-effective,
coordinate the efforts of the various players, channel existing potential and
exploit the results. Three key approaches will be emphasized:
1. Research in a number of sectors that are regarded as being vital to
economic development and social progress will be reinforced and
encouraged. Of these, four will be paramount: agriculture, forestry and
fisheries, water, and energy and desertification. Development of
research in these areas must be counted on to maintain a competitive
position in agriculture and fisheries, lead to self-sufficiency in water
resources, reduce Morocco's energy dependency, and lastly address the
problems of desertification in the southern provinces.
2. Instruments will be established so as to provide funding and support to
research capacities. A government statement referred to the
establishment of a national research fund that will draw from a variety
of sources: government grants, loans and advances, parafiscal
revenues, as well as a share in revenues from patents and applications
of projects assisted by the fund. Institutional and support measures are
also planned, in particular:
• reinforcement of the MARWAN network, a vital tool for
distributing information in the research sector;
• development of the research capacities of experienced teams in
priority areas, which will be identified as skill reservoirs;
» establishment of a centre for scientific and technical information
that will collect and exchange such information, provide
opportunities for exploratory studies, and give researchers access
to learned articles, theses, conference proceedings and the like;
and
• establishment of regional technical centres that will facilitate
technology transfer, plus the execution of thematic and
collaborative research programs.
3. Reform of the legislative and regulatory framework will be
accomplished, so as to support the implementation. The new provisions
will be designed to facilitate:
• establishment of truly representative agencies whose purpose is
to coordinate research policy;
• creation of independent monitoring and evaluation agencies;
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• restructuring of the agencies responsible for planning and
coordinating research activities, particularly the CNCPRS;
• application of an incentive-based policy and the development of
university-business interfaces; and
• reinforcement of existing research units and laboratories with
additional human, technical and financial resources.
These orientations are part of a comprehensive, multi-year strategy to
put a new R&D system in place, which will make the national economy more
competitive. The goal is to give Morocco the skills, resources and structures
to strengthen its position in an increasingly globalized and highly
competitive environment. This strategy — to bring a new innovative vision
to all levels (such as the legal and regulatory frameworks, funding, and
evaluation) — is designed to orient R&D to development goals.
Conclusions
Morocco's research sector has significant assets, including a human potential
made up of qualified researchers and numerous, fairly well-equipped
research centres/The sector is marked by the following characteristics:
• research is mostly carried out in institutions of higher education and in
a few public boards and institutes; the private sector invests practically
nothing in innovation;
• university research is mainly oriented towards training and the earning
of degrees, and in most such work, application of the results is not a
concern;
• there is no system for evaluating research, even in research institutes;
• there is no structure for funding and managing research;
• the bodies supposedly responsible for coordination have neither
hierarchical authority nor budgetary control; and
• there is very little collaboration between the research and production
sectors.
The result is that the research work being done in the various
establishments is marginal, uncoordinated and dependent. Dispersal of
researchers and of research activities, the scant funds allocated to them, the
failure to integrate them with the production sector: these are all constraints
that prevent R&D from playing its full part in the economic development of
Morocco.
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Because of this situation, for the last few years those who are
responsible for the research sector have considered which ways would best
encourage thorough reform. The objectives of reforms now underway are:
• the creation of a guiding structure responsible for defining the national
R&D policy, and setting its objectives and priorities;
• the creation of a structure responsible for the management, funding and
programming of research, like the CNRS in France;
« definition of the goals of the existing research institutes;
• definition of the status of research within the universities;
« the creation of national and international research networks;
• the establishment of a system for the evaluation of research proposals
and completed work; and
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Chapter 6.
Science for Policy and Development:
Discussion Notes from the Workshop
During the two-day workshop, the discussions centered on how science in
general — and social sciences in particular — affects policy-making for the
development of the region. Participants recognized the failure of scientists to
influence development agendas and development practices. This was related
to a restraining political environment, but also to serious gaps and weakness
in institutional research frameworks, research relevance, quality, data
availability, and dissemination.
The political environment
The tension between social-science research and power was noted as being
prevalent in most countries of the region. Independent and critical social-
science research has been specifically constrained by a general absence of
democratic practices.
Access to funding, promotions, and career opportunities have often
been hindered by the publication of research results contradicting official
government positions. In many countries, a significant proportion of the
intelligentsia has accommodated power. Its contribution to any debate on
future social, economic, or political development is negligible.
The difficulty of performing social-science research is amplified by
what a participant referred to as the "protective culture" in the region.
Authorities and statistical bureaus are over-protective when it comes to
sharing data, particularly when it is considered politically sensitive. The
difficulty researchers have in obtaining research results is aggravated by the
red tape placed by most governments on releasing permits for social or
economic surveys. In some cases, these can take up to two years to provide
and result in the abandonment of research projects.
On the other hand, such situations are not considered static. While
traditional civil society structures, such as trade unions, have been co-opted
by governments, new forms of civil-society organizations are emerging in the




Institutionalization of the research environment
In all countries of the region there is an urgent requirement to create
autonomous and solid institutional frameworks for teaching and research. As
well, it is important to see research as a vector of socioeconomic, cultural,
and political development. A historical perspective was given on the research
system in Morocco so as to contrast it with Egypt.
Unlike Egypt, the research system in Morocco has not developed large
and weighty research institutions. Consequently (at least in the field of social
sciences), for the past 30 years research has become a private, individual
career activity, and a growing gap has developed between research and
teaching. The best researchers are now connected to international research
centres —- either French or American. This happens at the expense of average
research that can be adapted to local, social needs. The only interesting
development model that exists in Morocco is the applied research undertaken
by the Institut Agronomique, where there is a worthwhile articulation
between research, teaching, and development work.
The crisis of research institutions — as described in Morocco — is
similar in other countries of North Africa and is a worldwide phenomenon
related to globalization and technological revolutions in many diverse fields.
Such a crisis is conveyed dramatically through the amplifying unemployment
problem experienced by graduates. According to a recent study, the active
world population will be reduced by 20% in the new millennium. This forces
a reflection around new orientations and visions related to educational (and
professional training) systems, as well as to the identification of new jobs of
the millennium in relation to the contemporary mutations of the social and
economic systems.
Research in the region is made in episodic manners, or in centres of
excellence (which are rare) or by individuals pursuing their career either in
their respective country or by immigrating. For example, 30 billion centimes
have been absorbed by research centres and private-research offices which
undertake applied research. There are now approximately 20000 PhD
graduates in mathematics and physics who teach in French secondary schools
and 82% will not return to Morocco. Of Moroccan computer technicians,
10% have immigrated to France or Canada. In Morocco, concrete steps are
now launched to address this weakness through surveys on the research
potential in that country.
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Relevance of research topics to policy making and development
A number of participants observed that research projects in the region often
do not reflect — and are not aligned with — the increasing complexity of the
development process. In addition, research projects do not address issues of
policy relevance and are not geared to work out problems within a policy
timescale. The importance of multi-disciplinary approaches was underlined
in this regard. Although the task of breaking down barriers among disciplines
is difficult, particularly when there are additional constraints based on
different institutional cultures, participants agreed that it was essential for
social scientists from different disciplines to work together on the same
project. Also important is for them to address research topics using a
combination of quantitative and qualitative, micro- and macro-, as well as
multi-sectoral approaches. The role of IDRC in encouraging such multi-
disciplinary and multi-sectoral work, when dealing with complex issues such
as poverty, employment, or governance, was stressed.
The need to identify mechanisms for integrating demand by
policymakers and supply by researchers was discussed. The involvement of
policymakers in the research early in the process — at the stage at which
problems are identified and research methods defined — was considered as
being crucial for making research relevant to policy. In this context, there
was strong support for the idea of encouraging the role of development
intermediaries. They would act on behalf of social scientists to develop
networking and communication channels between researchers, development
agencies, and key policymakers in the region.
But relevance of research for policy is also about the role played by
social science in promoting values such as social equity, good governance,
and democracy. Participants made a number of remarks about the need for
researchers to give a voice to the interest groups that are hardly ever heard in
the policy-making arena, and to work with NGOs. This is important for a
number of reasons: such groups represent a major way in which the poor can
participate in civil society; they undertake a multitude of development
efforts, including social-science research; and they constitute an important
vehicle in developing models which can be presented to governments as
being complementary to their own policies.
Palestine provides a relevant example of the importance of supporting
advocacy for policy influence. Based on a comparative analysis between
different associative laws in various countries, a Palestinian NGO network
developed and lobbied for what is probably the most progressive and
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democratic associative law in the developing world. Through a long and
sustained campaign of lobbying and advocacy, and despite strong resistance
from the authorities, this law was finally passed in the third reading in the
Palestinian Legislative Council. Participants confirmed the importance of
researchers engaging in public debates and lobbying activities in order to
promote social spaces and participatory decision-making processes.
With regard to the gaps between the academic and development world,
it was noted that — in the case of Egypt for example — there is a wealth of
experimentation and innovation, data and action-research produced within
community-based development projects, in such fields as MSMEs, informal
education, water, and sanitation. Such data however is not documented and
not analyzed because it is not considered by formal institutions as valuable
for researching, and it never finds its way to policymakers.
Research quality
The quality aspect of research was considered a major component of the
crisis in the research environment. Encouraging competition, providing
incentives, and building capacities were identified as key tools to improve
research quality. Encouraging competition is a major challenge in view of the
hierarchical structures which characterize research institutions in the region
(whether academic, semi-autonomous, or governmental departments).
Associated with this is the fact that very often, good researchers are the
younger ones, but that they are not the ones given support and funding. In
addition to bringing a competitive edge to the approval of proposals, it was
considered important to provide rewards for the achievement of good
research and to improve an incentive structure. Finally, capacity-building
measures must be structured in sustainable ways through regular programs of
training plus exposure to front-line research and researchers. The urgency of
giving chances to young researchers was underscored. In this respect, the role
of donors should be key.
Participants stressed that the crisis in the region's educational system is
intrinsically related to the quality of research produced within various
institutions. Much research being produced demonstrates a lack of analytical
and methodological skills, weak articulation of research questions and
problems, and inadequate utilization of research findings. These weaknesses
are related to the build-up of the educational process, from the school system
to university-level education.
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Data availability and dissemination
The availability of data is an issue that also raised considerable debate during
the plenary discussions. The ability to access information, databases, and
appropriate knowledge is essential for influencing government as well as
donor policies. This problem is not new to the region and has been discussed
in other forums for decades. But new approaches need to be studied. One
experiment in this direction is a research training program, where a core of
informed, young, and dynamic policymakers was made aware of the
importance and value of data access, data collection, and data analysis, and
was linked with statistical institutes in this regard.
A related issue is the absence of networking among different countries
of the region. To illustrate this situation, one participant indicated that on
their two websites, 57% of the users are from the USA, around 35% are from
Europe, and less than 1% are from the region. Participants also discussed the
lack of proper information systems. This represents a very serious obstacle to
the possibility of doing up-to-date, sophisticated, and quick research in
various fields related to development. Thus, proper research and planning in
the region is seriously hindered.
Participants stressed the responsibility of donors and researchers to
improving data availability. Substantial funding has gone into numerous
research projects, but once projects are completed the results are almost lost.
Few report copies are disseminated and it is very difficult to locate them, let
alone find out about them or access them. Capacity-building in making
research results accessible is required. Donors can play a major role by
making sure that sufficient funding is provided for wide dissemination of
research results. As well, donors should use their ability to convene a variety
of players to look at opportunities for resolving this issue, at least in the
specific areas in which they are involved.
Central to the weakness of scientific policy impact in the region, is the
inadequacy of knowledge-diffusion mechanisms. There were numerous
observations touching on the quality of the region's extension services and
the effectiveness of different kinds of delivery systems, particularly with
respect to information and communication technologies (ICTs). A number of
participants argued that one of the weakest points of researchers and research
institutes in the region is the lack of use of the Internet for disseminating
research results. Participants urged IDRC to give attention to this question.
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Finally, there was general agreement on the need to develop research
results into simple language and practical, policymaking implications. Easy-
to-read publications should be posted on the Internet and disseminated
through the media. As well, the need to disseminate research results in
Arabic was emphasized in order to widen dissemination and to empower
communities in their development efforts.
PART II.
THE R&D ENVIRONMENT IN THE MENA
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Chapter 7.
Social and Economic Development
1. Socioeconomic development in the Arab world:
challenges for the next century
Galal Amin
I will address socioeconomic development from a research perspective, from
a current as well as with a future outlook. There are a lot of reasons to be
unhappy about the state of social and economic research in the Arab world
today — or even as it has been for the last few decades. This does require
soul searching, especially because we are at the end of the century, the end of
the millennium — and the start of a new era.
In looking back at the last 50 years we can see that research on Arab
economic and social development has gone in and out of fashion from one
decade to the next. These fashions are not justified by changes in real need;
they have largely originated from outside the region and we have been
merely following them.
Let me very quickly demonstrate how this happened. Consider the
realities at the London School of Economics in 1957. As an Egyptian studying
economics at LSE, I had no option but to study economic development. This
may seem innocent enough, but "economic development" at that time was
defined in a particular way to raise per capita income. Worse, countries were
judged as underdeveloped according to certain criteria. The implicit logic was
that the goal of these underdeveloped countries should be to catch up. And
"catching up" really meant raising per capita income. If the criteria were
defined in terms of human development, per capita income would not have
been an appropriate goal or subject for study. This is because one can raise per
capita income without solving the problems of the underprivileged, or one can
solve the problems of the underprivileged without necessarily achieving high
rates of per capita income.
Now let me remind you also that the most important obstacle to
development was the shortage of capital. This means that economic
development was considered almost synonymous with capital accumulation
and industrialization. And there was the fashion of the stages of growth,
where every student was trying to decide whether their country had reached
the take-off stage or not.
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In the 1950s and 1960s, economic integration among underdeveloped
countries was a very popular fashion. Now this is no longer the case. The
reason is, that in the 1970s the emphasis shifted from capital to labor
productivity and education, from foreign aid to issues of self-reliance. Here,
the dependency theories became quite fashionable. Suddenly, basic needs
became important and distribution was linked to growth. The causes of such
change range from the detente of the 1970s, the lessons learned from the
Chinese experience, to the declining rates of the rapid growth of the West in
the 25 years after the war.
In the 1980s, we sang completely different tunes. Multinational
corporations became the subject; foreign aid gave way to private foreign
investment; import substitution saw its popularity enjoyed in the 1950s and
1960s decline; and economic integration among underdeveloped countries
almost completely went out of fashion.
In the Arab world, we just followed what was happening to the extent
that the same economists — who sang the praises of import substitution and
Arab socialism in the 1950s and 1960s — are now writing books and articles
about the necessity of trade liberalization and export promotion.
In the 1990s, structural adjustment, macroeconomic stabilization, and
privatization became the fashion. Of course, researchers quickly realized that
we should not forget social impacts, but this was mainly out of fear that
social consequences might create instabilities, that structural adjustment
would fail and that privatization would come to a stop, and not out of any
real concern for the poor.
How one can explain this? Let me suggest the following. Research
must start from some implicit goals or value premises, but this is rarely made
clear. The goals have been changing over the years, the value premises have
been changing over the years, and as a result the subject of interest in
research had also changed. But unfortunately, the change in goals and value
premises have occurred outside of us. I can spot two major value premises
which are dominating our research now.
1. Economism
The first value premise is "economism." We are very economistic in our
outlook on development. For example, the delay in the peace process is seen
as delaying the regional integration or the flow of trade between Arab
countries. But development does not necessarily have to be economic even
when one talks about the Palestinian question. Another example is that
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governmental corruption is criticized because it is a threat to growth. When
the military is studied, the question becomes how to incorporate the people
who used to work in the military in the economic mainstream, as if the
problem of the militarization of the society is again only economic. Even the
subject of women is often discussed mainly from the point of view of the role
of women in the labor force and in the labor market. Very basic human
subjects are discussed from a very narrow economistic point of view.
Economics is not the whole of life, there is much more to life than that.
2. Social integration to the outside world
The other value premise, which has been dominating our research agendas
for the last two decades, is an assumption that the more the society is
integrated in the outside world the better. But is it better? Of course, having
contact with the outside world has a lot of advantages — but it is not true that
openness has no limits. Bernard Russell once said, "a mind which is
perpetually open is perpetually empty." That precisely defines the problem
with openness. To be completely empty is to have nothing inside. So by all
means one should integrate the outside world, but it is imperative to preserve
some identity when doing so.
These two value premises affect our research agendas. They not only
affect the choice of research subjects, they also influence the meanings we
give to the subjects.
Whether from Western or Arab writers, the phenomenon of Islamic
revival has been mainly examined from the point of view of its threat to
internationalism. This phenomenon, however, has many aspects and
dimensions to it. One aspect is pure religiosity. Terrorism or fanaticism are
certainly a threat to internationalism, but the phenomenon of people
becoming more pious or religious is no threat to anybody. Actually, this is
the most interesting aspect of the so-called religious revivals. People who are
becoming more pious are innocent people; those people reading the Koran in
the train are not carrying guns and they are not even fanatic. This ingrown
religiosity has been relatively ignored because it is not of concern to people
who are concerned about how open the society is and how ready it is to
accept Western values.
I will give another example. Human rights are such a vague illusive
concept, which can be understood in several ways. However, human rights
are given one meaning only — and mainly a Western one. Consider women's
emancipation: there are so many aspects to the freedom of women, and so
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many ways in which women can be enslaved other than the oriental way of
enslaving them. Women have also all sorts of restrictions on their humanity
in the Western society. But women are mainly studied from the point of view
of the numbers working outside the home. There are so many ways of
enslaving a woman other than preventing her from working, such as using
her in advertisements or as a sex symbol for instance — and this is more a
phenomenon of Western societies.
I could stop here, but I think it is inappropriate to end on a negative
tone. I propose opposite value premises and subjects that could be suggested
by different value premises. Here are a few examples.
One phenomenon worries me immensely. In university colleges in
Egypt, English and French are slowly replacing the Arabic language as
languages of instruction. Even subjects that have long been taught in Arabic,
like economics, political science, or business, are now being taught in
English. In three or four decades, this could mean a great decline for Arabic.
I believe that one indicator of a nation's progress is what happens to its
mother tongue. People cannot be really innovative except in their mother
tongue. You can get a PhD but I would not call that really innovative. To be
really innovative, you have to write or think in your mother tongue. So what
is happening in Egyptian universities is worth a research topic. But of course,
nobody is worried about that because of the economism I have been talking
about. Arabic is not good for business right now. The economistic and
internationalistic view has prevented this from taking enough attention.
The other example concerns regional disparities in Egypt. You can
deal with it from a purely economic point of view, but the oppressive effect
of Cairo on the rest of Egypt is not only economic. It brings out all sorts of
issues: cultural, intellectual, social, and psychological. But undertaking
research on regional disparities by making some calculations on per capita
income will not go into the heart of the matter.
And finally, the last example concerns the family as a support system.
In a country like Egypt — and like the rest of the Arab world — the family
has a support system that addresses failed formal policies of the state. In a
country with a high rate of unemployment as in Egypt, without this family
support system, people would have died a long time ago. Proper research on
this is not evident— yet this is undeniably science: it is not literature; it is
not fiction. Tremendous scientific, objective work on this topic can and needs
to be done.
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2. The politics of MSME development in the Middle East and North Africa
Tamer El-Meehy
A few years ago, during a study of households headed by women in the
district of Al-Gawaber in Boulaq, Cairo, a case was asked to define poverty.
Her answer was "illet elheelah" (powerlessness, lack of capacity). According
to Fergany (1998), poverty
is not about low income, or even the failure to meet basic needs, but
about human-capability failure ... in this perspective, poverty is almost
synonymous to 'powerlessness.' Powerlessness manifests itself in a
lower level of satisfaction of basic needs, and more importantly, in lack
of access to, and control over, capital: physical, human, financial and
social.
Defining poverty and inequality with reference to the political (as
powerlessness) is naturally consistent with an important characteristic of the
societies of the region, whereby the political (the state) continues to play a
major role in all aspects of life. Accordingly, political power becomes an
asset in itself. In this context, poverty and inequality gain new meanings that
are related to such concepts as exclusion, marginalization, illegality, and
powerlessness. Here, it should be noted that the "political" is used in the
broad sense to denote power relationships permeating society at large.
Institutions, policies and practices materialize and reflect socio-political
(power) relations between groups and classes in society each in its own way.
In its essence, development is the progressive mastery and control of
individuals over assets with the purpose of attaining the greatest good for
members of society. In other words, overcoming the powerlessness of human
beings. Nevertheless, little emphasis is placed by our governments, donors,
experts, and academics on the political determinants of development. Despite the
emphasis donor organizations and development experts place on micro, small
and medium-sized enterprise (MSME) development, the issue of the political
determinants of their development has largely been neglected. Rather, emphasis
is laid on the extension of financial and non-financial services to them. While
sustainability is of major concern to the development process, it has consistently
been reduced to the practice of advanced and more sophisticated forms of cost-
recovery. Little emphasis if any was delegated to the concept of sustainability in
the broad sense — the creation and maintenance of a macroenvironment that is
favorable to the development process.
One cannot tackle the issue of the political determinants of MSME
development in isolation from the larger contexts of political development —
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and development at large. MENA countries have been witnessing a lopsided
development process. This has focused on the development of the economy
to the neglect of the development of adequate political structures, or of
practices that can provide for the sustainability of economic development, as
well as steer the development process. On the political level, we can detect
two main traits that are characteristic of MENA. Those traits are
underdevelopment and unequal development. Historically, the dissolution of
the pre-modern state, and political structures and practices, was not
accompanied with the rise of modern institutional arrangements that embody
the modern democratic values, deepens citizenship and modern democratic
values, and represents the interests of the various social classes and groups in
society. Only an educated urban minority was (and still is) actively involved
in the modern political processes. Civil society institutions and other forms
of associational life were historically largely created by the foreign
minorities and the Westernized local urban elite. In fact, it can be argued that
even their continued existence until now is closely related to Western
influence, whether material or ideological. Similarly, political consciousness
in MENA is, with minor exceptions, largely underdeveloped. In general, this
gave rise to an underdeveloped political context that is reflected in the
region's current state of political structures and practices.
Unequal development manifests itself in various forms. One form is
the blatant duality MENA societies suffer from. On the one hand, rich
powerful minorities enjoy the fruits of the development process in terms of
strong ties or access to the West, education, wealth, and services. But on the
other end of the spectrum, we have the great sea of the disadvantaged, the
illiterate, the uneducated, the poor and the informal. Politically, this duality is
reflected in the coexistence of the modern political institutions and trends
that are mainly related to the same more-sophisticated and privileged sects of
society. These coexist with more traditional sectors of society — such as the
mosque and fundamentalist movements — with which the uneducated and
the disadvantaged sympathize.
Those two trends of underdevelopment and unequal development are
expressed in the functioning of our institutions today. Taking the above into
consideration, we can approach the issue of the political determinants of
MSME development. First, however, we must identify certain qualitative
attributes of the MSME sector. This is best done by juxtaposing MSMEs to
large enterprises, as in Table 1. It focuses on attributes of relevance to our
topic, rather than focusing on the narrow definitions that use fixed criteria
(such as number of workers, or size of capital).
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Table 1. Qualitative features of small and large enterprises.
Small enterprises Large enterprises
Institutionally under-represented Institutionally visible
Lack access to decision-makers
Established in single-ownership structures Incorporated into sophisticated legal forms
Cater to the lower classes and for the market Cater for upper and middle classes, and
in their immediate geographical location export markets
Mainly sensitive to local-level microeconomic Sensitive mainly to macroeconomic policy
controls (licensing, tax administration, fluctuations (interest rates, exchange rates,
physical space, etc.) trade regimes, etc.)
Mainly access informal credit markets Dominate formal credit markets
Constitute the vast majority of the private Constitute a minority of the private sector
sector
Source: This table was designed by the Technical Office of the Minister of Economy; see the
Ministry's "A Draft National Policy on Small and Medium Enterprise Development in Egypt".
1998. Cairo (June).
institutional under-representation of MSMEs
In pre-modern times, the very institutional setup of society organized artisans
and the traditional micro-entrepreneurs in "tawa'if" or "asnaf' (groups) that
served to intermediate between the state and the artisan. Unfortunately, the
modern counterpart (such as the "ta'aweniyat," or cooperatives, in Egypt) are
largely controlled by the state and are far from being effective as an
intermediary body. As a social group, contrary to the case with large
businesses, MSMEs do not have the institutional presence that would
guarantee them access to policymakers. Industrial federations, business
associations and similar institutions are mainly dominated by large businesses.
The effects of such under-representation are obvious. Large businesses
in MENA are, in many respects, organically connected to top officials. For
example, in Egypt, consultations with businessmen are widespread prior to a
particular form of legislation being passed that affects economic life. On the
other hand, while 84% of Egyptian MSMEs operate from rented space, no
similar consultations were held with them prior to issuing the law on non-
residential rents.
This under-representation of MSMEs is due to two factors. The first is
the underdevelopment of representative bodies in MENA in general. The
second is the unequal development of the collective consciousness of the
various social classes and groups in the region. On the one hand, large
entrepreneurs are typically more conscious of their social status and of their
economic and political interests than small ones. Research has shown that
only an estimated 9% of MSME owners and operators in Egypt have
university degrees. Accordingly, no autonomous MSME organizations have
Well-connected
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evolved in the region. Their under-representation has consistently served to
place MSMEs at the mercy of the government as well as other market
institutions such as the formal financial sector.
The regulatory environment
While regulatory constraints may face all private-sector firms, they weigh
significantly more heavily against MSMEs. This is primarily due to the latter's
lack of adequate education, sufficient institutional mass, as well as its limited
ability to utilize the legal and other pertinent consulting services that large
firms can easily employ. Although legal and regulatory constraints vary by
sub-sector, it is a well-known fact that MSMEs face significant and numerous
problems with regards to establishment and licensing, operation, taxes,
registration, export and import permits, and compliance with directives of
various governmental entities. In Morocco, per late-1997 estimates, the
establishment of a company "requires a plethora of documents, and the process
often takes up to six months" (Hamdouch 1997, p. 14). In Egypt, an enterprise
has to prove compliance with at least 11 laws and deal with what amounts to
30 government entities before market entry. Moreover, one alarming indicator
with regards to the cost of licensing alone is that the average cost for a licensed
shop is 30% higher than in the case of an un-licensed shop. Payment is usually
made ahead of time, in order for existing tenants to leave. This 30% is, in
effect, the market value of the costs associated with just the workshop
licensing process (Ministry of Economy 1998, p.22). Similar obstacles were
reported in other Arab countries, for instance in Syria, where there also exists a
multiplicity of governmental entities with which MSMEs have to interact
during their establishment and operation.
The complexity of the regulatory system is further exacerbated by
several other problems. These include the overlapping jurisdictions across
the government institutions as well as central and local government codes;
the lack of coordination among government entities and the inconvenient
location of some of these entities; the low quality of information available to
officials; inadequate filing and record-keeping; and rudimentary data-
processing equipment. Because they have access to state officials, financial
resources, as well as legal and technical resources, large businesses find little
difficulty in surviving these hurdles.
Such a situation, coupled with an underpaid bureaucracy and a
deteriorating economy, constitute a fertile ground for corrupt practices that
became widespread in the bureaucracies of MENA. While there are no
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comparable data for other MENA countries, per the Transparency
International Corruption Perception Index for 1996, only 14 out of 54
countries exceeded Egypt in terms of corruption (Moody-Stuart 1997). The
corruption scandal involving some members of the last Palestinian cabinet is
another indicator of the seriousness of the problem. For the larger and
wealthier firms, corruption is a way out of the legal and regulatory maze we
have created and nurtured. For the smaller informal firms, corruption is a
burden they have learned to carry in order to survive.
Faced with this situation, it is only natural for the small entrepreneur to
choose informality. The huge size of the informal sector in MENA (30%-
45%) is a reflection of the complexities posed by the legal and regulatory
environment to MSMEs. Formal compliance with the legal and regulatory
o-j
environment is both size- and sector-sensitive. To a great extent, a firm's
decision to remain small or informal is a result of the trade-off between the
costs of abiding by regulations and the benefits associated with formality and
economies of scale. MSMEs are particularly affected by over-regulation. As
MSMEs try to expand, they can be faced with regulatory requirements that
they managed to avoid while remaining small — and, in most cases,
informal. Such regulations provide disincentive to growth. Graduation into a
larger size and more formal entities can be a relatively expensive undertaking
when compared to the costs of remaining small or informal.
Finally, it should be noted that while there are several attempts at
regulatory reform in several countries (such as Morocco and Egypt), the
process has been largely focused on large enterprises. In Palestine, where an
entire body of laws is being created from scratch, reports indicate that the
entire process is aimed at large businesses. This takes place at a time when at
QO
least 90% of Palestinian enterprises employ less than 5 workers. Rather
than learning from the mistakes of the other countries in the region, it is
interesting to note how the Palestinian government is replicating the same
patterns that are widespread among the regimes of the region.
87 Size sensitivity means that the larger (and hence more visible) the enterprise, the less
likely it will be able to evade regulations. Sector sensitivity means, among other things, that
MSMEs producing more visible products find it more difficult to evade the legal and
regulatory environment than MSMEs producing less visible products.
88 Presentation-by the Palestinian delegation in the workshop on "Microfinance in the
Middle East and North Africa: Priorities and Challenges", at the UNDP/World Bank meeting
in Marrakech, September 1-5, 1997.
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The importance of the legal and regulatory environment is that it ideally
acts as the regulator to the functioning of the market. It is the state's tool to
affirm that a level-playing field (if there is ever such a thing) is available for
all. It also determines who gets access to what and how. It defines the borders
between illegal (or criminal) and legal behavior. If anything, it regulates
access. However, in its present state, as Assaad and Rouchdy noted in 1998,
"the state's rules and regulations are conceived in such a way to make it
virtually impossible for large segments of society to secure their livelihoods,
thus forcing them to operate outside these rules." The second logical step is to
incriminate the "outlaws" and confirm their denial of access to resources;
hence reproducing their poverty or powerlessness.
Institutional finance
The financial constraints faced by MSMEs are another manifestation of how
the unequal development and underdevelopment patterns are reflected in the
institutional setup of the region's societies. In Egypt, for example, the
banking industry is severely underdeveloped in several aspects in comparison
to advanced countries, in such ways as branching, the range of services
offered, and (above all) the quality of these services. The formal banking
sector in most MENA countries is oriented to corporate banking, for instance
in servicing large enterprises that enjoy a sufficient institutional mass. Unlike
its counterpart in developed countries, MENA banks have not developed
their retail banking skills, whether in loan extension or in savings
mobilization. In Egypt, only 6% of the total banks' credit goes to MSMEs.
Ninety-five percent of small enterprises do not hold bank accounts, and 92%
of these enterprises never obtained a loan from a bank. In Morocco, at least
1.2 million micro-entrepreneurs do not have access to institutional finance.
Even in richer countries like Saudi Arabia, the Industrial Development
Fund (which extends soft loans to industrial enterprises) targets only those
establishments licensed by the Ministry of Industry and Electricity. The latter
only licenses those enterprises whose capital is more than one million SR.
MSMEs in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia lacked access to the investment
incentives provided by the government including access to industrial parks,
electricity, and relaxed custom duties on imported inputs (Commercial
Industrial Chamber of Riyadh/Research and Studies Center 1998).
The financing required for microenterprises in the MENA region is
valued at $1.4 billion, representing less than 1% of the total lending of banks
in the region and less than 0.5% of their total assets. This 0.5% would meet
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the needs of some 4.6 million poor beneficiaries. However, MENA's
financial sector is not interested in attempting to close this gap. The above
picture should be contrasted with the sizeable increase in credit delivered to
the region's private sector. In 1995 credit extended to the private sector
exceeded 70% of the country's GDP. The same percentage was 68% in
Tunisia, and 64% in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
This orientation towards bigger business does not only reflect an
underdevelopment on the part of the banking sector. It also denotes the
power relationship between MSMEs and large businesses reflected in the
financial institutions in society, and in the regulations and practices followed
by such institutions. It is this relationship that affirms the widespread
conviction that banks are created by and for the rich. Faced with the above
situation, MSMEs are again pushed to informality. They rely almost entirely
on private, informal credit sources, advances from customers; and suppliers'
credit. While the interest rate for MSMEs in the informal credit market is
reported to reach 100%, if not more, this market is in many respects more
reliable. Among other things, the informal credit market is more accessible,
offers more flexible loan terms, requires little documentation, if any, and has
low transaction costs for the entrepreneur. It is, nevertheless, very expensive,
limited in resources, and beyond the reach of most MSMEs (Ministry of
Economy 1998, p. 14-15).
Conclusion
MSME development, like other development issues, is an institutional issue.
The challenge is to have institutional arrangements conducive to sustainable
MSME development. Programs, schemes, and mechanisms cannot be
established except over a solid institutional infrastructure. Of relevance to
this point is the challenge of re-engineering the whole institutional setup. The
current institutional setup and the macroenvironment favor big businesses
and corporate actors, and serves to further marginalize the disadvantaged
sectors of society. The already privileged in a social setting thus possess an
unequal distribution of wealth and power.
One view worth examining is that of Nader Fergany (1998; p. 18), who
argues that
the crux of the process of poor enabling development is institutional
reform of major proportions that radically raises the share of the poor
in the power structure of society. Institutional reform is the path to
maximizing the social capital of the poor. As such it is institutional
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reform, rather than economic growth per se, that constitutes the heart of
poor-enabling development. Without it, growth is likely to be slow.
More importantly, growth is doomed, in the context of unrestrained and
uncompetitive markets, to grossly favor the rich and penalize the poor.
Another related challenge is the creation and maintenance of
consultative mechanisms that actively engage the MSME sector, the
decision-maker, and other stakeholders in a continuous and fruitful dialogue
on MSME development. In an un-participatory context where top-down
approaches to planning and implementation are the norm, and where the
adequately informed decision-maker is a rarity, this might require serious
effort. This is especially the case since such a mechanism presupposes the
existence of an adequate institutional infrastructure. At minimum, it requires
strong and capable institutions representing both the MSME sector and
subject matter experts.
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3. Change and the transition to democracy: issues in the Moroccan context
Mohamed Tozy
What conditions must be in place in order for a country to successfully
embrace deep political change such as transition from autocracy to
democracy?
Any debate on this topic must include how such change can effect
public policy. And, will the change improve the management of resources,
the reduction of social disparities or poverty? Will change guarantee civil
freedoms?
Such questions defy quick answers or analysis. Nor is it fair to
conclude that if political transition works for one country, it would be
appropriate for others in MENA. Any debate of this nature is compounded by
a lack of reliable data — particularly on cultural aspects of society — or even
of balanced information that could provide a basis for analysis and
comparison.
This paper focuses on Morocco. It identifies the main changes
underway in that country's political system, outlines their limitations, and
assesses their chances of success. First of all, I present a brief analysis of the
historical and philosophical prerequisites needed for transition, making a
comparison with the rest of the Arab world. Secondly, I review the reforms
underway — both in Morocco's institutions and in its political culture — and
discuss the ways in which the country is managing the processes of
democratic transition. Finally, I end with an analysis of the challenges that
the system must assume if it hopes to successfully achieve this historic
turning-point, and cope with the forces that have emerged over the last nine
months. The latter are discussed in the context of how the socialist
government manages its conduct of public affairs (i.e., how it has achieved
credibility for civil society, and started a debate on governance).
The prerequisites
Morocco's current political experiment with democracy could only take
place after two needed changes occurred: a political non-aggression pact and
a negotiated process for constitutional reform. Extending the notion of
democracy to the rest of the Arab world involves analyzing which of the
MENA countries have already achieved these two preconditions.
A political pact is defined by the authors of the series Transition from
Authoritarian Rule (O'Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead, 1986). They suggest
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it is an explicit — if not always publicly interpreted or justified — agreement
among a given group of players, that redefines the rules that govern the
exercise of power, mutually guaranteeing the vital interests of each party.
Central to such a pact is a negotiated compromise. Each party agrees not to
use — or exploit — its ability to attack either the organizational autonomy or
the vital interests of the others.
If we proceed from this theoretical basis and review the rest of the
Arab world, we realize that very few are ready for a transition to democracy.
In the 1990s, Morocco — the country I know best — has achieved a political
culture of compromise and negotiation, both in union affairs and in public
life in general. Working out the details of the negotiation has been a drawn-
out, laborious process involving a number of protagonists: the national
movement (Koutla) parties, the monarchy, and in an indirect and minor way,
the Islamists.
The pact did not require a national conference (as in Black Africa).
Memorandums (Istiqlal and USFP, 9 October 1991, and Koutla, 19 June
1992 and April 1996) have been the main medium of communication with
the Palace. This type of communication offers two advantages: the adversary
is not designated, and a response is not required. Beyond the deference they
imply, memorandums convey the imbalance among the political players.
Leaders of the political parties are always supplicants, rather than being
competing alternatives. Thus, the implied debate on how to accomplish
constitutional revision is both begun and developed by the national
movement parties through their congresses and memorandums. All parties
limit themselves to commenting on the content of the revision: but what is
implicitly sought is the establishment of a "contractual" constitution.
The Palace's vigilance is focused primarily on the forms of exchange,
although major concessions have been made on matters of substance.
Whatever the means of exchange, a deal has been made. Although the King
always stresses the consultative character of such realistic and contradictory
concepts as "consensual alternance", the government alternance that the King
seeks is the very purpose of the pact.
Constitutionalism demands that the law must protect specific spheres
of authority against the discretionary — or arbitrary — power of the state
even if it does express the will of the majority. For such protection to exist,
the political power structure must favour a division, allowing "power to
offset power." As well, contitutionalism has to be based on a common
agreement— or pact— in which rules are created that are difficult to
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challenge. As well, a constitution must guarantee that its rules take
precedence over political expediency.
Thus, constitutionalism is an essential element in any political
transition. It must not be assimilated by populist groups or traditional
theocracies. Instead, constitutionalism is part of a world view that embraces
competition among a variety of interests and values; it represents a
polyarchic compromise between strategic elites that represent powerful
social imperatives to varying degrees.
Morocco has had five constitutions in thirty years — in other words, a
new one every 6 years. This fact reveals the tensions that are associated with
the emergence of a constitutionalist culture, as well as the difficulties that are
inherent in building a political pact that is permanent. However, those
changes that are now underway, the reforms that the most recent
constitutions have brought, and the political conditions that have made them
possible, are all bringing in new political viewpoints and new ways of doing
politics.
This reform process began in the very early 1990s. The relationship
between the monarchy and the "opposition" underwent a profound change, in
both form and content. For instance, "coups" are no longer an acceptable
way to achieve change; as well, a parliamentary monarchy has been created.
Hence, such changes made it possible for the opposition and monarchy to
eliminate certain misunderstandings and to create a common basis of
understanding — a pact.
Writing the constitution was no a single act. It was revised on 4
September 1992; and in 1996. It expressed a political will consistent with the
expectations voiced both by funding agencies and Western partners. But it
was also, in part, a reflection of the profound changes affecting Moroccan
society.
It was against this background that the following institutional reforms
took place:
the establishment of the Conseil Consultatif des droits de rHomme
[consultative council on human rights] by order 1-90-12 of 24
Ramadan 1410 (20 April 1990);
the establishment of administrative tribunals under Law 41-90,
proclaimed by order 1-91-225 of 10 September 1993;
the establishment of the Ministere charge des Droits de l'Homme
[ministry of human rights] in 1993;
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• the establishment of the Conseil Constitutionnel [constitutional
council] by Law 29-93 and the order of 25 February 1994; and
• the establishment of the Conseil Consultatif pour le Suivi du Dialogue
Social [consultative council on the continuance of social dialogue], 24
November 1994.
Apart from the main features of this constitutional reform, it is
important to stress the consensual atmosphere in which the current stage of
reform is proceeding. What is new, is that for the first time in recent
Moroccan history, the proposals won a broad consensus that included the
USFP and Istiqlal parties. Until now, politics had been governed by rules that
had been rejected by a significant number of players. The government's
accountability to both Houses, along with the unstated requirement that the
King must appoint a prime minister who will represent the majority of the
people are confirmations of the main innovation of democracy in the last
constitution.
The bicameral approach, the constitutionalization of the Conseil
Economique et Social [economic and social council], and the constitutional
recognition of regional concerns are integral features of the constitution.
Another important feature is a key provision that ties national legislation to
the international body of law. Politically, the Kingdom of Morocco aligns its
actions with several international agencies, of which the country is an active
partner. Therefore, the preamble to the constitution confirms that the
Kingdom subscribes to the principles, rights and obligations flowing from the
charters of those agencies. It also confirms that human rights will be
recognized.
The watchwords of recent months have been "consensus" and
"dialogue." These express a genuine desire for political change which, over
and above the manipulative culture of the makhzen, indicates a new
equilibrium and a consolidation of advances in political maturity. A few
short months ago, it would have been unimaginable for the Minister of the
Interior to drop by the CDT congress, as he did last March. This is
particularly true for anyone who is aware of the history of tumult in relations
between that union and the authorities. It would have been equally
unimaginable for the legislation on the forthcoming election and on
regionalization to pass unanimously. Only the coming months will offer
confirmation of this trend, which has defused the atmosphere and created a
place for the Islamists within the opposition.
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Two major questions arise with respect to the political pact in the Arab
world and the possibility of constitutionalism.
1. Political forces have polarized. One camp is comprised of those whose
allegiance to Islam is explicit. This group includes those who subscribe
to a political Islam as well as those who embrace an archaic, traditional
Islam that has a clear opinion of — and makes a clear statement — on
social issues.
2. The other camp is comprised of those who evoke Islam as the
wellspring of their politics. Here we find the political intelligentsia
made up of nationalists, old-line Marxists, democrats and so on. In
other words, this group represents an amalgam of elites, bureaucrats
(both military and civilian), and family clans. In many Arab countries,
this group constitutes a distinct political force. It can either be
institutionalized (as in some countries of the Gulf), or non-institutional.
Political change comes about as a result of deals between these various
factions. Islam is a good example of this. Some commentators identify three
main components of political Islam:
1. the rural and urban marginalized elements, or hetestes, as they are
called in Algeria (these are young people who filled the ranks of the
member groups of the Islamic Salvation Front, the FIS);
2. the bourgeoisie pieuse, or middle-class faithful; and
3. the Islam of the ulamas, the religious traditionalists in various
countries.
The balance between these three elements defines political transition in
the Arab world. In Morocco, a form of compromise exists that has made
change not only feasible, but just. But unfortunately, in Algeria, hope for
such a compromise was shattered because the bourgeoisie pieuse could not
restrain the hetestes.
Morocco teaches us that a change is possible. Given the possible
alliances, and if political figures can break free of the traditional culture of
servitude, and above all build a constitutionalist political pact based on the
balances between the political elements of Arab society, then change in other
MENA countries is possible. Indeed, this is the research imperative for the
future. A thorough understanding of these structures, elements, possibilities
and capabilities is strategically important, not only so that the process will be
intelligible, but also, so that we can identify the fields in which it will be
effective.
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The manifestations of political change
Very few commentators doubt the innovative character of some aspects of
the new legislation. Particularly welcome are those changes directly related
to the operation of the political system, or those designed to upgrade the legal
framework governing the economic sector (for example, the business and
labour codes). Three phenomena illustrate the political transformations now
underway in Morocco:
1. the partial involvement of the moderate Islamist movement in the
political arena;
2. the advent of a gouvernement d'alternance, or changeover
government; and
3. the stronger sense of community.
The fact that Islamists were present and actually within the walls of the
Ministry of the Interior the evening of 14 November 1997, was the
crystallizing event of that year's election. It captured the attention of the
international media, who took great pains to analyze the string-pulling by the
regime. Such media also speculated about the new system's chances of
surviving the "green peril" and of refuting the assumption of an Algerian-
style scenario. Very few of them had noted, however, that this was not the
first time the Islamists had taken to the hustings. They were involved in
popular consultations on three previous occasions: the constitutional
referenda of 1992, 1996 and 1997. In 1992 and 1996 they campaigned for the
"yes" side. During the local elections of June 1997 they forced the hand of
their ally, the Mouvement populaire democratique et constitutionnel
(MPDC), and run as candidates with no political allegiance.
During the November 1997 election, the Islamists' participation was
official. For the first time, the authorities recognized the MPDC-Islah axis.
Admittedly, the party was not invited to the various preparatory meetings.
But it did receive its share of public funding: the Ministry of the Interior paid
the first 20% to the MPDC.
A quick survey of the 142 candidates fielded by the MPDC shows a
direct connection with the sociological profile of the entire political class,
particularly the opposition. They are not drawn from a single segment of
society, a new social or occupational category, or a region represented only
by Islamists. Like the Koutla candidates, they are predominantly teachers
(49%) and other professionals (17%). Their average age is over forty. Nearly
all of the Islah members — who accounted for fewer than half of the MPDC
candidates -— ran in urban districts.
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The profiles of the MPDC candidates did not greatly differ from those
of their opponents. However, their political professionalism and
communication skills that were honed by years of religious proselytizing, did
surprise observers.
A statement by Moroccan Prime Minister Youssoufi in the newspaper
Jeune Afrique on the eve of the 14 November election of 1997 intimated"that
the Islamists might be admitted to the very closed circle of the opposition.
This acknowledgment was received with great enthusiasm by the Islamists. It
established their credibility and opened the door to their admittance to the
official political arena. It also enabled them to envisage a range of scenarios
for participation in, and support for, the future government. But it had the
drawback of making them vulnerable to the Sheikh Yacine's faction and
requiring them to adopt a process of constant adjustment. In the universities,
for instance, they had to continue support for Al Adi members and maintain a
hardline political stance. This was the price to be paid for their participation
in order to get Sheikh Yacine's tacit consent— which was only given after
lengthy discussions with his followers.
In that election, the only successful operation was this tightly
controlled integration of moderate Islamism. It was then possible, for a time,
to redirect the attention of Sheikh Yacine and stress the dissension within his
own movement. This does not mean that the Islamist issue is closed. The
existence within the parliamentary precinct may reshuffle the political deck
by requiring the parties to take a clear stand on the proposals that they will
surely propose. The danger is that parliamentarians may be lured into a
holier-than-thou contest.
Beyond the political significance of the 1997 election, there were two
major societal achievements. For the very first time, credibility was given to
a career in politics; secondly, civil society had been reinforced. Prior to 1997,
anyone who became active politically was regarded with suspicion. In fact,
political involvement was considered taboo, and getting involved could
damage a person's career. This negative perception is being corrected. Now,
working in the social and political realm is appealing to people, which is
allowing Morocco to move beyond its former state of chronic
depoliticization. There is no denying the impact of this change on the
emergence and reinforcement of civil society.
Morocco has witnessed many serious hardships during the past several
decades. There was a period of mourning after the "Year of the Gun," when
the government published a list of victims who died during the repression of
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the 1970s. At that time, the government made a solemn commitment to the
rule of law and the defence of civil liberties. In later years, the country has
coped with an environment marked by macroeconomic constraints and
financial weakness — as well as a declared openness to the global economy.
Now, Morocco must meet the simultaneous challenges of population growth
and accelerating urbanization.
Since the late 1980s, NGOs organizations have experienced a
spectacular growth in Morocco. Official documents indicate anything from
17000 to 35000 associations. As well, the attitude of the Moroccan
government towards them has changed. The administration says very
positive things about the benefits of the association movement, which is
recognized as being a clear sign of open democracy in Morocco and of the
vigour of a civil society that is taking shape. A few political NGOs are
having difficulty acquiring legal status. But for the most part, the government
is now relying openly on support from most of these associations, in order to
make progress on a number of ventures. Work is proceeding on a contract
basis in the areas of electrification, highway construction and the like. This
represents a revolution in official thinking that would be hard to overstate.
While not denying the real strength of the association movement, it
does possess inherent limitations; otherwise, it would be easy to subscribe to
the idea of a civil society acting as the alter-ego of the administration. A field
survey quickly reveals the gap between the inventory of NGOs published in
certain studies, and their real operational effectiveness. For example, in the
field of rural development, there are only a few truly active NGOs. Official
announcements cover a wide range of realities. One proposal put forward by
the administration is to form ad hoc associations — such as an irrigation
association — that formalize a partnership with local people and a highly
structured NGO with a direct role in the decision-making process. However,
the latter type of NGO is far from common.
Looking more closely at the NGOs' many manifestations in the
countryside, one is tempted to explain this phenomenon further. It is
important to dissociate between the contractual bond associated with a
citizen and the state's abdication of its own responsibilities as a provider.
Traditional loyalties and modes of organization are being reshaped in the
new political environment, both in the marginal zones and on the periphery
of what might be called the former bled siba.
In conclusion, the unshackling of political life resulting from the
change of government has had an immense impact on the consolidation of
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civil society and upon the networks and communications between
associations. The current government has explicitly demonstrated its desire
for a partnership with the NGOs. On 13 January 1999, the prime minister
received an NGO collective to discuss how to reform the code of civil
liberties, and how to overhaul the rules governing associations. The path for
reform has been prepared by the collective. On the same day, the prime
minister entertained members of an association known as Transparency. For
some years it had been prevented from conducting its full range of activities.
But now it is directly involved in debates on how to introduce new rules that
can simplify governance in Morocco.
The limitations of the Moroccan experience
Political limitations still exist in Moroccan, such that sharing power remains
symbolic. As well, almost by definition, the effects of the experience mean a
slow, albeit reversible transformation of the political culture.
Notwithstanding this, the real challenge facing Morocco and other Arab
countries that are undergoing transition is an economic one.
In the case of Morocco, despite the government's efforts to improve
basic infrastructure, housing, health, and employment, large deficits are
accumulating. Indeed, they are this is accelerating the process of
impoverishment and marginalization.
A quantitative analysis of poverty in Morocco, carried out in 1997 as
part of a study of vulnerable populations (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches
Demographiques 1997) using national survey data on the family (ENF 1995)
and on household living standards (ENNVM 1990/91), showed that today,
the socially marginalized population is estimated at 5.4% of the total
population (1.4 million) and the vulnerability to relative poverty at 47.3% (13
million). Based on a grouping of socioeconomic categories by household
expenditure as compared to a common poverty threshold, this recent study
also sheds significant light on the characteristics of socially marginalized and
vulnerable populations. Deprived of a proper source of income, the socially
marginalized are, by definition, the poor people of Morocco; their sources of
subsistence are unofficial transfers, national welfare and donations.
While analysis of the spatial distribution of poverty shows that it is
predominantly rural, rural/urban marginalization is urban in character: of 10
socially marginalized people, 7 are city-dwellers. Analysis of household
characteristics further reveals that:
• 70.5% of marginalized urban households are headed by a person born
in the countryside;
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• More than one marginalized household in two is headed by a woman,
compared with 15.6% nationally;
• one-third of these heads-of-household are widowed or divorced;
• almost one-in-five marginalized household consists of a person living
alone, versus 3.9% nationally, and almost half are 60 or older; and
• heads of marginalized households have a 100% unemployment rate.
Furthermore, vulnerability to poverty is characteristic of a broad social
stratum, whose living standard or level of consumption approaches the
poverty threshold. Vulnerability to poverty affects one-third of city dwellers
and half the rural population, and the condition is strongly associated with
both an individual's residential surroundings and living conditions.
Vulnerability to poverty in urban environments is characteristic of those
sectors that are most deprived of social and economic infrastructures,
housing projects (50.9%), and former medinas (45.5%) •— as well as both
clandestine (43.5%) and makeshift (43.2%) dwellings.
Furthermore, analysis of social and economic data on vulnerable
households shows that the poor still have limited access to schooling and
family planning, since:
• 62.5% of them are headed by people with no schooling, versus 16.3%
in the wealthiest class; and
• those under 15 years of age represent 2.37 members per household in
vulnerable populations, versus 1.91 for the wealthy class.
Thus, the limitations of Morocco's political experience are known.
They are related to the Arab world with regard to poverty, but other
limitations also exist. These include administrative resistance, bureaucracy,
and a strongly authoritarian culture in the political class. The latter is also
shared, unfortunately, by a large part of society, which possesses a
widespread culture of "servitude" in its social fabric.
The relationship between political change and new development practices
It is very difficult to consider the Moroccan experience as a model of its
kind. Morocco is ranked 123rd (UNDP 1997), but it is difficult to deny that
the country has made symbolic progress on several fronts. After nine months
of socialist government, it can be said that:
• civil society is widely acknowledged as representing special interests
and being capable of contributing to the development process as a full
partner;
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• the Islamist movement has been largely accepted and recognized as
possessing special sensibilities that enrich Moroccan politics;
• there is more political acceptance now, expressed as a recognition of
those great social evils that had been largely suppressed and ignored in
the past. These conditions include poverty, illiteracy, street children,
poor distribution of resources, the drift away from agriculture,
corruption, drugs and the cultivation of cannabis; and
• the political agenda includes the issues of governance, desertification
control, and unemployment among young graduates.
Morocco's political transition is a new dynamic. While it is too early to
evaluate fully, we can make comparisons with the different political roadmap
being followed by other Arab countries, which are getting better results
without following the same route. Tunisia is one such example: it is getting
good economic results and making inroads against poverty. But, it has used a
Singapore-style approach to "resolve" the issue of political freedom.
Nonetheless, it faces a thorny question in the matter of political change.
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4. IDRC current programming concerning employment
and socioeconomic development in the region
Brent Herbert-Copley
Yesterday Nader Fergany talked about the conflicting emotions facing him
and mentioned an optimism of the spirit combined with a pessimism of the
mind. I felt similar, ambivalent feelings listening to the discussions
yesterday. On the one hand, I am optimistic that IDRC is on the right track.
We are addressing some of the key social and economic problems in the
region, whether these are governance and the transition to democracy,
poverty and social exclusion, or problems of employment and enterprise
creation. But at the same time, I admit to having a heavy dose of pessimism,
largely because of a sense that the scale of the problems tends to dwarf the
magnitude of our programs. This should make us humble in approaching a
session like this.
As a former colleague at IDRC once said, "we are optimists and we
will remain optimists to the bitter end."
What I am going to do very briefly is basically three things. First I am
going to talk about some of the broad structural features of IDRC that we
need to keep in mind when we are discussing the current research programs
and possible research entry points. These help to set some of the boundaries
around what IDRC can do — and do well.
Then I want to give a brief portrait of some of IDRC's current
programming in MENA in the social and economic fields. And, finally,
before turning the floor to the rest of you, I will highlight a couple of cross-
cutting issues which I think emerged from the discussions yesterday. We
certainly need to keep these in mind when we consider some of the future
research issues and modalities.
So let me begin with the structural features of IDRC. The first is our
size. We are a small player in comparison to both the magnitude of the
problems facing us and to other sources of funding available to confront
some of these problems. I think it is important to keep that in mind, not as an
excuse, but because the fact of our size has a very great influence on the way
we act. In particular, we have to be strategic in our decisions. We must pick
key issues and key entry points and focus on those. That is why a session like
this is very important. We need to have input from people in the region, in
the scientific community, and in public-policy positions. This means that our
program in the economic and social spheres in MENA is highly concentrated
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in terms of its country-coverage. IDRC's programs have tended to be
concentrated in Egypt, Palestine and, to a lesser degree, in some North
African countries such as Morocco and Tunisia. That is a structural feature to
keep in mind.
A second point is that IDRC has the freedom to experiment with a
range of modalities. It does experiment with different approaches to
providing support to research for development. In the social and economic
sphere in this region, IDRC has given broad institutional support to important
and promising institutions such as the Economic Research Forum and the
Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute. We have supported cross-
country networks, not solely within the region, but also at the global level
where we have thematic networks addressing a particular problem. This is a
modality that IDRC has tended to use quite often in the field of trade and
finance, for example. But most of our support tends to be to individual,
standalone projects — and this will continue to be the dominant modality for
IDRC's operations for the coming years.
A third structural consideration is the highly decentralized nature of
programming at IDRC. By decentralized, I mean not so much decentralized
in terms of our regional presence, but in terms of the autonomy accorded to
programming units within IDRC, each of which make their own decisions
about funding. IDRC's research support is organized around a series of
targeted, thematic program initiatives. Each is focused on a particular
development research problem, and each is managed by a team of
professionals, both in the regional offices and in the head office in Ottawa.
This approach encourages flexibility and experimentation: indeed, these are
its hallmarks. It makes coordinating IDRC's efforts somewhat more
complicated, and we are concerned about this issue. One exception to the
rule is Palestine where, given the scale of our program there, the range of
other actors at work in Palestine, and the complexity of the political situation,
we are looking at ways of producing a more coordinated approach to IDRC's
support, which spans the range of these independent program initiatives.
What are the current areas of research that we are supporting in the field
of social and economic development? Three are currently active in the region.
The first is the field of post-conflict reconstruction where our Peacebuilding
and Reconstruction Program Initiative (PI) is playing an active role. This is
particularly so in Palestine, where the PI is looking at issues such as the
development of democratic institutions, state-civil society relationships, donor
roles in post-conflict situations, refugees and displaced people.
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A second area of IDRC's involvement is economic policy. This
involves not only research on the management of economic policy and
economic policy reform, but also research that examines the impacts of
macro and adjustment policies upon social welfare. One of the current
projects that is worth describing is a project in Morocco. It focused on
understanding the nature of poverty and the nature of transmission
mechanisms between changes in macroeconomic policies and welfare at the
individual and household levels. This project involves two main issues. First,
it monitors poverty in Morocco, to get a better sense of the nature and extent
of poverty in the country; second, it attempts to assess the coherence and
logic of the national social development project which is currently in place.
This involves econometric analysis on the links between growth, poverty,
and equity in the country as well as the development of better household-
level models to assess the behavior, or reactions, of households to changes in
trade and macro policies. Finally, it includes a series of thematic studies
looking at specific questions related to poverty among women, poverty and
the elderly, and the urban and rural dimensions of poverty in Morocco.
The third and final area of research support that I want to mention is
the field of employment and enterprise development. The employment
question was signaled very strongly yesterday as a key issue; indeed, it is an
issue of cross-cutting concern for a number of IDRC's program initiatives.
But it is of particular significance to the group to which I belong, a PI
focused on issues of MSME development.
This PI has a dual focus: on the one hand, it works on the development
and commercialization of technologies for use in MSMEs; on the other hand,
it examines the support environment for MSME development, i.e. the broad
policy and regulatory environments for MSMEs. Our PI concentrates on
three main issues: the nature of support services that are available to small
firms; the effectiveness of different approaches to MSMEs; and the kinds of
best-practice approaches to apply, for financial and non-financial support,
training, marketing, and consulting. An example is a project to establish an
industrial support unit in the West Bank in Palestine. That project involved a
range of sub-sectoral analyses to better-understand the situation of MSMEs.
But it has been also experimenting with a particular method of assisting
MSMEs: setting up a business consultancy center focused particularly on
production issues for MSMEs.
I would like to point out a couple of cross-cutting issues that
particularly struck me in yesterday's discussion. I think these are challenging
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for IDRC and are issues that we cannot ignore— although it is not
immediately apparent how we should deal with them.
The first issue is data and several people mentioned this. One of the
difficulties with good social and economic research is the shortage of data in
key areas. We have supported some work which is geared to improving the
quality and availability of data. But this is clearly a problem that goes beyond
the resources of an organization like IDRC. We must think with our partners
about ways to address that. This is an area IDRC needs to look at, using its
reputation, its credibility — what we in Ottawa call our "convening power."
By this, we mean our ability to bring a variety of players around the table and
look at opportunities to resolve issues — at least in some of the specific areas
where we are involved.
The second issue that struck me is the whole problem of linkages
between the research and policy communities. This is not new; linkages have
been a concern for many years. How can we ensure better utilization of the
research? How can we get better integration between research and policy?
Again, this is an area where we need to experiment. We certainly need to go
beyond the concern of utilizing the results of research once it is finished.
That approach does not work perfectly. Instead, we should be looking for
mechanisms that will bring the policy community into closer contact with
researchers early in the process, at the stage at which problems are identified
and research methods defined. There is clearly a hunger for useful and
credible research on the part of policymakers in a variety of fields. So I do
not think that the issue is a lack of demand — nor necessarily a lack of
supply. The issue is that there are problems associated with getting
appropriate mechanisms that can integrate the supply and demand. We need
to find opportunities for doing just that.
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5. Discussion notes
On socioeconomic development in the Arab world
The propositions raised by Galal Amin were labeled provocative and
controversial. His point on the hegemony of economism was well taken.
However, it was thought that the issue needed differentiation between
economism (which emphasizes a certain brand of economics that
concentrates on the financial aspects of global capitalism and disregards
human issues), and economic approaches (which extend to other fields of
science and include social, human and economic welfare).
The economic work of certain social scientists should be seen as the
convergence of different social-science disciplines. Women's employment,
for example, in Third-World countries as well as in the West, cannot be
restricted to the activities outside the household. This is because women
undertake more economic and social activities inside the home, in the form
of market-oriented or consumption-oriented economic activities. It was also
emphasized that linking corruption to economic calculations, and
demonstrating to decision-makers and other power-holders that corruption
can be costly to governments, can have the beneficial effect of encouraging
these powers to undertake action against corruption. Hence, there can be a
linking, or bridging between research results and policy influence.
On the other hand, the propositions and critics of what Galal Amin
labeled "internationalism" were considered dangerous. For example, drawing
on aspects of women's exploitation in the West does not mean that women
are not exploited in Arab countries. The issue of women's rights in the
MENA region is not necessarily going to be furthered by shielding the region
from Western values. Thus, the issue of human rights was accentuated as
being a universal one.
On MSME development in MENA
There was a general agreement that rigorous and solid research on MSMEs is
lacking. The discussion mainly evolved around the example of Egypt. While
there is substantial information on the financial situation of MSMEs, there are
no evaluation programs to assess success and failure and to determine needed
technical support. For example, small enterprises have been losing capital
because they are not receiving additional investment. This means that
depreciation of cost effectively does away with the present capital. There is
also is a lack of. a clear policy and strategy addressing financial and technical
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assistance, as well as the synchronization of both. The delivery of technical
assistance is of utmost importance, but because of the size of this sector in the
region — and particularly in Egypt — the question of what technical assistance
to provide is important arid demands the economies of scale. Certain solutions,
like incubators, produce good results but are limited in scope and cannot be
used to solve the national issue of the quality of products.
The means whereby autonomous organizations representing MSMEs
can be created and a collective consciousness fostered, which will in turn
support MSMEs in furthering their interests, constitute a critical research
area. An important reason for the isolation of MSMEs is their mode of
operation. But there is also a need for a general political reform to open
avenues that are not necessarily MSME-specific, but that could be used by
them to further their interests. In a related way, the lack of coordination
between NGOs, banks and donors, which are financing the MSMEs, has
been noted as a source of MSME weakness. The need for mechanisms at
country levels, to ensure better understanding and coordination of MSME
programs, and to avoid overlap and duplication, has been underlined.
Finally, there was a debate on whether MSMEs can contribute to solving
unemployment problems. On the one hand it was argued that employment
generation can only be done at the macro-level by increasing the rate of growth
and investments. On the other hand, it was also contended that high rates of
growth are not necessarily conducive to increased employment generation.
There are countries with high growth rates as well as increased poverty. It is
important to focus on the quality of growth and on the quality of investments,
and to factor MSMEs properly into the employment-generation challenge for
this region. This is because big capital is very capital-intensive, and its
activities produce very little employment opportunities. That does not mean
that MSMEs are a panacea. To the contrary, they also constitute a problem and
are particularly poor on productivity. That is why they have to be factored-in
correctly, as part of an overall plan for growth that tries to intertwine small-
scale as well as large-scale activities.
In this regard, it was noted that structural adjustment, or capitalist
restructuring, has added to the plight of MSMEs in many Arab countries. This
is because one of the basic tenants of structural adjustment is that only large
capital can be able to innovate and achieve economies of scale. Accordingly,
over the past 20 years, there has been a clear bias in favor of large capital in
many Arab countries. In turn, this has put MSMEs at a disadvantage. This can
be reversed neither through finance, nor through political reform (such as by
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sharing power). But it can be successful through an integrated, national project
at a country-level that looks at the entire spectrum of empowerment, of
finance, of technical backstopping, and of marketing.
On democratic transitions in Morocco
There was an interesting discussion on the prospects of the repercussion of
the Moroccan democratic experience on its Arab neighbors — a prospect
characterized by a participant as "positive regional neighborhood." In the
case of Morocco, both Southern Europe and the European Community (EG)
in general have acted as positive regional neighborhoods during Morocco's
transition to democracy. Specifically, the neighborhood with Spain has been
very beneficial, because the Spanish (also marginals in Europe), have firmly
believed that developments in Morocco are playing for the strategic, cultural,
and political, interests at their southern gates. They have brought their
expertise into Moroccan elections by way of information technology and the
administration of elections. But most interestingly, this was also paralleled
by exchanges on the Spanish political transition and on experiences with
political compromises. These relations, as well as those with France, have
helped Moroccan socialists to think and appropriate the ideas of dialogue
with different forces, and to engage in the historical compromise that
Morocco is undergoing. It was suggested that Morocco should now reach out
to its Arab neighbors with this experience.
The second set of questions related to Tozy's comment on the cultural
constraints to democracy in the Arab region and the attribution of the
hindered Arab democratic transitions to an authoritarian culture. This was
seen as a reductionist orientalist tendency, paralleling the assessments
regarding Germany 30^0 years ago, or Japan 50 years ago. At that time, it
was felt that these countries could never be democratic because of their
culture. Tozy's argument was that his view on the importance of culture in
democratic transitions is more theoretical and historical than "culturalist." In
Morocco, the democratic transformation has been possible because political
will and interventionism have created an equation between the two dominant
political cultural referentials. That is, between the patriarchal Islamic and
Mediterranean referential on the one hand, and, on the other, the "communal-
tribalist" referential. It is egalitarian, arid participated in the emergence and
consolidation of the political pluralism that dates since independence.
It was questioned whether the heavy Islamic symbolism that the
Moroccan King carries plays a major role in integrating Islamist movements,
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while at the same time facilitating their control. This is a question that is
often asked, even by Islamists, who wonder whether the King furthers or
handicaps their action. It is a complex question and requires that a distinction
is made between political and democratic transitions. On the one hand, there
is the issue of political mobility, of the recomposition of political classes and
of access of new political groups to power; on the other hand, there is the
progressive integration of a democratic culture that respects political
minorities, freedom of association, competence and responsibility, and a
number of other socioeconomic indicators of democratization.
It is important that the King monopolizes the right to interpret religion,
and that he has facilitated the means and the competencies for that. There are
three dimensions to this legitimacy. A charismatic one (and here he joins
other chiefs of state), a geographic legitimacy (descendance of the Prophet),
and the legitimacy of religious interpretation. All this counts, but this is not
the most important thing. There is an important process going on in Morocco
now, and this is a process of political learning, even by the Islamists, who are
undergoing enormous transformations in their political exegesis. They moved
very quickly from what one calls "adab al-mehna" (the literature of Sayyed
Kotb) to an Iqbalist literature. That literature is more political, indigenous,
and while it is centered on the liberty of religious interpretation, above all, it
emphasizes compromise and political pragmatism. This is why the Islamists
have not explicitly questioned the monarchical statue. There have been no
major violent confrontations with Islamists since they started in 1973.
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Natural Resource Management
1. MENA: Environmental issues
Mohamed Kassas
As an introduction, let me propose that if we want to understand the
environment and development problems, we could use a very simple model.
The world lives under the interaction of three very different and complicated
systems which can be illustrated by three interdependent spheres.
1. The first is the biosphere; God's part, nature itself. Observe that this
part is a natural system; its timescale is in billions of years; its space
scales are grand; control is cosmic and beyond human reach. This is
the system which is there and we live with it.
2. The second is the technosphere; this is the system that we build — all
the roads, the factories, the power stations and so forth. This system is
made by human beings and under our control: we can turn the lights on
and off; it's interactive.
3. The third is the social sphere; these are all the socioeconomic, socio-
cultural, and socio-political systems, and these are systems that are
mostly made by human beings. In time scale, it has a past history, lots
of cultural, legal, and constitutional norms. This sphere can be partly
modified by humans; constitutions can be altered, laws can be
changed. But the general structure of the culture is hard to modify.
Development of resources is the net outcome of the interaction
between these three systems. All worldwide environmental problems lie in
either disparities between technologies of the biosphere, or between the
social sphere and the biosphere. This simple model can provide us with a
progressive tool which can help identify the problem we are facing.
Development is the management of the interaction between the three
systems. Sustainable development is the maintenance of a balance between
them. Developed countries are countries that have the indigenous capabilities
of properly managing the interaction between the three, while poor and
developing countries are those that do not indigenously possess the
capabilities for proper management of the interactions.
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The MENA region is part of the Mediterranean realm. But the
Mediterranean is a word with three geographic connotations:
1. A body of water that is 2.5 million km2 in area and 3.7 million km3 in
volume. Environmental issues of the Mediterranean Sea are related to
the considerable volume of pollutants discharged into it and very low
biological productivity. Other water bodies of the MENA region
include the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba.
2. Coastal lands spread across eighteen countries. Environmental issues
of the coastal lands include threats of coastal erosion (especially
alarming in the Nile Delta) and heavy population pressures. The latter
includes extensive urban and recreational center development
(especially significant in the Egyptian and Tunisian coastal lands).
Coastal areas of the region also include a number of internationally
important wetland sites (under the Ramsar Convention).
3. The prevalence of a Mediterranean climate. The MENA region lies in
the southern section of the Mediterranean and is part of the world
drylands (arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid climates). Recurrent
drought (failure of rainfall) is an inherent attribute of the climate in the
region, which threatens rain-fed farming and rangeland productivity.
A number of environment and development issues in the MENA
countries are confined within national territories, while being common
throughout the region. Issues such as population— demography, human
settlement — urbanization, wastes and effluents, and environmental hazards
are much better-addressed at the national level. On the other hand, other
environmental issues span national, regional, and even global spheres. Some
lend themselves to national action plans, which have a regional impact on
elements such as marine environments, climate, and common natural
resources.
Regarding the marine environment, a number of regional conventions
and treaties have been signed, aiming at fostering regional collaboration for
the conservation of resources and biodiversity. The Barcelona Convention
was signed in 1976, and a number of programs and protocols were developed
to protect the Mediterranean. Countries of the Gulf region (Kuwait
Convention, 1978) and of the Red Sea (Jeddah Convention, 1982) set similar
plans of action. In 1990 the World Bank, UNDP, and the European Bank for
Development established a regional program called Mediterranean
Environmental Technical Assistance Program (METAP) to support national
environmental programs in countries of the Mediterranean.
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Now I would like to address two issues of major concern for the
region, in areas where no regional plans exist: water and climate change.
1. Water. This issue is the talk of the day. The volume of all the Earth's
water is 1.4 billion cubic km, 97% of which is salt water that is
unusable in agriculture. Only 3% is fresh water, and almost all of it is
in two forms: either ice or deep groundwater. Water stored in ice is
estimated at around 22 or 23 million cubic km, while groundwater is
also at around 22 million. All the water in the world's rivers only
amounts to 50 thousand cubic km. All the water that is withdrawn by
human beings for their use represents only four thousand cubic km.
Egypt's share of this is 55.5 cubic km.
So, what needs to be pointed out is that the water we use
comprises no more than a single drop of the total water on Earth.
Hence, we must examine how can we turn this one drop to two drops.
In other words, the water we are using is less than 0.001% of
Earth's total water. How can we increase this to 0.002%? If we can do
that, then we could irrigate the 40% of the earth's surface which is
currently unproductive and could feed the world. How can that be
done? We have three options.
Firstly, we must develop economic technologies for desalinating
water. We need to use some of the water in the oceans. I often tease
my American friends by saying that the last great American president
was H.S. Truman. Why? Because he was the only one who
appropriated $15 million to do work on desalination of water; after him
no-one else has done so.
Secondly, can we use some of the ice? There was an experiment
funded and supported by Prince Mohamed El Faisal, along with some
French involvement, on towing icebergs from the seven oceans across
Saudi Arabia. Although this experiment did not work, it is worth
looking into it and repeating.
Thirdly, regarding the 22 million cubic km of groundwater, we
need to investigate how we can pump this water because most of it is
deeply seated and not under artesian pressure. If we pump water using
classical energy sources, it is not economically viable. We need to
develop science and technology to address these issues. How do we
desalinate for economically viable agriculture? Can we utilize ice?
How do we develop pumping schemes to utilize this water on a sound
economic basis? I would like to say to everybody here that the
technologies I am talking about are considerably less complicated than
sending a man to the moon and bringing him back.
2. Climate change. We know that the world's concern about climate
change has evolved during the last two decades. We now have a
number of programs and conventions in place at the global level, such
as the International Framework Convention on Climate, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and a World
Climate Program under the leadership of WMO, UNEP, and ICSU. All
these encourage national programs to perform climate studies with
three principal components: the science of climate, the likely impacts
of climate change (interactions of climate, environment, and society),
and policy options and mitigation measures to cope with impacts of
climate change.
A point I want to make is that none of the above programs
allocates any priority to the study of climate and climate change in the
MENA region, despite their importance for livelihood and
development. We do not have drought-mitigating programs, which is
difficult to understand in a region typified by recurrent droughts and
where it's essential to manage this natural hazard. To do this we would
need to develop three programs:
a) an early-warning system;
b) a societal preparedness system; and
c) an insurance system helping people to tide over the catastrophes.
While the last two programs are essentially national in nature,
early drought-warning systems cannot be done at the national level.
This is because data requirements for early-warning systems of about
three-to-four months are dependent on the teleconnection of climatic
systems worldwide. An example of the importance of climatic
teleconnections is provided by the apparent relation between ENSO
(phenomena in the southern oceans) and climatic anomalies (including
drought and floods) in various parts of the world. The MENA region,
therefore, needs to link with global programs in order to obtain the
tools required so that early warnings of drought can be given.
Egypt offers a good example of vulnerability of the region to
climate change. First, its water balance is precariously maintained, and
its water revenue— mainly from the River Nile — is brought a long
way, mostly from the Ethiopian highlands (83%). Second, its intensive
agriculture within the limited river oasis (only 4% of the total area) is
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wholly dependent on climate systems. Because these are temperature
controlled, any change in climate could have a far-reaching impact on
agriculture. Contrary to other countries of the region, Egypt is
concerned with the climate of Ethiopia rather then MENA because that
country is its water source. At present, information available through
global circulation models does not tell us what will happen in the year
2050. Some of the models say that in that year, rainfall in Ethiopia will
be 70% less than today. This would be the most destructive catastrophe
that could happen to Egypt. Third, a principal part of the inhabited
territories of Egypt is the Nile Delta, a low-lying alluvial plain with its
coastal parts already under threat of marine erosion. The Delta and its
adjoining parts of coastal land on the west side (south and southeast of
the city of Alexandria) and on its east side (north and northeastern
parts of the Sinai Peninsula) are particularly vulnerable to what is
considered a probable rise in sea level. Fourth, population increase of
some 1.3 million persons per year means that some 400 000 jobs are
required every year. Impacts of climate change on national economies,
already strained, could be damaging. Fifth, energy has become a
common denominator of all aspects of economic and societal activities.
Impacts of likely global warmth on the national energy demand could
be notable. Again, means of coping with the increase of greenhouse
gases (national contribution to world mitigation actions) relate to both
national policies and management of energy use.
Continuing this example, an Egyptian national climate program
might comprise the following components:
• Scientific studies aimed at providing baseline data (such as direct
meteorological data, relevant information related to river flow);
the assessment of natural, temporal, and spatial variables; and
understanding the atmospheric reactions and dynamics related to
regional phenomena. The objective should be to develop
regional climate models that could be interrelated with available
global circulation models (GCMs). This may be a tool for
forecasting likely climate change in the region.
» Impact studies need to address four principal sectors: agriculture,
water, energy, and sea-level rise. It may also address issues of
how society and economics are affected.
• Agriculture research should give special attention to two issues:
temperature-related processes, for example, distribution of crops
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along the north-south axis of Egypt, seasonal distribution of
crops within the cropping rotation, and the timing of certain
husbandry practices; and rainfall-related processes, especially in
the coastal region.
• Water resource research has a four-part thrust. Because it is the
principal source of water, the Nile River must be studied. Also
relevant for this study, however, are the underground resources
and the contribution of rainfall (which is modest at the national
level but is a significant source in the coastal belt of the
Mediterranean). Water balance, as related to likely changes in
evaporation potential (that is, loss of stored water in the Aswan
High Dam Lake) or in evapotranspiration (water consumption by
crops), will be an element of special importance in the study.
• Energy research would examine the likely impacts of climate
change on energy use (consumption) and production (hydro,
solar, or wind). Other aspects of energy-climate studies include
assessment of greenhouse gases.
• Sea-level rise has not been researched properly since a joint
study, Vulnerability Assessment to Accelerated Sea-Level Rise,
Case Study— Egypt, was published by the Coastal Research
Institute (Egypt) and Delft Hydraulics and Resources (The
Netherlands) in 1992. It should be updated.
All these studies would provide baseline information to address
the impacts of climate change on economics and societal conditions.
Agriculture, water, energy (including industry and transport), plus sea-
level rise are components of the life-support systems — that is, the
bases of economic development and management of the human
environment. Result of this work would assist in the preparation of
programs for mitigation measures, and outline policy options to be
presented to policymakers in Egypt. They are a first step towards
setting a national plan of action for the management of effects of
climate change. Almost none of these R&D activities are currently
being performed in Egypt — or any other countries of the region. All
lack the financial and technical means to develop this kind of work. I
think it would be very useful if we could have a small group of people
sit together and consider how to develop a climate study program
within the region on these two aspects: early warning of drought and
climate change.
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2. IDRC current programming in environment and natural
resources management in the region
David B. Brooks
Those of you who are familiar with IDRC know that the organization
possesses a long, proud history of support for research on environment and
natural resources management. At IDRC, programming in this and other
fields is organized in a decentralized manner. We have 12 Program
Initiatives (Pis), which are problem-oriented development research priorities,
each managed by a multi-disciplinary team. Half of those Pis focus on
environment and natural resources management, but two of the six do not
work in this region: one focuses on Asia; the other on Latin America. In all,
IDRC has four Pis that are active in MENA. I will list them, and then give
some examples of the kinds of research they support.
The four Program Initiatives active in the MENA region are:
1. Cities Feeding People;
2. Sustainable Use of Biodiversity;
3. Ecosystem Approaches to Human Health (Ecohealth); and
4. People, Land and Water.
Item 4 is particularly active in this region and devotes nearly half its
resources to MENA. It is also the one in which I work when I am not
managing the larger program, so I will naturally have a little more to say
about it.
Typical IDRC-funded projects exhibit two characteristics: policy
orientation and participatory management. To one degree or another, you
will find elements of each in almost all projects. Policy Orientation means
that projects have some linkage to policy change; that is, they are designed
from the start to affect how policy is made or implemented. We do not want
IDRC-funded research to languish on the shelf. However, policy can be
widely interpreted. For instance, it does not necessarily mean national policy;
it may local policy, revised programming— or even a new institutional
framework. The important point is that the projects be designed from their
inception to make a difference for people.
Participation is the other common characteristic. In most cases, this
means that projects have a community base. Questions have been raised as to
whether all projects must be participatory in all parts and the answer is, not
necessarily. Some aspects of research are not amenable to participation,
although many parts are. In these, IDRC insists on ensuring that local people
are consulted and in particular, disadvantaged groups and women who are all
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too often left out of research planning. In short, some projects are aimed at
higher policy levels, and have less participation; others are aimed more
locally and have more. Few projects are totally devoid of both elements.
Now I will return to the four Pis and offer some examples of their
work. The first PI is Cities Feeding People, which is a fancy way of saying
urban agriculture. When that PI was started, the most important issue was
convincing people that there is such as thing as urban agriculture. This effort
has succeeded. IDRC took on work that was little known, and found itself on
the cutting edge. As a result, IDRC has - along with a couple of other donor
agencies - now ensured that urban agriculture is widely recognized as a
major part of the development agenda.
For climatic and geographic reasons, urban agriculture may not play so
large a role as it does in other regions. An example of this is some sub-
Saharan African cities where 35% to 40% of the food eaten in the cities is
grown within what can broadly be defined be considered the urban area. Still
there are opportunities to expand urban agriculture in MENA. Here Cities
Feeding People focuses on the re-use of waste products to support local food
production. In some cases, the projects focus on solid waste, but more often
the projects involve wastewater. The PI is particularly interested in research
on the re-use of "gray-water," which is a handy term that means all domestic
wastewater except that which comes from the toilet. The advantage of using
gray-water is that it is possible to reclaim 80% of the water, while avoiding
contacting with 90% of the disease vectors (most of which are found in
"black water" from the toilet). Thus, it is much more appropriate for
neighbourhood or community reclamation systems. Naturally, it is possible
to reclaim black water too, but there must be so many controls imposed, and
such careful maintenance of the systems, that we believe it is inappropriate
for local use. We already have a few gray water research projects, and we are
looking for more.
The second PI is Sustainable Use of Biodiversity (SUB), which looks
primarily at farm or household use of plant materials, and particularly at plant
materials that are either being over-harvested or that can be processed locally
in order to increase their value. In many cases, plants with medicinal value or
that contain essential oils are gathered in open fields or in nearby forests. But
once such materials acquire value, they tend to be harvested too heavily and
they can be eradicated from the region. SUB looks for ways by which
production and conservation can go hand-in-hand, by encouraging the use of
home gardens, for instance. The PI also supports research that will identify
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value-adding opportunities that can be incorporated into local production
methods. This creates a linkage to the discussion of SMEs, which is another
IDRC Program Initiative, but one that is discussed in a different session.
Earlier on, a point was made about need for linkages between
researchers in MENA and those in other regions. In this PI, we are doing
exactly that. SUB has created a network of researchers working on the
protection, production, and processing of naturally based medicinal plants.
They focus on ways to create incentives to promote both production and
conservation at the same time. By this very process, the PI also identifies
research that can ensure that property rights to those plants remain in the
hands of local communities. This work on traditional knowledge and
indigenous property rights is very important for MENA, and it should have
high priority for distribution in Arabic language publications. I am afraid that
IDRC has been guilty of neglecting Arabic as a research language. Much of
our work is trilingual - English, French and Spanish - but we can and ought
to take steps to become quadralingual by publishing more in Arabic.
The third PI, Ecosystem Approaches to Human Health (or Ecohealth
for short) is just starting to become active in MENA, and so far there are not
very many such projects. The term has a special meaning; its objective is to
improve or protect human health by focusing on disease vectors that come
through the ecosystem. Therefore, one could say that the objective function is
human health but the field of operations is the ecosystem. In this region,
Ecohealth will work primarily on intensive agriculture and on urban
environments. For example, a joint Palestinian-Israeli project examined a
range of substances found in the shared environment: dioxins, pesticide
residues, radioactive wastes, and lead. The sources and the impacts were
identified, and appropriate policy changes designed. The project also has a
strong community linkages because it is important to study the best ways to
make people aware of problems such as lead or dioxins in the air, that are
otherwise invisible to them. It is equally important to research ways to bring
the views of those people to the attention of appropriate authorities.
Finally, the fourth PI is People, Land and Water (PLAW), the one in
which I work. It has two broad areas of emphasis: food and water security.
Both are critical issues for MENA because of its fragile environment, plus
both scanty and poorly distributed rainfall. Many of the comments made in
previous sessions of this workshop have focused explicitly or implicitly on
these same two issues. Indeed, many of the participants in this workshop are
involved in PLAW projects.
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A typical FLAW project on food security is represented by a study of
irrigated agriculture in Palestine. Undertaken by the Applied Research
Institute of Jerusalem under Jad Ishaq, this study looked at the technical,
physical and socio-economic aspects of raising crops in different parts of the
West Bank. Similarly, Dr. Shady Hamadeh of the AUB in Beirut is studying
a region in northeastern Lebanon where active land-use changes are
underway in response to higher values for stone fruit. As a result, something
like an enclosure movement is occurring whereby land that was formerly
open to all for pasture is now being converted to orchards. This represents
not only economic change but also a social and cultural one. In a third
example, mountain terraces are very common in Yemen, where they create a
very productive but very fragile form of humanly modified ecosystem.
Researchers in Yemen are studying why these terraces have deteriorated in
recent years, and how that deterioration affects men and women differently.
They are also trying to identify policies and technologies to ensure that the
terraces are maintained. As you can see, much of our work in this area
focuses on uplands.
Turning now to projects on water security, we are particularly hopeful
about the new network to support research on water demand management.
This is one of the few really good options designed, in effect, to increase the
supply of water in MENA. The work in MENA has only just started, but
FLAW projects are so exciting that groups in southern Africa (which shares
many of the climatic and geographic conditions of MENA) are trying to
create a similar network.
In summation, most of PLAW's work on water security falls into one
of four sub-topics:
1. water demand management;
2. use of water of marginal quality (as with saline water);
3. alternative local water supply sources (as with water harvesting); and
4. institutional development (as with water user associations).
Despite centuries of work, there remain huge gaps in our knowledge of
water, particularly the appropriate instruments to manage transboundary
water. We also need much more research on appropriate means for
groundwater or aquifer management. Here I can point to another Palestinian-
Israeli project focusing on joint management of the mountain aquifer. Work
related to the notion of bi-national management of aquifers is barely
explored, so IDRC-funded research is on the cutting edge. Indeed, this
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research is being observed by policy makers and researchers in far less
contentious situations than that of Palestinians and Israelis.
In conclusion, IDRC has an active global program in support of local
researchers wishing to study environment and natural resources management.
Nowhere is that program so active and so needed as in the MENA region.
3. Discussion notes
The presentations of Mohamed Kassas and David Brooks triggered lively
discussions around the issues of water, biodiversity, and research support.
Water: The question of water desalination provoked a number of
observations from the floor. Although desalination of brackish water is more
economically feasible than of seawater, it still remains quite expensive for
the region. Energy cost is a major problem, and economic alternatives to
traditional fuel sources are still unavailable. Participants argued that
technology innovations in this area are slow and that a breakthrough could
take up to two generations.
Researchers suggested other approaches to increasing water supply, in
particular, through rainwater harvesting, a technology used since time
immemorial in the region. They stressed that 70% or more of rainwater is
lost through evaporation and could be used for agricultural purposes, animal
drinking, or recharging groundwater. One participant reminded the floor that
some countries, such as Israel, are able to manipulate rainfall through
cloudseeding and increase the precipitation rate by 15%. He stressed that a
15% increase in a country like Egypt would shift rainfall from 250 to 300
mm, thus converting a good part of the country from arid to semi-arid.
Another possibility, some argued, would be through the utilization of
brackish water which, is plentiful in a number of countries in the Arab
region, for irrigation purposes and the development of saline-resistant crop
varieties.
However the main arguments centered around the need to focus on
curbing the demand for water. This is an increasingly important difference,
rather than on increasing supply. Because the latter is finite and expensive to
increase, research on how to better-manage the limited water resources of the
region is key. This can be done through improved water conservation,
intersectoral water reallocations, water costing, and by using water more
efficiently for all purposes, but in particular, for agriculture, which uses the
lion's share of the water resources in the region. The combination of technical
as well as economic, social, institutional, and legal tools are required.
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Although all participants recognized the importance of reducing the
demand for water, some argued that demand management would not suffice
to cover the needs of the increasing population. The example of Egypt was
provided. Currently all available water-— including the reuse of waste-
water— is used to irrigate about 3.4 million acres of land. Plans for the
future are to increase irrigated areas to 7 million acres, almost doubling the
current agricultural lands, through watersaving and reuse. However, when
these projects are completed, the land will only provide for the food needs of
an extra 3 million people, while the population is expected to increase by 27
million.
A number of remarks were made highlighting the linkage between
poverty and water. In the area of water-demand management, one participant
reminded the audience that some options, such as water pricing, could have
negative impacts on poor segments of the population.
A number of participants also raised the point that the water issues of
the region were not limited to quantity, but include quality. Naturally-
occurring saline water in aquifers, for example, are quite common in the
region, and in some countries represent the only groundwater resource
available. Because of poverty, poor-quality water is used for crop production
with very negative environmental impacts, such as loss of soil fertility —
and, in some extreme cases, loss of agricultural land — and further increases
in water ^salinity. Also widespread in the region are increasing problems of
water sanitation and pollution, which cause important health problems,
particularly in rural areas.
The link between environment and poverty was also stressed as
participants noted that the poor are the ones who suffer the most during
droughts. They suggested that it was essential to secure minimal water
requirements for their and their animals' survival. This could be done, for
example, by providing water rights to landless farmers.
Concerns were raised about the fact that, despite their importance in
mitigating drought and in supplementing rainfall for agricultural production,
groundwater resources are poorly documented in the region. Participants
stressed that aquifers were being over-exploited and hence were degrading at
extremely fast rates. Examples were given of situations where aquifers were
completely depleted and where whole villages had to be abandoned. There is
little knowledge about the legal, institutional, economic, and social aspects of
underground water management, both at the national and the international
levels. While centralized state management has failed in protecting these
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resources, there is very little knowledge about alternative models, such as
community-based water management. In countries where these new
approaches have been implemented, like Tunisia and Morocco, recent studies
have indicated that management was very inefficient on both counts of water
availability and quality.
Biodiversity: On the issue of sustainable use of biodiversity, participants
highlighted the fact that intellectual property rights did not receive much
attention in MENA. This is despite the fact that the region is the center of
origin of a number of important agricultural and medicinal plants. In
addition, they expressed worries about the increasing tendency towards
monoculture of several crops in the region, and the loss of large numbers of
sources of biodiversity, both in cultivated and wild species.
Research management: A number of issues regarding research management
were raised, similar to those discussed earlier in the document, and
particularly on the question of water-data availability and quality. Also
addressed was the issue of the timeframe of projects, and that full stakeholder
participation plus an integrated approach require appropriate time duration.
Related to this, participants discussed the difficulty of introducing complex
research frameworks such as those involved in multi-disciplinary and
participatory research within their institutional frameworks. A note was made
of the helpfulness of IDRC's open-door policy on choice of research topics,
capacity-building in research, and data-building, -sharing, and -interaction.
This page intentionally left blank 
Chapters.
Information and Communication Technologies
1. Information and telecommunication technologies in the MENA
SherifReda Hashem
In the last decade, there have been several national and international
initiatives to empower and support the spread of the IT revolution in the
MENA. Despite the recent development and growth of IT societies in this
region, there are still a number of key issues influencing the wide adoption
and utilization of information and telecommunication technologies (ICTs).
Today I will briefly summarize the current status of ICTs in MENA, and then
highlight some of the key issues and challenges in terms of R&D activities.
When speaking about ICTs, we are referring to a whole spectrum of
merging technologies within the last thirty — but especially the last ten —
years: communications, networking, and multimedia technologies. What has
emerged is the creation of what we call the "information society" — people
who use these technologies to communicate and exchange information over
this information infrastructure. And the Internet, as a medium in itself, has
attracted much interesting research on its different aspects. As our target is
the information society, I will not focus here on the technological aspects of
this revolution, but there are some aspects to highlight briefly.
The tremendous revolution in communication networking that has
happened with the establishment of the Internet has produced a widely
acceptable network where people address each other on specific,
predetermined routes and exchange information freely. The resulting new
satellite technology as a medium for that communication is now becoming
widely available. The invention of portable, mobile, and cellular phones, plus
the integration of telephone and computer technology, provide networks that
can accommodate the exchange of data at high speeds. This is often a very
attractive option for the exchange of information between people who are
remotely located from one another. We are, for instance, talking about a
medium that allows for the exchange of an entire encyclopedia from one
place to another anywhere in the world — and in less than a second.
These technologies have tremendous impact on, and implications for,
how we position ourselves in the MENA region. It effects how we think
about archives, about the business sector, and about school systems. Its
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impact on education is particularly profound: rote learning, for example,
versus teaching for inquisitive, lifetime learning— whether it be primary
education or university research. This is a major challenge for educators.
I work as an assistant professor at Cairo University and as a consultant
at a regional information, technology, and software engineering centre. How
should we prepare course materials for university students? How can we
make use of this technology if it is available? These are challenges in
themselves and, in addition, they require training for instructors, mobilization
of financial resources to allow students to access these technologies, and all
sorts of revolutionary changes in the systems themselves. In addition, new
businesses are emerging— information and network services providers —
and I will talk later about the importance of their presence in supporting this
revolution within our region.
What we are seeing when we address the issues of ICTs is a whole
spectrum of tens of thousands of networks and computers linked together.
This concept is revolutionary and, coupled with multimedia aspects, we are
now talking not merely about exchanging text, or images, or even video
clips, but of the integration of all this, plus more. There is, for example, a
group researching how to transmit of the sense of smell and touch over the
Internet. All of these technologies that were unavailable before. What will
happen as they become available? What will happen for a merchant selling
textiles, or perfumes, when these technologies are in place?
These revolutions are opening up a whole spectrum of potential
applications for the community. They are creating the global village, where
once you are connected to the network, you are connected to everybody,
regardless of time and space differences. Research has found that people are
more open to exchanging e-mails with superiors and other key people than
using other means of communication. From the business point of view, we
have seen the creation of global service-providers, whether in information
service-provision, or networking and communication service provision.
These are reshaping the command-information industry all over the world.
You can be sure that this global aspect will have tremendous impact on our
local or regional companies.
The status quo of the telecommunication infrastructure
The present status of the telephone communication infrastructure in Africa is
such that the entire continent, with over 12% of the world's population, has
only 2% of the world's telephone lines. There are, in fact, more telephone
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lines in New York City or Tokyo than in the whole of Africa. The situation
in the Middle East is very similar. In sub-Saharan Africa the teledensity —
the number of telephone lines per 100 individuals — is 0.5, that is, one
telephone line for every two hundred persons. In Egypt it is 9 per 100,
whereas the USA and Europe stand at 65 and 45. The cost of local calls in
Africa— and to a great extent in all of MENA— is also tremendously
higher: users are charged by the minute for each call. In the USA, users are
not time-charged, but they pay a monthly rate. In parts of Europe, such as
Germany, where they have a fee for local calls, users think about the time
they take to link to networks, and this might hinder the process of adapting to
and adopting these technologies. Clearly the cost of networking affects the
extent of consumer use.
If we want to extend connectivity within Africa, what would it require?
The World Bank estimates that the cost of bringing the teledensity rate in
sub-Saharan Africa to 10 lines per 100 population (a level already surpassed
by large parts of Latin America) would require the installation of 50 million
new lines, representing an investment of US $50 billion. Obviously this
money would be quite apart from the funding of ICTs. Perhaps one of the
most promising opportunities for overcoming this funding challenge in
telecommunications infrastructure in Africa lies in recent satellite technology
developments. In addition, cellular telephone services are now available in
most countries in Africa and the Middle East, covering capital cities and
some secondary towns. However, the cost is still far more expensive than in
the developed world.
The status quo of Internet access
Recent surveys reveal that almost all countries in the Middle East and Africa
have established some form of public access to the Internet, at least in capital
cities. The only exceptions are Libya, Eritrea, Somalia, and Iraq. Worldwide,
there are an estimated 276 million Internet users,89 of which only about 2.5
million are in Africa and 1.3 million in the Middle East. Excluding South
Africa and Israel from these figures leaves less than two million Internet
users in the rest of Africa and the Middle East. Internet users are defined as
people who have access to the Internet whether they have Internet accounts
of their own, share accounts, or use accounts at libraries, universities, or
Internet cafes. Moreover, Internet services are still largely confined to capital
89 Source: Archived at http://www.nua.com/ (February 2000).
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cities and major towns, in contrast with more developed countries. This does
not provide local access for most of the population, 70-80% of which reside
in rural areas. In spite of recent progress, the Middle East and Africa remain
far behind the developed world in terms of Internet connectivity and usage.
An estimated 1 in 2-10 people use the Internet in North America and Europe
compared to 1 in 825 in Africa, excluding South Africa. Even South Africa,
with an Internet utilization rate of 1 in 25, is below the world average of 1 in
22. Currently, there are more than 400 Internet service providers in Africa,
with South Africa leading again at more than 100 of those, and Egypt
representing only about 55 of those providers. Clearly the numbers speak to
the problem.
As to who these users are and what type of usage they are making of
the Internet, in the Middle East, North Africa, and Africa we find a spectrum
including business people trading, exchanging commodities, and looking for
new markets; professionals; health care personnel; travel agencies;
environmentalists; researchers; educators; students; and the general public. A
recent survey by Internet Arab world magazine found that the average age of
Internet users in the Arab world is twenty-nine, seven years younger than the
average age in the USA. Although it is good that Arab youth are accessing
the Internet, the number indicates that we do not have enough decision-
makers or even middle-managers using the Internet compared to the USA
and other developed countries. Furthermore, the survey found that only 4%
of respondents were women, the rest being educated males.
These numbers are frightening. We hope we are not creating areas of
inequality within society— whether of age, gender, education, or other.
While I was very pleased with the launching of the global infrastructure
commission in Washington, D.C., in 1995, people saw the Internet and
information technology revolution as a chance for the developing world to
leap forward into the future. Actually, what we are seeing is what we feared:
it might be widening the gap between the "haves" and "have nots." We must
be very careful to address this issue when doing research regarding ICTs.
Challenges for the road ahead
There are several reasons for the inadequate telecommunications
infrastructure and lack of public access to the Internet including political,
regulatory, financial, technical, social, and cultural issues. In addition to
access issues, there are valid concerns regarding the scarcity of local content
and regional information exchange, resulting from limited computer and
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information literacy within the population, insufficient computer penetration
in various social and economic sectors, inadequate access to national
information, lack of comprehensive national archives and databases, and skill
shortage.
Empowering the local community to interact effectively with the rest
of the world while preserving culture and traditions is one of the first
challenges we face. Innovative solutions to access, like technology-access
community centres and telecentres being established through cooperative
efforts between international organizations (UNDP, ITU, IDRC, UNCTAD,
and World Bank) can play vital roles in leveraging resources, and providing
wide access to IT and the Internet to the general public. Open access —
regardless of age, gender, or educational barriers — must be addressed.
The fact that there is not enough content within the African continent
and the Arab region, not to mention the problem of Arabic language content,
is a large challenge. Countries need to be very active in creating local content
in their own language. This will help people to use the Internet more
extensively for their own development within the regional and national
context. The development of useful local and regional information content
requires mobilizing resources to overcome obstacles like language and
cultural barriers. Critical sectors where information content needs to
developed include commerce, trade, industry, small and medium-sized
enterprises, healthcare, education, tourism, culture, public services, the
environment, and agriculture.
The culture surrounding the use of the Internet is an issue. Are users
exchanging e-mail, accessing information from the West, or exchanging
information? Numbers from local Internet service providers tell us most of
the traffic is in e-mail exchange. Provision must be made for adequate
training and technical assistance to enable users to incorporate these
technologies within their lines of work. Greater ICT use opens the way to so
many more options for professionals, from physicians being able to make use
of teleconsultation to travel agencies being able to monitor their packages
more efficiently and competitively. There is, too, the negative impact of the
protective culture around information sharing — the mindset of "this is my
data; I will not share." We should have within the national initiatives
something similar to regulations I have seen in the developed world — that
information needs to be open and shared.
And then there is the inadequate awareness of the potential impact of
ICTs among all sectors of society. Here is one example: I was disappointed
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that in Ramadan City, one of the newly industrialized cities in Egypt with
about a thousand manufacturing facilities and a turnover of roughly EGP 13
billion a year, most people do not know how to use the Internet or IT in their
lines of work. They are isolating themselves from the rest of the world and
there is the potential for them to be invaded or replaced by other
manufacturers. By adopting this technology in just one sector — software
production— India was able to export more than $2 billion worth of
software in 1998. This industry does not require a lot of oil or other sources
of energy.
Training is needed to address the shortage of IT professionals within
the region. That deficit, even within the USA, translates into a disadvantage
in moving to a developing country, and results in a drain of local, skilled
professionals to the developed world where they are offered better salaries,
benefit packages, opportunities, as well as working and living standards.
Cost is a big barrier in the developing world, where international
communication is perceived as a way of subsidizing other services. The fact
that we have a much higher cost for ICT access compared to the rest of the
world is a significant problem. In Africa, the average cost of Internet dial-up
service is four times that of the USA, not counting such issues as difference
in income levels. We need to address the financial issue and convey the
message that it really is a development tool; a tool to support economic and
social development. Increasing Internet accessibility for the community at an
affordable price, plus securing sufficient financial resources both from
government and private sectors to sustain ongoing development, is required.
One of the key problems has to do with the privatization of this sector
and the lack of national policies and initiatives that place enough emphasis to
ICTs. Internet connectivity varies from country-to-country depending on its
political system and what the basic infrastructure will allow. Usually the
problem is addressed within different ministries or at different levels of
government. What we need to do is something similar to what has been done
in the USA and other countries with a national policy. We need a national
initiative that highlights ICTs as a key technology, and crucial basic building
blocks, for national development. Legislative issues present one of the most
important challenges as Internet services have been commercially deployed
while the legal framework and model for government/private sector
partnership have not yet been completely worked out. Internet security and
protection of individual privacy need also to be addressed.
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High taxation of computer hardware and software, a problem which
some countries have solved, has resulted in missed opportunity. Not enough
people are being trained because of the prohibitive cost of the technology. As
a result, many countries lost the opportunity when the window was there and
now need to catch up quickly. Incentives, even subsidies, rather than
taxation, will allow people to buy the needed technologies for inclusion in
the global network.
The low emphasis on adopting modern information technology tools in
the educational systems needs to be remedied — not just the introduction of
computers in classrooms, but also the integration into the school curricula
and the training of teachers. I have read articles evaluating Egypt's
experience with computer education that discovered that students are not
interested because it doesn't translate into grades.
The limited use of computer systems in public administration and
government systems means, among other things, that as government systems
penetrate everywhere, the potential extent of reach is tremendous, whereas at
present it's limited.
To conclude, it is clear for the newly established information societies
in the region that the IT revolution still has a long way to go. National and
regional initiatives such as the African Information Society Initiative (AISI),
supported by the UNESA (Cogburn 1997), can be vital in outlining important
issues, raising awareness, and hopefully in proposing solutions and action
plans to implement such solutions. In addition, there is a lot to be gained
from cooperation and exchange of experiences and expertise across borders
with the rest of the world, especially with the existence of regional
organizations and forums that can support such cooperation and cross-
fertilization.90
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2. IDRC current programming in information
and communication technologies
RenaldLafond
IDRC has been involved for over 25 years in information and communication
using a variety of some ICTs. I recall the microfiches, then the introduction
of the microcomputers, and now we have CD-ROM. But in 1994-95, when
we started developing our programs, we made a broad consultation,
particularly in Asia, to find out what was the number one priority in
information and communication. The answer was very clear — access to the
Internet and use of Internet technology. That is how the Pan Asia Network
(PAN) program was established, first in Asia, and later by its introduction in
Latin America. In parallel, we have introduced another program in sub-
Saharan Africa to respond to the particular needs of that region.
The objective of the PAN program is to help researchers and research
institutions in developing countries to use Internet technologies for
networking and for order applications. We identified more-or-less four areas
where research was necessary: the aspect of connectivity, content, and
communication. The fourth involves a number of issues related to the
introduction of the Internet; we call it "collaborative research" because at
stake are issues relevant to several regions.
In the area of connectivity, we noted that several countries in Asia — the
least-developed countries —• did not present any initial potential for investment
by the private sector. The reason was that the institutional base was small,
there were relatively few enterprises, and it was very difficult to sustain access
to the Internet. So we had to proceed very slowly, first by the introduction of
e-mail to build capacity at the national level, in order to sustain a system and
develop a market for Internet use later on. Second, we financed it through
another donor, as was the case in Mongolia. Now we have done that in Laos,
Cambodia, Mongolia, and, more recently, Bhutan. This part is over and we are
now looking at Internet access in more remote areas. For instance, we now
have a project in Pakistan where the Internet has been introduced in remote
areas. Another, in the southern part of the Philippines, builds on a telephone
infrastructure recently put in place with the assistance of CIDA in Canada. And
we have other examples in India, the Amazon, and Ecuador to see how Internet
access can be sustained in such regions.
As was said yesterday, content is perhaps the most important
requirement. We have been helping several institutions to build content, but
particularly to build novel applications via the Internet. One example is in the
sale of publications. We have supported several information centers in the
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past and several research institutions that are generating research results.
They want to put their publications on the Internet, but at the same time they
want to generate income from them. It was not obvious how they could sell
via the Internet. There are all sorts of issues concerning how to collect money
and how to use credit cards. We have the example of APCC Indonesia (the
Asian and Pacific Coconut Community; http://www.apcc.org.sg) selling their
subscriptions to their journal via the Internet. We were surprised to see that a
lot of people were giving credit card numbers without any security. Now the
type of help is how to use credit cards appropriately in Internet transactions.
Another is a study being conducted now to sell Grameen fabrics in
Bangladesh via the Internet. A website must be prepared that will show the
different colors and patterns and how to buy via the Internet. Other content
applications are in distance education in all kinds of fields. MSMEs also
often link to the communication aspect.
But one important criterion for content is to identify the user. Many people
have expressed concern that the content of the Internet is in English. While it is
true that in the beginning it was 100% in English, now we see a number of sites
in Spanish, Russian, and other languages increasing significantly. Alexander
Graham Bell may have invented the telephone but that didn't dictate that it had
to be used in English. We have to take Internet technology as a language-neutral
technology just like the telephone. We can use this technology to build websites
in all different languages depending on the user we intend to serve.
In the area of communication, we have been experimenting with a number
of research networks. It is not always obvious when you hook up a computer
with a modem and connect people that they will know how to communicate and
how to exchange information, even less how they will conduct joint-research
together. We have been supporting a small number of projects to determine the
best way of doing it. It is not easy to find an efficient way of networking.
Finally, the fourth objective is research activity. One aspect has been the
developing of standard fonts when introducing new language for use on the
Internet. For instance, we supported small research in standardizing a Nepalese
font. The other big issue is Internet policies. Internet and information policies
can relate to telecommunications policies and it is raising a whole set of issues
such as human rights and the right to access information. One type of project
we are supporting in Latin America looks at the efficiency of Internet
communication and e-mail communication in the process of governance. We
do not want to communicate just for its own sake. We want to communicate to
make a change, and that is the research issue: how to do it to best enable a
change at a later stage.
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3. IDRC's Acacia program
Marc Van Amerigen
About two years ago IDRC launched one of its most exciting programs in
Africa. Acacia: Communities and the Information Society in Africa aims to
demonstrate that ICT can have an impact on the development needs of
communities in Africa. We identified four key areas that we felt we had to
address if ICTs are going to have an impact on communities. The first was
the policy environment. As in this region, many of the countries in Africa are
facing inefficient monopolies, high prices, and very limited openness in the
policy environment. The second area was the lack of infrastructure, a major
obstacle to ensuring that ICTs do have an impact on communities, from
telephone lines to Internet access tools. The third looked at applications and
content: the premise being that essentially, if you are going to introduce this
technology, the content has to be in local languages; it also has to be
accessible to people, many of whom are illiterate. The final area was how to
use ICT where it can reinforce other major development initiatives going on
in other sectors.
We decided to focus on these areas and on four countries, rather than
spread our resources too thinly. We are putting most of our efforts into
Mozambique in South Africa, Senegal, and Uganda, with some regional
initiatives around those countries. In each of these countries, we recognized
that we needed this to be driven by the stakeholders, not by IDRC as a donor.
Thus, in each, a multi-stakeholder advisory group was set up with the
objective of driving this program. I must say that in some of those countries
it has not been a normal thing — in Mozambique, for example, which has
been a very state-centric society— for trade unions, NGOs, community
leaders, and ministers to sit down together and decide how to deliver our
program. It has taken on quite a whole life of its own, and now we have four
of these multi-stakeholder committees driving the program. In Dakar, we
have recently brought all these stakeholder committees together to share
experiences.
In the kinds of projects we are looking at, our main concerns are how
to get access and how to make this technology accessible. There are two key
access vehicles we have identified as possessing the biggest impacts. The
first one is schools. We have established school networking programs in all
these countries, which are proving to be very effective, doubling the number
of schools that have access to the Internet every couple of months. The
second area is telecenters. A telecenter can be a phone shop with Internet
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access dropped into communities as a way of trying to get people introduced
to the Internet and accessed to telecommunications. Some telecenters are
attached to schools, some to clinics, others to butcher shops; they take all
kinds of different forms.
We are also using our resources in this program to support ongoing
activities. One we are discussing right now is how to use information
communication technologies to support a whole number of human rights
NGOs in southern Africa. Here they can actually have a number of set tools
through CD-ROM and through Internet access to help them in their work.
We collaborate with quite a number of donors in this area. To us, the
big challenge is not the donor committee. It is how you leverage the private
sector, the key actor in this area. How can we get them to join us in a
development agenda? That's really the main challenge we are focusing on
because that is how we will get investment.
We are also looking now at the prospect of whether the ACACIA
program can be expanded to incorporate the MENA region. This is a
discussion going on within IDRC right now.
4. Discussion notes
Capacity-building: Discussions indicated that capacity-building was a
primary concern of all participants. This was considered the main
impediment to extending the availability of, and access to ICTs and to the
effective use of these technologies within the region. The research
community in the region lacks mastery or even appreciation of the kind of
services which can be provided by the web. A participant remarked that even
when they are Internet literate, the weakest point of researchers when it
comes to ICTs is their lack of training on setting up web pages and
disseminating research results through the Internet. Reference was also made
to the need of capacity-building in applications-development and
maintenance of hardware.
Access: Participants commented that problems of accessing, connectivity,
and usage in the MENA region are very significant. Unlike the telephone, the
Internet requires first of all literacy — and then computer literacy. Both have
excluding effects on the number of users, although an area of encouragement
is that the technology is becoming more and more user-friendly all the time.
Usage, in turn, affects the sustainability of the technology: the fewer users
the more expensive is access-per-person. Technologies to reduce cost are
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needed, as well as policies on universal access. A frequent comment was the
need to support open access for the community through training in schools,
and the provision of telecenters, thus leveraging the number of users and type
and quality of usage of the technologies. One participant noted that in some
places a toll-free number was introduced to enable users access to the
Internet for the price of a local call. However, it was also noted that there is
more equipment in the region than there is use, especially effective use. We
are not utilizing what we have in hardware because of the lack of skill to
develop applications and to maintain the equipment. Having computers in
schools and community telecenters is insufficient in itself if much of the
equipment is not in service. Finally, the role of researchers in capacity-
building was discussed and the linking of research with policymakers,
planners, and implementers for greater access to and use of ICTs within
MENA.
Content: Discussion centered on the establishment of proper information
systems within the Arab world in relation to the issues of research and
planning, literacy, and language. Participants agreed that the current lack of
information systems in terms of records, databases, and the recording of
ongoing activities is presenting a serious obstacle to the possibility of doing
up-to-date, sophisticated, and quick research and information-accessing in all
fields. Accordingly, the opportunities for networking between different
countries in MENA are very limited, as they are for professionals and
business people within the region. Fundamental to this issue is the packaging
of specific information for the use of professionals in different fields, and in
the Arabic language. Several participants spoke to the futility of translating
all of the information on the Internet into Arabic, but agreed that Arab
content should be available in the language if it is to be accessed.
Standardization is presently hampering this need, with major software firms
not abiding by the Unicode — the internationally recognized character set
standard— and resulting in several different formats. The building of
websites, the dissemination of research results, and the building of archives
of local, national, and regional concern are crucial to the exchange of
information so-needed in the region. One participant noted that in dealing
with MSME user-needs, he found that over 90% of the information they
needed was of a local nature and not always technological. For the Ministry
of Industry, for those generating information for MSMEs, and for those who
want to develop this sector, it is important to produce information in Arabic
and use the Internet to distribute it. The difficulty facing MSMEs in using the
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Internet to reach outside markets lies, as with other users, in the problems of
literacy, computer literacy, and the fact that so much of the information is in
English and in English-speaking markets. Again, the interdependency of
issues affects the extent of useful ICT content.
Research: The topic of research was broached on two levels: the role of
research in planning for capacity-building, and the problems of dissemination
of research results over the Internet. The lack of information about what
other agencies are doing and what is going on in the region was addressed as
an issue of a need for greater sharing, through the building and maintaining
of websites. These enhance information exchange by permitting access to
pictures of ongoing projects as well as text. The importance of research into
the impacts of ICTs was stressed — the negative along with the positive —
in projects dealing with communication or content development. A project in
India, for example, deals with women issues and measures the impact of the
Internet at the village level, including the potential for teleworking and other
applications. Methodology in relation to research product quality was raised
as a concern. This refers to the need to focus on using both qualitative and
quantitative data in analysis, because the descriptive factors, the "whats,
whys, and hows," are as important as statistics. A shift in the way researchers
see themselves and their role is required: as capacity builders as well as
quality control specialists. This shift can result in meaningful partnerships
between research activities and planning and development. The potential for
capacity-building of institutions might be connected to how we relate and
link the results of research to planners, implementers, and policymakers.
Research results put into simple, direct language (especially if it is in Arabic)
and posted on a website can provide empowering knowledge to these
professionals — and to people in general.
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Chapter 10.
Toward a more Qualified and Pertinent Research Agenda
This publication looks at the significant R&D transformations in the MENA
region during the past two decades and attempts to identify the specific
challenges in the field. Our main concern has been to better understand the
development and research trends of the region and to ensure that our research
programs address at least some of the key emerging development issues of
the future, as identified by our partners, while supporting qualified
approaches to research.
In this final chapter, we attempt to summarize the priority research
areas recommended during the workshop deliberations, as well as suggest
ways to improve our own as well as other donors' support to research in the
region. We have organized these recommendations around the major themes
which emerged from the two-day discussions. The first, on the status of
research and development in the region, focuses mainly on the relationship
between science (or research) and policy (or development). The second
involves specific research needs within the three sectors: social and
economic development, natural resource management, and ICTs.
Narrowing the gap between research and policy:
research on knowledge systems
Flaws in the research and knowledge systems of the region have been
presented and discussed throughout this publication. They converge toward
an ineffective utilization of the already meager scientific assets available, and
hence toward a limited impact of scientific output on development efforts as
well as policy substance in the region. To help address issues of scientific
quality and relevance, one needs to study and evaluate the context of research
as well as research processes and outputs. More specifically, the following
research areas were proposed.
Research quality and management
Participants proposed to identify approaches to improving research quality
through the establishment of a competitive system, the provision of
incentives and awards, and through capacity-building in research and
research management, as well as to capitalize on sources of foreign funding
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to put such systems in place. It was suggested that IDRC provides incentives
to recipient institutions so that once multi-disciplinary teams establish
research frameworks, the work does not end with the project. In terms of
capacity-building, the need to build models of research excellence to upgrade
skills and technology in the region was emphasized.
The broader issue of poor education systems was found to be very
relevant with regard to research quality. While recognizing the immensity of
the task, participants suggested the need for more thinking on the educational
system in the region and on its impact on development.
It was suggested that frameworks for participatory research need
developing, which will address the involvement of active players, the impact
of the research project, and its sustainability. It was further suggested that
models of research evaluation mechanisms must be created, whereby
evaluation criteria and processes are clearly established from the beginning
throughout project implementation, termination and follow-up. The specific
role of IDRC in terms of evaluation was underlined with the plea calling for
strengthening of its evaluation unit. This aspect of impact assessment must
be infused with the idea of sustainable and equal development.
In the funding of research projects, several participants-remarked that
present budget restraints make it worthwhile to convince donors to make
more funds available— and to recognize the high reward for doing so.
Therefore, the significance of coordination among donors was stressed.
Data availability, accessibility and dissemination
Regarding the question of the inadequacy of knowledge diffusion
mechanisms, specifically vis-a-vis policy-makers, participants stressed the
need to study the weak utilization of research results, and to examine new
approaches to better application and dissemination. A suggestion was made
to examine the impact of "development intermediaries." They act on behalf
of scientists and develop communication channels for networking among
themselves, with development agencies and key policymakers in the region.
Advocacy and lobbying has been found to be an effective tool of
knowledge transfer and policy influence. A suggestion was made to support
research on this, and to document best approaches, structures and tools for
lobbying and advocacy. In addition, participants urged IDRC to give
attention to the question of the effectiveness of extension mechanisms, and of
information delivery systems. Research on case studies of success stories and
best practices should be supported, and successful experiences promoted.
CHAPTER 10. A RESEARCH AGENDA 25
A recommendation was also made for donors to encourage, within
their projects, transparency in data dissemination, as well as the preparation
of research results in simple language and practical policy making
implications. In the same vein, donors should encourage their partners to
publish their results in the Arabic language and to utilize the Internet for a
wider dissemination and accessibility of research results.
Participants also discussed the need to strengthen coordination and
partnerships among donors as well as their partners to improve research
impact.
Encouraging and supporting unconventional approaches to research
In light of the drawbacks in the current conventional research systems, it is
important to support other approaches. A number of specific recommendations
were made.
Participants saw a strong role for IDRC in encouraging multidisciplinary
and multisectoral work when dealing with the complex issues of poverty,
employment, or governance, and to pursue research that is closer to the
concerns of policymakers. The relation of research to power was emphasized
in this regard, and the need to promote and support critical social science as the
means to true enlightenment, knowledge and empowerment was noted.
Empowerment of the powerless. Much of the social-science research in the
Arab region is state-led and does not address the real problems of, and
opportunities for, the poor. Participants stressed the need to support more
work aiming at identifying how to enable communities to address their owns
needs through research. A suggestion was made to support comparative
research on community-based and grassroots experimentation, and to identify
successful innovations and approaches. Another recommendation was made
in favor of supporting NGOs, to enable them to put forward credible
alternative-development models and policies. Finally, the need to support
young social scientists within research projects was stressed.
Research on alternative-funding modalities was also recommended.
This includes the exploration of private-funding opportunities, and the study
of Israeli models of research endowments, which are part of the bilateral aid
packages of a number of donor countries. IDRC was requested to work more
diligently in the area of mobilizing local and indigenous sources of funding
for research.
260 CONCLUSION
Sectors of development intervention in the Arab region
Social and economic development
We have summarized the main recommendations of the workshop around the
issues of democracy and governance, MSMEs and poverty eradication, and
socioeconomic impacts of conflicts.
Transitions to democracy and governance. The question of democracy was
raised in diverse ways within the discussions of the workshop, whether in
terms of governmental accountability and transparency, the rule of law and
corruption, or in terms of public participation and empowerment of the poor
and powerless. Recognizing that the issue is sensitive, it was also stressed
that it is very critical for the development prospects of the region.
Participants emphasized the need to analyze the historical, cultural and
sociopolitical dynamics of authoritarian patterns within governmental bodies,
political parties, an within family and traditional civil society structures in
the region. This is needed in order to identify ways to reconcile traditional,
institutional setups with the requirements of good governance and sustainable
development.
On the other hand, it was also stressed that models of good
(democratic) governance are developing in the region (not the least in
Morocco at the political level, and in Palestine at the civil society level) and
that methods need to be explored to export and disseminate these models.
The relationship of social capital to good governance — and to new forms of
public participation in the development process — was also mentioned as a
crucial area for investigation.
MSMEs and poverty eradication. Despite long and intense debates on
MSMEs, there was a general agreement that these play a major role in
employment-generation and poverty-eradication. However, MSMEs also
have to be dealt with as an integral component of a dynamic productive
system that has very strong linkages between small and large enterprises.
The political context of MSME development and their organizational
and associational capacity was considered as crucial for a MSME research
agenda. Means need to be explored to encourage MSMEs to form themselves
into independent associations, which are also not necessarily of the
representative type. This is seen as valuable in order for MSMEs to obtain
voice and power, and so they can collaborate among themselves, with larger
companies and with governments. In addition, there needs to be a lot of work
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done on researching the modes to encourage firms to complement one
another, and achieve a collective economy of scale in many areas.
In view of the opening-up to free trade with Europe and industrial
enterprise, investigations have to be made on the extent to which programs
are being adapted to the needs of MSMEs. There are many "mis-a-nouveau"
programs, but they are more geared for the medium-sized and larger firms. A
more specific research objective was proposed. This was the creation of
questionnaires to study the behavioral aspects of formal and large-scale
enterprises. These could be used across the region and become a standard,
like the household-data questionnaires that, for instance, the World Bank
worked on for a long time.
On the other wing of poverty eradication, human capital-accumulation
(and especially its quality dimensions), has been underscored as a vital
research area, specifically because the poor are getting increasingly excluded
from high-quality education. Finally, it was noted that there is very little
research in the Arab countries on the dynamics of poverty. This kind of
work, which is expensive because of the intensive field work it entails, has to
be co-funded with other donors. It was suggested that IDRC takes a lead to
coordinate with other donors on this issue.
Socioeconomic impacts of conflicts. In addition to internal conflicts, latent
(and sometimes overt) interstate conflicts are prevalent in the region. This is
not only the case of the Israeli-Palestinian or the Israeli-Arab conflict. It also
applies to Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Egypt, and Turkey. Regional economic
cooperation is minimal, capital flows out of the region, and human insecurity
is on the rise. Research questions range from determining the causes and
impacts of protracted conflicts in the region to means of conflict prevention.
This is related to a suggested research area on the obstacles and opportunities
of regional cooperation and the means to develop and promote institutional
arrangement for such cooperation.
Natural resource management
Participants strongly endorsed the program priority on water and the focus on
water demand management, utilization of water of marginal quality,
alternative water supply sources, and institutional development adopted by
IDRC for the region. They called for an expansion of the program in
different directions, some of which are already covered by IDRC programs.
Water quality. Continuous surface and underground water quality
deterioration is receiving inadequate attention, despite becoming a critical
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issue in the region. Little data is available on this aspect of water
management, and even less is known about the impact of poor water-quality
on human health, particularly the poor who are most affected. Participants
urged IDRC to provide more attention to water quality in the future. Given
the region's endowment with large quantities of naturally occurring poor
quality water (brackish water), insufficient attention has been given to the
sustainable utilization of this resource for agricultural or other purposes.
Examples of such activities could include support for biotechnology for the
development of saline-resistant crops, and the use of dual systems for
municipal purposes.
Management of underground water resources. Underground water
management, both centralized and decentralized have, until now, failed to
contribute to the conservation of underground water quantity and quality.
The recent trend toward decentralization of water management has been
implemented without careful definition of the respective roles of states and
citizens. Hence, it has resulted in continuous poor water management.
Research should be undertaken to provide criteria, models, and support tools
for communities and the state while assuming their changing roles.
Although there were no discussions about specific research entry
points around climate change and biodiversity, participants concurred that
these constituted important research areas for the region. The workshop
recommendations include supporting the tenure of expert panels to further
explore these topics.
Information and communication technologies
Participants stressed the need for more IDRC support for ICTs in MENA. In
particular the following recommendations were made.
Research into the application of, ICTs in education. In light of the critical
situation of education in most MENA countries, participants urged IDRC to
support research into the role of ICTs in education, especially in distance
education, and their impact on the schools and universities of the future.
Support content in Arabic. The whole context of dissemination of research
results is very complex one and does not only stem from language problems.
Nevertheless, participants agreed to suggest that the publication of research
results in Arabic in hardcopy, or through the Web, should result in a broader
dissemination and impact in the region.
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Capacity-building. There are immense needs for capacity-building in the area
of ICTs. As it relates to research, participants voiced the need for IDRC to
make a contribution, via its programs, to supporting the building of websites
for the dissemination of research results, and the building of databases of
local, national, and regional concern. A broader research question is to study
how IGTs can help the information and dissemination gaps in the Arab
region.
Editing a collection of works on the research environment in the
MENA region might appear obvious for an institution like IDRC, which
supports research on development in the developing world. The implications,
however, for IDRC's research agenda in the region are enormous and most
challenging. In the course of the year which followed this workshop, IDRC
programming in the MENA region has been nurtured by its rich and strong
substance and messages. Through this collection, and through further
exchange and engagement with our partners, we hope to continue giving our
interventions in the region more proficiency, more relevance, and to
contribute— even if in a modest way— to a qualified and durable
development in the region.
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